PLATO'S PARMENIDES

TEXT, TRANSLATION & INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

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ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ, ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ, ΑΝΤΙΦΩΝ, ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ, ΠΥΘΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΖΗΝΩΝ, ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΣ, ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΗΣ

126 [Κέφαλος]:

Ἐπειδὴ Ἀθήναζε οἴκοθεν ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν ἀφικόμεθα, κατ᾽ ἀγορὰν ἐνετύχομεν Ἀδειμάντῳ τε καὶ Γλαύκωνι· καί μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς ὁ Ἀδείμαντος· " Χαῖρ᾽, " ἔφη, " ὦ Κέφαλε, καὶ εἴ του δέῃ τῶν τῇδε ὧν ἡμεῖς δυνατοί, φράζε."

" Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή," εἶπον ἐγώ, " πάρειμί γε ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, δεησόμενος ὑμῶν."

" Λέγοις ἄν," ἔφη, " τὴν δέησιν."

b Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· " τῷ ἀδελφῷ ὑμῶν τῷ ὁμομητρίῳ τί ἦν ὄνομα; οὐ γὰρ μέμνημαι. παῖς δέ που ἦν, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησα δεῦρο ἐκ Κλαζομενῶν· πολὺς δὲ ἤδη χρόνος ἐξ ἐκείνου. τῷ μὲν γὰρ πατρί, δοκῶ, Πυριλάμπης ὄνομα."

" Πάνυ γε," ἔφη.

" Αὐτῷ δέ γε; "

" Ἀντιφῶν.[1] ἀλλὰ τί μάλιστα πυνθάνει; "

" Οἶδ᾽, " εἶπον ἐγώ, " πολῖταί τ᾽ ἐμοί[2] εἰσι, μάλα φιλόσοφοι, ἀκηκόασί τε ὅτι οὗτος ὁ Ἀντιφῶν Πυθοδώρῳ τινὶ Ζήνωνος ἑταίρῳ
c πολλὰ ἐντετύχηκε, καὶ τοὺς λόγους, οὕς ποτε Σωκράτης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Παρμενίδης διελέχθησαν, πολλάκις ἀκούσας τοῦ Πυθοδώρου ἀπομνημονεύει."

" Ἀληθῆ," ἔφη, " λέγεις."

" Τούτων τοίνυν," εἶπον, " δεόμεθα διακοῦσαι."

" Ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χαλεπόν," ἔφη· " μειράκιον γὰρ ὢν αὐτοὺς εὖ μάλα διεμελέτησεν, ἐπεὶ νῦν γε κατὰ τὸν πάππον τε καὶ ὁμώνυμον πρὸς ἱππικῇ τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβει. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δεῖ, ἴωμεν παρ᾽ αὐτόν· ἄρτι γὰρ ἐνθένδε οἴκαδε οἴχεται, οἰκεῖ δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐν Μελίτῃ."

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1 αὐτῷ δέ γε; ἀντιφῶν B: αὐτῷ δέ γε ἀντιφῶν (spoken by Adeimantus) T.
2 τ᾽ ἐμοι **Stephanus**: τέ μοί T: μοί B.

PARMENIDES

CHARACTERS

Cephalus, Adeimantus, Antiphon, Glaucon, Pythodorus, Socrates, Zeno, Parmenides, Aristoteles

[Cephalus narrates]: 126

When we arrived in Athens from our home in Clazomenae, we ran into Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace. Adeimantus took me by the hand and said, "Welcome, Cephalus, let us know if there is anything here you might need that we can provide."

"Indeed, I am here for that very reason," I replied, "to ask something of you."

"Tell us what it is," he said.

And I replied, "What was the name of your half brother on your b
mother's side? I don't remember it. He would have been a child when I came here from Clazomenae before—and that is now a long time ago. His father's name, I believe, was Pyrilampes."

"It was, indeed," he said.

"And his?"

"Antiphon. But why exactly do you ask?"

"These men here are fellow citizens of mine," I said, "keen philosophers, and they have heard that this Antiphon used to meet frequently with a friend of Zeno's called Pythodorus, and that he has often heard from Pythodorus the conversation that Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides once c
had with one another and can recite it from memory."

"That is true," he said.

"Well," I replied, "we would like to hear it all."

"That should not be difficult," he said. "When Antiphon was a young man, he practiced it diligently, though recently, just like the grandfather he's named after, he devotes most of his time to horses. But if you so wish, let us go to his house. He has just left here to go home; he lives nearby in Melitē."

127 Ταῦτα εἰπόντες ἐβαδίζομεν, καὶ κατελάβομεν τὸν Ἀντιφῶντα οἴκοι, χαλινόν τινα χαλκεῖ ἐκδιδόντα σκευάσαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνου ἀπηλλάγη οἵ τε ἀδελφοὶ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ ὧν ἕνεκα παρεῖμεν, ἀνεγνώρισέ τέ με ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἐπιδημίας καί με ἠσπάζετο, καὶ δεομένων ἡμῶν διελθεῖν τοὺς λόγους, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤκνει—πολὺ γὰρ ἔφη ἔργον εἶναι—ἔπειτα μέντοι διηγεῖτο. ἔφη δὲ δὴ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν λέγειν τὸν
b Πυθόδωρον ὅτι ἀφίκοιντό ποτε εἰς Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα Ζήνων τε καὶ Παρμενίδης. τὸν μὲν οὖν Παρμενίδην εὖ μάλα ἤδη πρεσβύτην εἶναι, σφόδρα πολιόν, καλὸν δὲ κἀγαθὸν τὴν ὄψιν, περὶ ἔτη μάλιστα πέντε καὶ ἑξήκοντα· Ζήνωνα δὲ ἐγγὺς ἐτῶν τετταράκοντα τότε εἶναι, εὐμήκη δὲ καὶ χαρίεντα ἰδεῖν· καὶ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸν παιδικὰ τοῦ
c Παρμενίδου γεγονέναι. καταλύειν δὲ αὐτοὺς ἔφη παρὰ τῷ Πυθοδώρῳ ἐκτὸς τείχους ἐν Κεραμεικῷ· οἷ δὴ καὶ ἀφικέσθαι τόν τε Σωκράτη καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς μετ' αὐτοῦ πολλούς, ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀκοῦσαι τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος γραμμάτων· τότε γὰρ αὐτὰ πρῶτον ὑπ' ἐκείνων κομισθῆναι· Σωκράτη δὲ εἶναι τότε σφόδρα νέον. ἀναγιγνώσκειν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν Ζήνωνα αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ Παρμενίδην τυχεῖν ἔξω ὄντα· καὶ εἶναι πάνυ βραχὺ ἔτι λοιπὸν τῶν λόγων ἀναγιγνωσκομένων, ἡνίκα αὐτός
d τε ἐπεισελθεῖν ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος ἔξωθεν καὶ τὸν Παρμενίδην μετ' αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν τῶν τριάκοντα γενόμενον, καὶ σμίκρ' ἄττα ἔτι ἐπακοῦσαι τῶν γραμμάτων· οὐ μὴν αὐτός γε, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ Ζήνωνος.

Τὸν οὖν Σωκράτη ἀκούσαντα πάλιν τε κελεῦσαι τὴν πρώτην ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ πρώτου λόγου ἀναγνῶναι, καὶ ἀναγνωσθείσης·

e " Πῶς," φάναι, " ὦ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγεις; εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὅμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια οὔτε τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια οἷόν τε εἶναι; οὐχ οὕτω λέγεις; "

" Οὕτω," φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα.

" Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τά τε ἀνόμοια ὅμοια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ πολλὰ εἴη, πάσχοι ἂν τὰ ἀδύνατα. ἆρα τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονταί σου οἱ λόγοι, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμάχεσθαι παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς οὐ πολλά ἐστι; καὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ οἴει σοι τεκμήριον εἶναι ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων, ὥστε καὶ

Having said this, we began walking and found Antiphon at his 127
home, giving a smith a bridle of some kind to work on. When he discharged the smith and his brothers told him why we had come, he recognized me from my earlier visit and greeted me. And when we asked him to repeat the whole conversation, in the beginning he was unwilling—claiming it was a lot of trouble—but eventually he began narrating it.

So Antiphon said that he was told by Pythodorus that Zeno and Parmenides once came for the Great Panathenaea. Parmenides was b
already well along in years, quite white-haired, but of distinguished appearance, about sixty-five years old. Zeno was then approaching forty, a tall and graceful sight—it was said he had been Parmenides' favorite pupil.[3] Antiphon said that they were staying with Pythodorus, in Keramikos, outside the city wall, and that Socrates had come there, c
together with many others, wishing to hear a reading of Zeno's writings, which he and Parmenides had just brought to Athens for the first time. Socrates was then very young. Zeno himself read to them; Parmenides happened to be outside. The reading of the arguments was almost over, Pythodorus said, when he came in from outside together d
with Parmenides and Aristoteles—the man who later became one of the Thirty—and they listened to what little remained to be heard. But Pythodorus himself had heard Zeno read it before.

When the reading was over, Socrates asked Zeno to read the first hypothesis of the first argument again, and when it was read, Socrates said, "Zeno, what do you mean by this: 'if the "things that are" are e
many, they must then be both like and unlike, but that is impossible; for neither can what is unlike be like nor what is like be unlike'? Isn't that what you are saying?"

"It is," said Zeno.

"So, if it is impossible for the unlike to be like and the like to be unlike, then, is it not also impossible for either of them to be many? For if they were many, they would be subjected to many impossibilities. Is this the gist of your arguments, to maintain—despite everything that is [commonly] said[4]—that the 'many are not'? And do you think that each of your arguments is a proof for just that, so that you suppose you have

3 The word *paidika* in this context may indicate that Zeno was not only Parmenides' favorite pupil, but also his lover.

4 Cf. "what is commonly said" with **Parmenides**' *ta dokounta,* B1.31, and the principal aim of a dialectic exercise to target an opinion that is generally accepted.

ἡγεῖ τοσαῦτα τεκμήρια παρέχεσθαι, ὅσουσπερ λόγους γέγραφας, ὡς
128 οὐκ ἔστι πολλά; οὕτω λέγεις, ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὀρθῶς καταμανθάνω; "

" Οὔκ, ἀλλά," φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, " καλῶς συνῆκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα ὃ βούλεται."

" Μανθάνω," εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, " ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὅτι Ζήνων ὅδε οὐ μόνον τῇ ἄλλῃ σου φιλίᾳ βούλεται ὠκειῶσθαι,[5] ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συγγράμματι. ταὐτὸν γὰρ γέγραφε τρόπον τινὰ ὅπερ[6] σύ, μεταβάλλων δὲ ἡμᾶς πειρᾶται ἐξαπατᾶν ὡς ἕτερόν τι λέγων. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
b ποιήμασιν ἓν φῂς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχει καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ· ὅδε δὲ αὖ οὐ πολλά φησιν εἶναι, τεκμήρια δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς παμπολλα καὶ παμμεγέθη παρέχεται. τὸ οὖν τὸν μὲν ἓν φάναι, τὸν δὲ μὴ πολλά, καὶ οὕτως ἑκάτερον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέγοντας ταὐτά, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρῆσθαι."

" Ναί," φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα, " ὦ Σώκρατες. σὺ δ' οὖν τὴν
c ἀλήθειαν τοῦ γράμματος οὐ πανταχοῦ ᾔσθησαι· καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναι σκύλακες εὖ μεταθεῖς τε καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν σε τοῦτο λανθάνει, ὅτι οὐ παντάπασιν οὕτω σεμνύνεται τὸ γράμμα, ὥστε ἅπερ σὺ λέγεις διανοηθὲν γραφῆναι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δὲ ἐπικρυπτόμενον ὥς τι μέγα διαπραττόμενον· ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν εἶπες τῶν συμβεβηκότων τι, ἔστι δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς
d τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμῳδεῖν ὡς εἰ ἕν ἐστι, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὑτῷ. ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταὐτὰ[7] καὶ πλείω τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἢ ἡ

5 οἰκειῶσθαι BT: corr B^2t.
6 ὅπερ **Proclus**: ὕνπερ B: ὅ*περ T.
7 ταὐτὰ **Schleiermacher**: ταῦτα B: om. T.

provided as many proofs that 'the many are not', as you have written down arguments? Is this what you are saying—or did I misunderstand?" 128
"No," Zeno replied. "Quite the contrary, you have grasped well the general intent of the work."
"Parmenides," Socrates said, "I understand that Zeno here wants to associate himself with you not only in friendship but also otherwise with his writings. For he has, in a way, written the same thing as you, but by reversing it he tries to deceive us into thinking he is saying something different. You say in your poems 'the all is one', and you b
provide excellent and fine proofs of this. He, in turn, says that 'it is not many' and he himself also provides a vast number of very great proofs. So while the one says 'one', and the other 'not many'—and though you almost say the same—you seem in this way to have said nothing of the same. Thus to the rest of us, it seems that what you have said is quite beyond us."
"Yes, Socrates," said Zeno. "Still, you haven't fully perceived the truth c
about my work, even though you track down its arguments as the Spartan hounds do, following their traces swiftly. First, you have missed this point: the work does not pride itself on having been written with the intent you have ascribed to it, namely, disguising itself from people, as if that were some great accomplishment. What you have mentioned is merely accidental. The truth is that the work provides support for Parmenides' argument against those who try to make fun of it by claiming that 'if d
it[8] is one', many absurdities and contradictions follow that argument.[9] My work speaks against the advocates of the many and pays them back the same and more, since it aims to show that their hypothesis, 'if it is many', would, if someone examined it thoroughly, suffer even more absurdities than those suffered by the hypothesis 'if[10] it is one'. It was out of such love of combat,[11] while I was still young, that I wrote it. Someone stole it after it was written, so I did not even have a chance to consider e

8 "If the *all* is one," see πᾶν above in 128a.
9 Compare Socrates' claims regarding *hen* (in 128a–b) to Zeno's "if it is one" (εἰ ἕν ἐστι) in 128d, and "it is one" (ἓν εἶναι, also 128d) to Parmenides' "whether it is one (or not one)" (εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν) in 137b and what must be considered the standard formulation "if it is one" (εἰ ἕν ἐστιν) in 137c, the expressed object of inquiry at the beginning of Argument I. (See also **Gill**, *Plato:* Parmenides, 66; **Kahn**, *Parmenides* chapter [a work in progress on Plato's later dialogues].)
10 Although it is only implied in the Greek, we have retained the "if" clause of the hypothesis in order to remain true to previous formulations, instead of adapting "*that* it is one," i.e., a more modern form of presenting a hypothesis.
11 The word *philoneikia* literally means the 'love of quarrel'.

τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίοι. διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονικίαν ὑπὸ
e νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καί τις αὐτὸ ἔκλεψε γραφέν, ὥστε οὐδὲ
βουλεύσασθαι ἐξεγένετο εἴτ' ἐξοιστέον αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ φῶς εἴτε μή. ταύτῃ
οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου φιλονικίας οἴει αὐτὸ
γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας· ἐπεί, ὅπερ γ' εἶπον,
οὐ κακῶς ἀπείκασας."

" Ἀλλ' ἀποδέχομαι," φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, " καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ὡς λέγεις
ἔχειν. τόδε δέ μοι εἰπέ· οὐ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ εἶδός τι
129 ὁμοιότητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον, ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον·
τούτοιν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τἆλλα ἃ δὴ πολλὰ καλοῦμεν
μεταλαμβάνειν; καὶ τὰ μὲν τῆς ὁμοιότητος μεταλαμβάνοντα ὅμοια
γίγνεσθαι ταύτῃ τε καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἂν μεταλαμβάνῃ, τὰ
δὲ τῆς ἀνομοιότητος ἀνόμοια, τὰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα; εἰ δὲ καὶ
πάντα ἐναντίων ὄντων ἀμφοτέρων μεταλαμβάνει, καὶ ἔστι τῷ μετέχειν
b ἀμφοῖν ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς, τί θαυμαστόν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ
αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά τις ἀπέφαινεν ἀνόμοια γιγνόμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὅμοια,
τέρας ἄν, οἶμαι, ἦν· εἰ δὲ τὰ τούτων μετέχοντα ἀμφοτέρων ἀμφότερα
ἀποφαίνει πεπονθότα, οὐδὲν ἔμοιγε, ὦ Ζήνων, ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐδέ
γε εἰ ἓν ἅπαντα ἀποφαίνει τις τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα
πολλὰ τῷ πλήθους αὖ μετέχειν· ἀλλ' εἰ ὃ ἔστιν ἕν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πολλὰ
c ἀποδείξει καὶ αὖ τὰ πολλὰ δὴ ἕν, τοῦτο ἤδη θαυμάσομαι. καὶ περὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὡσαύτως· εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη ἐν αὐτοῖς
ἀποφαίνοι τἀναντία ταῦτα πάθη πάσχοντα, ἄξιον θαυμάζειν· εἰ δ'
ἐμὲ ἕν τις ἀποδείξει ὄντα καὶ πολλά, τί θαυμαστόν, λέγων, ὅταν μὲν
βούληται πολλὰ ἀποφαίνειν, ὡς ἕτερα μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ δεξιά μού ἐστιν, ἕτερα
δὲ τὰ ἐπ' ἀριστερά, καὶ ἕτερα μὲν τὰ πρόσθεν, ἕτερα δὲ τὰ ὄπισθεν,
d καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ὡσαύτως· πλήθους γὰρ, οἶμαι, μετέχω· ὅταν δὲ ἕν,
ἐρεῖ ὡς ἑπτὰ ἡμῶν ὄντων εἷς ἐγώ εἰμι ἄνθρωπος μετέχων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός·

whether or not it should see the light. So in this way you have missed the point, Socrates: you think it was written not out of a young man's love of combat, but out of a mature man's love of honors. Still, as have I said, you portrayed it quite well."

"I accept," Socrates said, "and I believe it was as you say. But tell me, do you not think that there is a Form, itself by itself,[12] of 'likeness', and in the same way, another Form opposite of it that is 'unlike', and 129
that in these two, you and I and the other things we call many, participate? And do things that participate in likeness become like in the manner and to the extent that they participate in [likeness], whereas those that participate in unlikeness become unlike, and those that participate in both become both? And even if all [things] partake in both in spite of being opposites, and if by participating in both they are both like and unlike themselves, what is astonishing about that? But if someone showed that the likes themselves come to be unlike or b
the unlikes like, now that would be a wondrous thing in my opinion. If he shows, however, that the *things* that partake in both of these [the like and unlike] are subjected to both, for me there is nothing strange about that, Zeno—not even if he shows that all things are one by participating in the one, and that the same [all things] are also many by participating in multitude. But if he demonstrates that that which is one is *itself* many, and in turn that the many is one, then I will be c
astonished at that. And likewise for all the other things of the same character: if he showed that the Kinds and Forms in and by themselves would be subjected to these opposite qualifications,[13] this would merit astonishment. But if someone should show that I am both one and many, what is so astonishing about that? When he intends to show that I am many, he says that my right side is different from my left, and my front different from my back, and likewise with my upper and lower parts—for, I believe, I do partake of multitude. But when he intends to show that I am one [thing], he will say I am one man d
among the seven of us; since I also partake of oneness, he therefore proves both to be true. So if someone attempts to show that the same things—such as stones and sticks and the like—are [both] many and one, then we will say that he demonstrates these to be many and one,

12 Cf. **Parmenides** B8.29.

13 *Pathos* is translated here as 'qualification' instead of the literal but obsolete 'affection'. We choose this not in an attempt to evoke Aristotelian terminology but to establish, as far as possible, a rendering in English that, while being both literal and consistent, also reflects modern English usage.

ὥστε ἀληθῆ ἀποφαίνει ἀμφότερα. ἐὰν οὖν τις τοιαῦτα ἐπιχειρῇ πολλὰ καὶ ἓν ταὐτὰ ἀποφαίνειν, λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, φήσομεν αὐτὸν πολλὰ καὶ ἓν ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ οὐδὲ τὰ πολλὰ ἕν, οὐδέ τι θαυμαστὸν λέγειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅπερ ἂν πάντες ὁμολογοῖμεν· ἐὰν δέ τις, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, πρῶτον μὲν διαιρῆται χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ
e τὰ εἴδη, οἷον ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότητα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ στάσιν καὶ κίνησιν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφαίνῃ, ἀγαίμην ἂν ἔγωγ᾽, " ἔφη, " θαυμαστῶς, ὦ Ζήνων. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνδρείως μὲν πάνυ ἡγοῦμαι πεπραγματεῦσθαι· πολὺ μέντ᾽ ἂν ὧδε μᾶλλον, ὡς λέγω, ἀγασθείην, εἴ τις ἔχοι τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἀπορίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς εἴδεσι
130 παντοδαπῶς πλεκομένην, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις διήλθετε, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς λογισμῷ λαμβανομένοις ἐπιδεῖξαι."

Λέγοντος δή, ἔφη ὁ Πυθόδωρος, τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα αὐτὸς μὲν ἂν[14] οἴεσθαι ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου ἄχθεσθαι τόν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα, τοὺς δὲ πάνυ τε αὐτῷ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ θαμὰ εἰς ἀλλήλους βλέποντας μειδιᾶν ὡς ἀγαμένους τὸν Σωκράτη. ὅπερ οὖν
b καὶ παυσαμένου αὐτοῦ εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην· " ὦ Σώκρατες," φάναι, " ὡς ἄξιος εἶ ἄγασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους. καί μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διῄρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα; καί τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἓν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νῦν δὴ Ζήνωνος ἤκουες; "

" Ἔμοιγε," φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

" Ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιάδε," εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, " οἷον δικαίου τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν τοιούτων; "

" Ναί," φάναι.

14 ἂν add. **Burnet**.

and not that 'the one' is many, nor 'the many' one, nor that he is saying anything astonishing, but rather what everybody could agree to. But if someone first distinguishes the Forms, themselves by themselves, separately from the things I have just mentioned [i.e., stones, sticks]—such as 'likeness' and 'unlikeness', 'multitude' and 'oneness', 'rest' and 'motion',[15] and everything of this kind—and afterwards shows that in e
themselves these can be combined and separated, then, Zeno," he said, "I for one would be very much astonished. Now, I believe you have dealt with these matters quite boldly. But, as I say, I would be much more amazed if someone were able to demonstrate that this very same difficulty—which you and Parmenides went through on behalf of the 130
visible things—is also interwoven in omnifarious ways in the Forms themselves, and thus in things that are grasped by reasoning."[16]

While Socrates was saying this, Pythodorus said, he himself thought that Parmenides and Zeno would become irritated with each word; instead, they both paid close attention to Socrates and frequently exchanged glances and smiled as though they admired him. In fact, when Socrates had finished, Parmenides said: "Socrates, how admirable b
is your zest for argument! But tell me: do you yourself draw the distinction you speak of, separating on one hand certain Forms by themselves, and on the other the things that partake of them? And do you think that 'likeness' itself is something [entirely] separate from the likeness that we share? And also 'one' and 'many' and all the [other] things you heard just now from Zeno?"

"Yes, I do," said Socrates.

"And of such, too, there is a Form, itself by itself, of 'just' and 'beautiful' and 'good' and everything of that kind?"

"Yes," he replied.

15 Plato uses *kinēsis* or 'change' here instead of *pheresthai* 'change of place' (cf. 138b–138c). But as the relevant arguments demonstrate (cf. Part II), 'motion' is the proper counterpart to 'rest', not 'change'.

16 By asking for a demonstration of combining and separating the qualifications/qualifiers/Forms, Socrates is requesting a kind of demonstration that, as it turns out, only the Eight Arguments of the Second Part can offer; cf. Argument I, IV, VI, and VIII for 'separating' (i.e., 'neither/nor'), and II, III, V, and VII for 'combining' (i.e., 'both'). This is one of the clues to the link between the so-called First Part of the dialogue and the Second. Thus, the problems posed by the First Part are answered by the Second.

c " Τί δ', ἀνθρώπου εἶδος χωρὶς ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν οἷοι ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν πάντων, αὐτό τι εἶδος ἀνθρώπου ἢ πυρὸς ἢ καὶ ὕδατος; "

" Ἐν ἀπορίᾳ," φάναι, " πολλάκις δή, ὦ Παρμενίδη, περὶ αὐτῶν γέγονα, πότερα χρὴ φάναι ὥσπερ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢ ἄλλως."

" Ἦ καὶ περὶ τῶνδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ καὶ γελοῖα δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, οἷον θρὶξ καὶ πηλὸς καὶ ῥύπος ἢ ἄλλο τι ἀτιμότατόν τε καὶ
d φαυλότατον, ἀπορεῖς εἴτε χρὴ φάναι καὶ τούτων ἑκάστου εἶδος εἶναι χωρίς, ὃν ἄλλο αὖ τῶν ὧν[17] ἡμεῖς μεταχειριζόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ μή; "

" Οὐδαμῶς," φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, " ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν γε ἅπερ ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δέ τι αὐτῶν οἰηθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ᾖ ἄτοπον. ἤδη μέντοι ποτέ με καὶ ἔθραξε μή τι ᾖ περὶ πάντων ταὐτόν· ἔπειτα ὅταν ταύτῃ στῶ, φεύγων οἴχομαι, δείσας μή ποτε εἴς τινα βυθὸν φλυαρίας[18] ἐμπεσὼν διαφθαρῶ· ἐκεῖσε δ' οὖν ἀφικόμενος, εἰς ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εἴδη ἔχειν, περὶ ἐκεῖνα πραγματευόμενος διατρίβω."

e " Νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι," φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, " ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὔπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἔτι πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

Τόδε οὖν μοι εἰπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῄς, εἶναι εἴδη ἄττα, ὧν τάδε τὰ
131 ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαβόντα ὅμοια, μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, κάλλους δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι; "

" Πάνυ γε," φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

" Οὐκοῦν ἤτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἴδους ἢ μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον μεταλαμβάνει; ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο; "

" Καὶ πῶς ἄν; " εἶπεν.

" Πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἓν ὄν, ἢ πῶς; "

" Τί γὰρ κωλύει," φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, " ὦ Παρμενίδη, ἐνεῖναι[19]; "

b " Ἓν ἄρα ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη."

17 αὖ τῶν ὧν **Heindorf**: αὐτῶν ἢ ὧν BT.
18 φλυαρίας Par. 1836, **Proclus** (CD), Syenesius, Origines: φλυαρίαν BT.
19 ἐνεῖναι **Schleiermacher**: ἓν εἶναι BT: secl. **Burnet**.

"What about a Form of 'human being', distinct from us, and all those like us? Is there by itself a Form of 'human being', or of 'fire', or else of 'water'?" c
Socrates said, "I have indeed often been puzzled about these, Parmenides, whether I should speak about them in the same way as I speak about the others [above] or differently."
"And what about these, Socrates, things that might appear ludicrous, like 'hair' and 'mud' and 'dirt', or anything else altogether worthless and base? Are you puzzled whether or not you should say that there is d
a distinct Form for each of these also, one which is again other than anything we can grasp with our hands?"
"Not at all," Socrates answered. "These things are indeed precisely what we are seeing. But to even suppose that there is some Form for them would be utterly absurd. Still, I am troubled at times whether the same [principle] shouldn't apply in all cases. I then get stuck at this point, only to scurry away fearing that I might fall into a pit of nonsense and come to harm. But when I return to the things we just said have Forms, I abide there and devote myself to them."
"That is because you are still young, Socrates," said Parmenides, "and e
philosophy has not taken hold of you yet as, in my opinion, it will in the future, once you stop belittling any of these things. Now, though, you still care about other people's opinions because of your age. But tell me, do you think that, as you say, there are certain Forms, from which these other things, by participation, derive their names, as, for 131
instance, by partaking of 'likeness' they become 'like', by partaking of 'largeness' they become 'large', by partaking of 'beauty' and 'justice', they become 'beautiful' and 'just'?"
"Certainly," Socrates replied.
"So does each thing that partakes of a Form partake of the whole [Form] or [only] of part of it? Or could there be some other means of partaking aside from these?"
"How could there be?" he said.
"Do you believe, then, that the Form as a whole—since it is one—is in each of the many, or what?"
"What is to prevent it from being in [each], Parmenides?" said Socrates.
"So, being one and the same, it will be, as a whole, simultaneously in b
things that are many and separate, and consequently, [the Form] would be separate from itself."

" Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε," φάναι, " οἷον[20] ἡμέρα[21] μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὑτῆς χωρίς ἐστιν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἓν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταὐτὸν εἴη."

" Ἡδέως γε," φάναι, " ὦ Σώκρατες, ἓν ταὐτὸν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἷον εἰ ἱστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς
c εἶναι ὅλον. ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγεῖ λέγειν; "

" Ἴσως," φάναι.

" Ἦ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ τὸ ἱστίον εἴη ἄν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ' ἄλλῳ; "

" Μέρος."

" Μεριστὰ ἄρα," φάναι, " ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἑκάστου ἂν εἴη."

" Φαίνεται οὕτω γε."

" Ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἓν ἔσται; "

" Οὐδαμῶς," εἰπεῖν.

d " Ὅρα γάρ, φάναι· " εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει σμικροτέρῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἆρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανεῖται; "

" Πάνυ γ', " ἔφη.

" Τί δέ; τοῦ ἴσου μέρος[22] ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἕξει ᾧ ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου τὸ ἔχον ἴσον τῳ ἔσται; "

" Ἀδύνατον."

" Ἀλλὰ τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἕξει, τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται ἅτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ
e τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται· ᾧ δ' ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἔσται ἀλλ' οὐ μεῖζον ἢ πρίν."

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20 οἷον εἰ BT: οἷον **Proclus**.
21 ἡμέρα εἴη BT: εἴη secl. **Heindorf**.
22 μέρος **Proclus**: μέρους BT (corr. t).

"No, it would not," he replied. "At least not if it were like the one and the same day, which is in many places simultaneously, without at all being separate from itself. If it is in this way, each of the Forms too might be, simultaneously, one and the same in all things."
"How nicely, Socrates," he said, "you make one and the same thing be in many places at the same time! It is as if you were to spread a sail over many people, and then claim that one thing as a whole is over many. Or is this not the sort of thing you suggest?" c
"Perhaps," he replied.
"Now, then, would the sail be, as a whole, over each person, or part of it over one and another part over another?"
"Part."
"So the Forms themselves are divisible, Socrates," he said, "and things that partake of them would partake of a part; and no longer would a whole [Form] be in each thing, but only a part of it."
"It does appear that way."
"Well then, Socrates, are you now willing to assert that the one Form is in truth divided for us, and [then] will it still be one?"
"In no way," he replied.
"For consider this," Parmenides said. "If you divide 'largeness' itself, d and each of the many large things is to be large by virtue of being a *part* of 'largeness', which [in turn] is smaller than 'largeness' itself—will this not seem nonsensical?"
"It certainly will," he replied.
"What about this? Will each thing that has received a small part of 'the equal' possess something that makes it equal to anything else, when what it has is *less* than 'the equal' itself?"
"That is impossible."
"But suppose that one of us will have a part of 'the small'. 'The small' itself will be larger than this part, since the latter is a part of it, and thus 'the small' [itself] will be 'large'. But if what was taken away [from 'the small'] is added to anything, *that* will be smaller, and not larger, e than it was before."[23]

23 Plato aims to demonstrate that one cannot apply physical criteria to abstracts, just as before he showed that abstract criteria cannot be applied to tangible things.

" Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο," φάναι, " τοῦτό γε."

" Τίνα οὖν τρόπον," εἰπεῖν, " ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα; "

" Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία," φάναι, " οὔ μοι δοκεῖ εὔκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι."

" Τί δὲ δή; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις; "

" Τὸ ποῖον; "

132 Οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἓν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πόλλ' ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἓν τὸ μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι."

" Ἀληθῆ λέγεις," φάναι.

" Τί δ' αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς, οὐχὶ ἕν τι αὖ μέγα φανεῖται, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα ἀνάγκη[24] μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι; "

" Ἔοικεν."

" Ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρ' αὐτό τε τὸ
b μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἓν ἕκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλ' ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος."

" Ἀλλά," φάναι, " ὦ Παρμενίδη," τὸν Σωκράτη, " μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ᾖ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ[25] ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἕν γε ἕκαστον εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσχοι ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο."

" Τί οὖν; " φάναι, " ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός; "

" Ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον," εἰπεῖν.

" Ἀλλὰ τινός; "

" Ναί."

24 ἀνάγκη om. B.

25 προσήκῃ **Proclus**: προσήκει BT.

"This could not happen," he said.
"Then in what way, Socrates," he said, "will the other things partake of your Forms, if they cannot partake of them either as parts or as wholes?"
"By Zeus!" Socrates said. "This sort of thing seems to me not entirely easy to determine!"
"What then? And what do you think of this?"
"Of what?"
"I suppose you believe that each Form is *one* for the following reason: 132
whenever a number of things appear to you to be large, it would seem that the one and the same concept applies to all of them; therefore, you would presume that 'the large' is one [i.e., a singular concept]."
"What you say is true," he said.
"Yet what about 'the large' [itself] and the other things that are large? If you regard all things the same way in your mind's eye, will not yet again one large [thing] make its appearance by which all those [things] necessarily appear large?"
"So it would seem."
"So another Form of 'largeness' will appear again alongside the 'largeness' that has come to be and the things that partake in it; and, in b
addition to all those still another [will appear] by reason of which all those will be large. So each of your Forms will no longer be one, but unlimited in multitude."[26]
"But, Parmenides," said Socrates, "perhaps each of the Forms is [simply] a thought [about these things], and it would not be proper for it to occur anywhere else but in our minds.[27] In this way, each of them would be one and no longer would be affected by what was just said."[28]
"What then?" Parmenides asked. "Is each of these thoughts one, but yet a thought[29] of nothing?"
"No, that's impossible," he said.
"Of something, rather?"
"Yes."

26 I.e., an indefinite number.
27 Noetic part of the soul; cf. the *Phaedo*.
28 Cf. **Parmenides** B4: "things . . . securely present to the mind," not affected by being "dispersed" or "gathered."
29 I.e., the thought itself.

c " Ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος; "

" Ὄντος."

" Οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ,[30] μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν; "

" Ναί."

" Εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἓν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; "

" Ἀνάγκη αὖ φαίνεται."

" Τί δὲ δή; " εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, " οὐκ ἀνάγκη ᾗ[31] τἆλλα φῂς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα
d νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; "

" Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο," φάναι, " ἔχει λόγον, ἀλλ', ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα, καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς."

" Εἰ οὖν τι," ἔφη, " ἔοικεν τῷ εἴδει, οἷόν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ' ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον εἶναι; "

e " Οὐκ ἔστι."

" Τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἆρ' οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους μετέχειν; "

" Ἀνάγκη."

" Οὗ δ' ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾖ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος; "

" Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν."

" Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἴδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό
133 τῳ ὅμοιον ᾖ,[32] ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἀεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται."

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30 ἐπὸν νοεῖ **Proclus** (Cod. B): ἐπὸν νοεῖν T: εἶπὸν νοεῖν B.

31 ἀνάγκη ᾗ **Waddell**: ἀνάγκη ᾗ B: ἀναγκη ᾗ T: ἀνάγκη εἰ **Proclus**.

32 ᾖ] ἢ BT.

"Of something that is, or of something that is not?"[33] c
"Of something that is."
"Is it not of some *one* thing which that thought thinks as appertaining to all cases, by being some single idea?"
"Yes."
"Then will not this thing that is thought to be one—and always the same with respect to all cases—be a Form?"
"That seems necessary, again."
"And what about this?" said Parmenides. "Given the necessity by which you say the other things partake of the Forms, do you think that each thing is composed of thoughts and all things think, or that, although they are thoughts, they are unthinking?"[34]
"But that, too, is not reasonable, Parmenides," he said. "No, what seems d
most likely to me is this: these Forms are like patterns set in nature, and the other things resemble them and are likenesses [replicas] of them. For the other things, this partaking of the Forms turns out to be no different than being likened to them."
"Then if something resembles the Form," Parmenides said, "can that Form not be like what has been likened to it, to the extent that the thing has been made like it? Or, rather, is there any device by which 'the like' is not like its like?"
"No, there is not."
"And must not of necessity 'the like' partake of one and the same e
Form, as its like?"
"It must."
"And will that in which 'the like' are [made] like by participation, not be the Form itself?"
"Certainly."
"Therefore, nothing can be like the Form, nor the Form like anything else.[35] Otherwise, another Form will always appear alongside the Form, and if that Form is [also] *like* anything, yet another [will appear]; and 133
a new Form will never cease coming to be, if the Form comes to be like that which partakes of it."

33 Cf. **Parmenides** B8.16.
34 The adjective *anoētos* can be interpreted either as 'unthinking' or as 'unthought', depending on its form—real, potential, active, or passive, respectively.
35 An argument for the 'metaphysical bookend', which cannot be yet another book. See **Hermann**, "Above Being" (work in progress) for details.

" Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις."

" Οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τἆλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει."

" Ἔοικεν."

" Ὁρᾷς οὖν," φάναι, " ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅση ἡ ἀπορία ἐάν τις ὡς εἴδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ διορίζηται; "

" Καὶ μάλα."

b " Εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθι," φάναι, " ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἅπτει αὐτῆς ὅση ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, εἰ ἓν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἀεί τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις."

" Πῶς δή; " εἰπεῖν.

" Πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα," φάναι, " μέγιστον δὲ τόδε. εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γιγνώσκεσθαι ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν μὲν τύχοι ἔμπειρος ὢν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφυής, ἐθέλοι
c δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἕπεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπίθανος εἴη ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι."

" Πῇ δή, ὦ Παρμενίδη; " φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

" Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτήν τινα καθ' αὑτὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογῆσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν."

" Πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἔτι εἴη; " φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

" Καλῶς λέγεις," εἰπεῖν. " οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὑτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ
d παρ' ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα· τὰ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτα ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις αὐτὰ αὑ πρὸς αὑτά ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἴδη, καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως."

" Πῶς λέγεις; " φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.

"Very true."
"And so, if it is not by [way of] likeness that the other things partake of the Forms, then we must seek some other [way] by which they partake."[36]
"So it seems."
"You see then, Socrates," he said, "how great the difficulty is if one singles out the Forms as things by themselves?"
"Certainly, I do."
"Be well aware," he said, "that you have not yet grasped, if I may say so, how great the difficulty is, if you postulate a single Form every time you make a distinction between each of the 'things that are'." b
"How so?" he asked.
"There are many other difficulties as well," Parmenides said, "but the greatest one is this: if someone were to say that the Forms—such as we claim they must be—are not even fit to be known, one would be unable to prove him wrong, unless the disputer happened to be widely experienced and not unintelligent, and also willing to follow the proof through numerous remote arguments. Otherwise, the person who requires that they be unknowable would remain unconvinced." c
"How so, Parmenides?" Socrates asked.
"Because, Socrates, I believe that you or anyone else who postulates for each thing some [sort of] being, *itself by itself*, would agree, first of all, that none of these is in us."
"For [if it were,] how could it then still be itself by itself?" said Socrates.
"Well said," replied Parmenides. "And so those Forms, which are what they are in relation to one another, have their being in relation to themselves, but not in relation to the likenesses that are amongst us—or as whatever one may establish them—and by partaking of which we come to be named after them. And these things amongst us, though they bear the same names as the Forms, are in turn what they are in relation to themselves, but not in relation to the Forms; and again, they receive their names after themselves and not after the Forms." d
"What do you mean?" Socrates asked.

36 Is 'likeness' here suggestive of an inferior epistemological approach, as is suggested by the Parmenidean Doxa, i.e., not truth but an approximation of truth?

" Οἷον," φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, " εἴ τις ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δοῦλός
e ἐστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου δή που, ὃ ἔστι δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δοῦλός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δούλου, ὃ ἔστι δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφότερα ταῦτά ἐστίν· αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστι, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως αὐτὴ δουλεία αὐτῆς δεσποτείας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ
134 ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὑτῶν καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως πρὸς ἑαύτά. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω; "

" Πάνυ γ', " εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, " μανθάνω."

" Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη," φάναι, " αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη; "

" Πάνυ γε."

" Ἑκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἣ ἔστιν, ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἴη ἂν ἐπιστήμη· ἢ οὔ; "

" Ναί."

" Ἡ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη,
b καὶ αὖ ἑκάστη ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἑκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι; "

" Ἀνάγκη."

" Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἴδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρ' ἡμῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι."

" Οὐ γὰρ οὖν."

" Γιγνώσκεται δέ γέ που ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἔστιν ἕκαστα; "

" Ναί."

" Ὅ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν."

" Οὐ γάρ."

" Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν."

" Οὐκ ἔοικεν."

c " Ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν."

" Κινδυνεύει."

"For instance," said Parmenides, "if one of us is someone's master or slave, he is certainly not a slave of 'master' itself—of what it is to be master—nor is the master a master of 'slave' itself—of what it is to be slave. Rather, being a human being, it is of a human being that he is e
both [i.e., master or slave]. Yet 'mastery' itself is what it is in relation to 'slavery' itself; likewise, 'slavery' itself is slavery in relation to 'mastery' itself. But the things amongst us do not have their capacity in relation to the Forms, nor do these have theirs in relation to us, but, as I say, the Forms are what they are of themselves and in relation to themselves, and, in the same fashion, the things amongst us are what they 134
are in relation to themselves. Or don't you understand what I mean?"
"Certainly," Socrates said, "I understand."
"So, too, knowledge itself," he said. "Wouldn't what it is to be knowledge be knowledge of that which is truth itself?"
"Indeed."
"And, in turn, each particular item of knowledge that is, would be knowledge of some particular thing that is. Or not?"
"Yes."
"But wouldn't the knowledge amongst us be of the truth that is amongst us? And again, wouldn't each particular knowledge amongst us be b
knowledge of each of the particular things amongst us?"
"Necessarily."
"But, as you agree, we neither possess the Forms themselves, nor can they be amongst us."
"No, they cannot."
"And the Kinds themselves, what each of them is, are known somehow by the Form itself of 'knowledge'?"
"Yes."
"Which we do not possess."
"No, we do not."
"Then none of the Forms is known by us, since we do not partake of 'knowledge' itself."
"It seems not."
"So 'the beautiful' itself, as it is, and 'the good', and, indeed, any of the c
things we consider to be ideals[37] in themselves, are for us unknowable."
"I am afraid so."

37 The word *ideas* is here rendered as 'ideal' in the sense of 'idea or archetype' (see the definition of 'ideal', *Oxford English Dictionary,* A 1.a, and its Platonic connotation), in the belief that it comes closest to what Plato had in mind.

" Ὅρα δὴ ἔτι τοὔτου δεινότερον τόδε."

" Τὸ ποῖον; "

" Φαίης ἄν που,[38] εἴπερ ἔστιν αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κάλλος καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτως."

" Ναί."

" Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἄν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην; "

" Ἀνάγκη."

d " Ἆρ' οὖν οἷός τε αὖ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν γιγνώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων; "

" Τί γὰρ οὔ; "

" Ὅτι," ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, " ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μήτ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἴδη πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἣν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτὰ ἑκάτερα."

" Ὡμολόγηται γάρ."

" Οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὔτ' ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων
e ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὔτ' ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίη οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τ' ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γιγνώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπόται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γιγνώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες."

" Ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν," ἔφη, " θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος ᾖ,[39] εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσει[40] τοῦ εἰδέναι."

" Ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες," ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης,
135 " καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὁριεῖταί τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος· ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὔτε ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴ τε ὅτι μάλιστα εἴη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα· καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τὶ λέγειν, καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσανάπειστον εἶναι. καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ
b δυνησομένου μαθεῖν ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἑκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὑρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον."

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38 που T: ἢ οὖ B.

39 ᾖ add. **Heindorf**.

40 ἀποστερήσει **Stephanus**: ἀποστερήσειε BT.

"Now consider something even more dreadful than this."
"What is it?"
"You would admit, somehow, that if in fact there is such a Kind as 'knowledge' itself, it is much more exact than the knowledge amongst us. And likewise with 'beauty' and all the rest."
"Yes."
"So, if anything else partakes of knowledge itself, wouldn't you admit that God more than anyone else possesses the most exact knowledge?"
"Necessarily."
"Then again, will God, who possesses 'knowledge' itself, be able to d
know the things that are amongst us?"
"Yes, why not?"
"Because," Parmenides said, "we have agreed, Socrates, that neither do those Forms have their capacity in relation to things amongst us, nor do the things amongst us have theirs in relation to the Forms, but each of the two Kinds [has it] in relation to itself."
"Yes, we did agree."
"Well, if this most exact mastery itself and this most exact knowledge itself belong to the divine, then their [i.e., the gods'] mastery could never master us, nor their knowledge know us nor anything else that is e
amongst us. Just as we do not rule over them by the rule that is amongst us, nor know anything of the divine by means of our knowledge, so they, in turn, by the same reasoning, are neither our masters, nor, being gods, do they know human affairs."
"But surely," he said, "if God is to be deprived of knowing, our argument would be too strange."
"And yet, Socrates," said Parmenides, "these difficulties are necessarily involved in the Forms, and still many more besides them—if these are 135
the concepts for the 'things that are' and someone delimits each Form as 'something by itself'. Thus, whoever hears about them is confounded and disputes whether they exist, or that, even if they do indeed exist, they must necessarily be unknowable to human nature. In saying this, he seems to be saying something [reasonable], and thus, as we have just said, he will be extremely difficult to persuade otherwise. Only an ingenious man will be able to understand that for each thing there b
is some Kind, a being itself by itself, but only someone even more remarkable will be able to discover it *and* teach it to another who has [already] thoroughly examined all these difficulties."

" Συγχωρῶ σοι," ἔφη, " ὦ Παρμενίδη," ὁ Σωκράτης· " πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν λέγεις."

" Ἀλλὰ μέντοι," εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, " εἴ γέ τις δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ μὴ ἐάσει[41] εἴδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι[42] ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅπῃ τρέψει τὴν
c διάνοιαν ἕξει, μὴ ἐὼν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ἠσθῆσθαι."

" Ἀληθῆ λέγεις," φάναι.

" Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι; πῇ τρέψῃ ἀγνοουμένων τούτων; "

" Οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι."

" Πρῳ γάρ," εἰπεῖν, " πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν.

d ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρῴην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἕλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια."

" Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος," φάναι, " ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; "

e " Οὗτος," εἶπεῖν, " ὅνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος. πλὴν τοῦτό γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἠγάσθην εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐκ εἴας ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστά τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο εἶναι."

" Δοκεῖ γάρ μοι," ἔφη, " ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν."

" Καὶ καλῶς γ', " ἔφη. " χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ ποιεῖν,
136 μὴ μόνον εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ὑποτιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑποτίθεσθαι, εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι."

" Πῶς λέγεις; " φάναι.

41 ἐάσῃ BT.
42 μὴ δέτι B: μηδ' ὅτι T.

"I agree with you, Parmenides," Socrates said. "What you say reflects very much what I think."
"But, on the other hand, Socrates," said Parmenides, "if instead someone, fixing his attention on all the present issues and others of the same kind, will not concede that there are Forms of 'the things that are', and will not define a Form for each one [of them], he will not have anything to turn his thought to, since he won't allow that for each of c
'the things that are', there is a concept that is always the same. And by doing this he will completely destroy the power of discourse. But you seem to me to have perceived that quite well."
"What you say is true," Socrates said.
"What, then, will you do about philosophy? Where will you turn, if these things remain unknown to you?"
"At the moment, I don't seem to see at all."
"Socrates, that is because you are trying to define prematurely what is 'beautiful', and 'just' and 'good', and each one of the Forms," he said, "before you are properly trained. I realized that the other day too, when I heard you conversing with Aristoteles here. Be assured, the impulse d
you bring to discourse is noble and divine. But train yourself while you are still young; drag yourself through what is commonly considered useless, which most call idle talk. Otherwise, the truth will escape you."
"What manner of training is that, Parmenides?" he said.
"The one you heard Zeno practice," he replied. "Except for this: you told Zeno something that delighted me very much, that you would not e
allow inquiry to wander around the visible things, nor be about them, but be about those things one could apprehend best by reasoning, and could regard as Forms."
"It seems to me," Socrates said, "that in this way, it is not at all difficult to show that [visible] things are both like and unlike, and affected in any other way whatsoever."
"You are quite right," Parmenides answered, "but in addition to that, you must also do this: examine the consequences of each hypothesis— 136
that is, not only hypothesize 'if a thing is' but also 'if that same thing is not'—if you want to be trained more thoroughly."
"What do you mean?" he said.

" Οἷον," ἔφη, " εἰ βούλει, περὶ ταύτης τῆς ὑποθέσεως, ἣν Ζήνων ὑπέθετο, εἰ πολλά ἐστι, τί χρὴ ξυμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς πολλοῖς πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἓν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ πρός τε αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολλά· καὶ αὖ εἰ μή ἐστι πολλά, πάλιν σκοπεῖν, τί ξυμβήσεται καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ
b καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ αὖθις αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ, εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως ξυμβήσεται καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποτεθεῖσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα.

καὶ περὶ ἀνομοίου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἀεὶ ὑποθῇ ὡς ὄντος καὶ ὡς οὐκ ὄντος
c καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο πάθος πάσχοντος, δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα πρὸς αὑτὸ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅ τι ἂν προέλῃ, καὶ πρὸς πλείω

"Take, if you like," Parmenides said, "Zeno's hypothesis, according to which 'if it is many',[43] what consequences ensue both for the many in relation to themselves, and in relation to the one, and for the one in relation to itself, and in relation to the many. And conversely, 'if it is not many', you must again examine what consequences follow for both the one and the many, in relation to themselves and in relation to each other. And again, should you suppose, 'if it is like'[44] or 'if it is not [like]', what will the consequences be for either of our hypotheses: both for what we have hypothesized, and for the others, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other.

The same approach[45] appertains to 'unlike' and to 'motion' and to 'rest' b
and to 'generation and corruption' and even to 'being' itself and 'not being'. In short, for whatever you hypothesize as being or not being,[46] and as subjected to any other qualification,[47] you must examine the consequences [that will follow] in relation to itself and in relation to each and every one of the others—whichever you may choose—and in relation to more than one, and in relation to all in the same way. c
In turn, you must examine the others, both in relation to themselves,

43 We have here the same phrase εἰ πολλά ἐστι as in 128d. It is often translated as "if there are many" but could also be rendered as "if (things) are many," or "if (something) is many," or, what seems most likely in this context, "if (the object of inquiry) is many." As appealing as "if there are many" might seem to us today, it creates an inconsistency with other passages (e.g., 128b, 128d) where we had to translate the phrase as "if it is many"—the "it" referring back to Socrates' claim (128a) that Parmenides says with "the all is one" in his poems. Thus, we are assuming that here (136a) Parmenides is referring to the same Zenonian hypothesis introduced earlier. The "it," therefore, can stand for "the all," as well as for the "one," if the Zenonian proposition is meant to debunk the notion of "*it* being many," as part of an attempt to defend Parmenides. Most likely, the "it" in "if *it* is many" refers to "the one." It is also the "one" that is positioned as counterpart of "the many" throughout the exercise mentioned above. See also **Gill**, *Plato:* Parmenides, 139n21.

44 To be consistent, the same rendering must be followed here as well: εἰ ἔστιν ὁμοιότης = "if it is like," instead of "if likeness is."

45 The use of *logos* here seems akin to its use in Parmenides' Poem (e.g., B8.50), namely, as an ordered and systematic 'account', a 'way', 'procedure', or 'method'.

46 Cf. **Parmenides** B8.15–16.

47 For example, the *sēmata* of **Parmenides** B8.2–6.

καὶ πρὸς ξύμπαντα ὡσαύτως· καὶ τἆλλα αὖ πρὸς αὑτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο ὅ τι ἂν προαιρῇ ἀεί, ἐάντε ὡς ὂν ὑποθῇ ὃ ὑπετίθεσο, ἐάντε ὡς μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλεις τελέως γυμνασάμενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές."

" Ἀμήχανόν," ἔφη, " λέγεις, ὦ Παρμενίδη, πραγματείαν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα μανθάνω. ἀλλά μοι τί οὐ διῆλθες αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενός τι, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθω; "

d " Πολὺ ἔργον," φάναι, " ὦ Σώκρατες, προστάττεις ὡς τηλικῷδε."

" Ἀλλὰ σύ," εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, " Ζήνων, τί οὐ διῆλθες ἡμῖν; "

Καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἔφη γελάσαντα φάναι· " αὐτοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεώμεθα Παρμενίδου. μὴ γὰρ οὐ φαῦλον ᾖ ὃ λέγει. ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ὅσον ἔργον προστάττεις; εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι· ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν ἄλλως τε

e καὶ τηλικούτῳ· ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Παρμενίδη, Σωκράτει συνδέομαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς διακούσω διὰ χρόνου."

Ταῦτα δὴ εἰπόντος τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντιφῶν φάναι τὸν Πυθόδωρον, αὐτόν τε δεῖσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνδείξασθαι ὃ λέγοι καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιεῖν. τὸν οὖν

137 Παρμενίδην· " ἀνάγκη," φάναι, " πείθεσθαι. καί τοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι, ᾧ ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητῇ ὄντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑφ' ἅρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι' ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον, ἑαυτὸν ἀπεικάζων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω πρεσβύτης ὢν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἰέναι· κἀγώ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος[48] λόγων· ὅμως δὲ δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί,

48 πέλαγος **Stephanus** (fr. Ficinus), and **Proclus** seems to have had this reading: πλῆθος BT.

and to anything else you may choose, whether what you have hypothesized you assume as being or not being. All this you must do, if, after completing your training, you are to discern the truth with authority."
"You speak of an impossible undertaking, Parmenides," Socrates said, "and I don't quite understand it. Why don't you go through it for me by hypothesizing something yourself, so that I may comprehend it better?"
"That is a big task to assign to a man of my age, Socrates," he said.
"Well then, what about you, Zeno?" said Socrates. "Why don't you go d
through it for us?"

And Pythodorus said that Zeno replied, laughing, "Let us ask this of Parmenides himself, Socrates. For this is not a light matter that he speaks of. Or don't you see how great the task is that you are assigning? Indeed, if there were more of us present, it would not be proper to ask him—it is not suitable, especially at his age, to speak of such matters when many are present. For most do not know that unless we go through e
a comprehensive and circuitous inquiry[49] we cannot encounter [what is] true and achieve insight. And so, Parmenides, I join Socrates in this request, so that I too may listen to your teaching, after all this time."

Antiphon said that Pythodorus told him that when Zeno had said this, he too, along with Aristoteles and the others, asked Parmenides to demonstrate what he meant and not to refuse. Then Parmenides said: "I must comply. But I feel like I am suffering what Ibycus' horse suffered, that old fighter, who, at the start of a chariot race, trembled from past experience at what was to come. Comparing himself to the 137
horse, the poet claims that he too, unwillingly, and being so aged, is being compelled to enter the contests of Love. Thinking back, I too, seem to feel very afraid of how to traverse at my age such a dangerous and vast sea of arguments. All the same, I must oblige you, especially since, as Zeno says, we are amongst ourselves."

49 Cf. **Parmenides** B5: the circuitous journey of his Goddess' approach, as opposed to the aimless wandering of stupefied mortals in B6.

b ὃ[50] Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοί ἐσμεν. πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα; ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, ἀπ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως, περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἕν, τί χρὴ ξυμβαίνειν; ”

“ Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα.

“ Τίς οὖν; ” εἰπεῖν, “ μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται; ἢ ὁ νεώτατος; ἥκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, καὶ ἃ οἴεται μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις.”

c “ Ἕτοιμός σοι, ὦ Παρμενίδη,” φάναι, “ τοῦτο,” τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη· “ ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων· ἀλλ᾽ ἐρώτα ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου.”

50 ὃ **Bekker**: ὁ BT.

"Well, then, where shall we start? What shall we hypothesize first? b
Since we have determined to play this laborious game, I shall begin with myself and my own hypothesis, hypothesizing about 'the one' itself, whether it is *one* or *not one,* and the consequences that must follow [in each case].[51]"
"By all means," said Zeno.
"Then who will answer me?" he asked. "The youngest, perhaps? For he would waste the least time, and would be the most likely to reply as he thinks; meanwhile, his answer would allow me to catch my breath."
"I'm ready to do that for you, Parmenides," Aristoteles said. "For you c
speak of me when you speak of the youngest. Ask, then, and I shall answer."

51 Cf. 128b, 128d, and 137c. See also note 9. There have been suggestions to emend the text (εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἕν) to "if one is, or if one is not" in order to avoid conflicts with the all-too-common reading that the Second Part delves only into the question of the one's existence or nonexistence. Yet such a reading ignores the possibility that the Second Part is exploring the differences between a oneness itself-by-itself, versus a relational one. However, that is precisely the kind of examination Socrates demands in 129d–130a. Particularly, Socrates is most interested by the interweaving of Intelligibles (Forms), not some merely existential proving (130a, cf. also 135e). At issue are the consequences that follow from "the one's" availability or unavailability to partake and be partaken in, or generally (with a view to the *Sophist*), to be intertwined with. However, the attempt to emend 137b4–5, and thus to cast an existential spin on *all* the main hypotheses of the Second Part, cannot work, as it severs the connection between crucial passages, and results in inconsistencies. The sense preserved in 137b4–5 is in some way related to that expressed in 128b, ἓν . . . εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, which states that "the all is one" and not "the one *exists,*" much less "the one exists as *all.*" The only difference here is that this time around, the subject is not specified as "all" but, as the text states, "the one itself" (ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ).

" Εἶεν δή," φάναι·
" εἰ ἕν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἕν; "
" πῶς γὰρ ἄν; "
" οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι."
" τί δή; "
" τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος[52] ἐστίν."
" Ναί."
" Τί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὗ ἂν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῇ, ὅλον ἂν εἴη; "
" πάνυ γε."
" ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον τε ὂν καὶ μέρη ἔχον."
d " ἀνάγκη."
" ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄρα οὕτως τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἴη, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἕν."
" ἀληθῆ."
" δεῖ δέ γε μὴ πολλὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι."
" δεῖ."
" οὔτ᾽ ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἕξει, εἰ ἓν ἔσται τὸ ἕν."
" οὐ γάρ."
" Οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι· μέρη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη."

52 ὅλου μέρους B: μέρος ὅλου T.

FIRST ARGUMENT

"Well then," said Parmenides, "'if it is *one*',[53] would not the one be something other than the many?"
— "How could it be [many]?"

PARTS/WHOLE

"Then, there must not be a part of it, nor can it be a whole."
— "Why?"
"For a part is presumably a part of a whole."
— "Yes."
"But what is the whole? Wouldn't that from which no part is missing be a whole?"
— "Certainly."
"In both cases, then, the one would consist of parts, since it would be whole and would have parts."
— "Necessarily."
"In that way, in both cases the one would be many, rather than one."
— "True." d
"Yet it must not be many, but one."
— "It must."
"Thus, if the one is to be one, it will neither be a whole nor have parts."
— "No, it won't."

LIMITED/UNLIMITED

"Then, if it has no part, it would neither have a beginning, nor an end, nor a middle, for these kind of things would be parts of it."

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53 "One" (ἕν) can also be translated as Oneness, or Unity. For "if it is *one,*" as above, compare also **Gill**, *Plato:* Parmenides, 141, and also **Kahn**, chapter on the *Parmenides* (a work in progress on Plato's later dialogues). However, εἰ ἕν ἐστιν here has also been translated as "if there is one," "if the one exists," and "if one is" (compare with 142b), and some scholars consider the wording sufficiently ambiguous to allow both versions. Yet if we compare other passages that mention *hen* as object of inquiry (for example 128b, but especially 128d and 137b), it becomes clear that the hypothesis in Argument I should be taken not in an existential sense but in a predicative one, in contrast to Argument II and its hypothesis "if one is" (ἓν εἰ ἔστιν), which, as the Argument shows, focuses on results of the existential intertwining between One and Being. See also **Gill**, *Plato:* Parmenides, 65*ff.*, for a lengthy discussion of the issue. Compare also note 9.

" ὀρθῶς."
" καὶ μὴν τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἑκάστου."
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἕν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει."
" ἄπειρον."
e " καὶ ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα· οὔτε γὰρ[54] ἂν στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχει.[55]"
" πῶς; "
" στρογγύλον γέ πού ἐστι τοῦτο, οὗ ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχῃ."
" ναί."
" καὶ μὴν εὐθύ γε, οὗ ἂν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν ἐπίπροσθεν ᾖ."
" οὕτως."
" οὐκοῦν μέρη ἂν ἔχοι τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλ' ἂν εἴη, εἴτε εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦς μετέχοι."
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
138 " οὔτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε περιφερές ἐστιν, ἐπείπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει."
" ὀρθῶς."
" Καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εἴη· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη." " πῶς δή; "
" Ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὂν κύκλῳ που ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπ' ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἐνείη,[56] καὶ πολλαχοῦ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἅπτοιτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἑνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῇ κύκλῳ ἅπτεσθαι."
" Ἀδύνατον." " Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν κἂν ἑαυτῷ[57] εἴη περιέχον
b οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὑτό,[58] εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη· ἔν τῳ γάρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον."
" ἀδύνατον γάρ."

54 γὰρ BT: γὰρ ἂν vulg.
55 μετέχει **Proclus**: μετέχοι BT.
56 ἐνείη **Heindorf**: ἂν ἓν εἴη B: ἃ εἴη T.
57 ἑαυτῷ B: ἑαυτὸ T, **Proclus**.
58 αὑτὸ **Diels**: αὐτὸ BT, **Proclus**.

— "Quite right."
"Furthermore, 'end' and 'beginning' are the limit of each thing."
— "How could they not be?"
"Therefore, if the one has neither beginning nor end, it is limitless."
— "Yes."

NO SHAPE

"And consequently, it is without shape; for it partakes in neither round nor straight."
— "How so?" e
"For the round is presumably that whose extremities are everywhere equidistant from its center."
— "Yes."
"And straight is that of which the middle stands in between both extremities."
— "So it is."
"So the one would have parts and be many, if it were to partake in either a straight or a round shape."
— "Certainly."
"Therefore, it is neither straight nor round, since it has no parts either." 138
— "Correct."

NEITHER IN ITSELF, NOR IN ANOTHER—NOWHERE

"Furthermore, being of such a kind, it would be nowhere, because it would be neither in another nor in itself."
— "How so?"
"If it were in another, it would presumably be surrounded all around by that in which it would be contained, and it would be in contact with this thing in many places with many parts. But since it is one and without parts, and since it does not partake of all-aroundness, it cannot possibly be in contact all around in many different places."
— "It could not."
"Yet, conversely, if it were in itself, what contains it would be no different than itself, if indeed it were in itself, for it is impossible for a thing b
to be in something that does not contain it."
— "Impossible indeed."
"So the container itself would be one thing, and the contained another, because the same thing as a whole will not be able both to undergo

" οὐκοῦν ἕτερον μὲν ἄν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταὐτὸν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἓν ἀλλὰ δύο."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
" οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἕν, μήτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν."
" οὐκ ἔστιν."
" Ὅρα δή, οὕτως ἔχον εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἑστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι."
" τί δὴ γὰρ οὔ; "
c " ὅτι κινούμενόν γε[59] ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἄν· αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις."
" ναί."
" ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἓν ἔτι εἶναι."
" ἀδύνατον."
" οὐκ ἄρα κατ᾽ ἀλλοίωσίν γε κινεῖται."
" οὐ φαίνεται."
" ἀλλ᾽ ἆρα τῷ φέρεσθαι; "
" ἴσως."
" καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἕν, ἤτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας."
" ἀνάγκη."
" οὐκοῦν κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ
d τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ. ᾧ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι; "
" οὐδεμία."
" ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμεῖβον ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται; "
" εἴπερ γε δή."
" οὐκοῦν εἶναι μέν που ἔν τινι αὐτῷ[60] ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη; "
" ναί."
" ἆρ᾽ οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον; "

59 γε b, **Proclus** al.: τε BT, **Stobaeus**.
60 αὐτῷ BT: αὐτὸ vulg.

and to act at the same time. And so the one would no longer be one but two."
— "It would not."
"Therefore the one is not anywhere, neither in itself nor in another."
— "It is not."

MOTION/REST

"If this is the case, consider then whether it can be at rest or in motion."[61]
— "Yes, why not?"
"Because if it were in motion it would either change place or alter its character, since these are the only motions."[62]
— "Yes."
"But it is impossible for the one to alter itself and still be somehow one." c
— "Impossible."
"So it does not move by altering its character."
— "Apparently not."
"But by changing place?"
— "Perhaps."
"And yet if the one moved spatially, then it would either revolve around itself or change from one place to another."
— "Necessarily."
"Well, if it revolves around itself, it must be poised in the center, and have other parts of itself revolving around the center. But by what d
means can that, of which it is not fitting to have either center or parts, revolve around the center?"
— "There is no way."
"But by changing place, does it come to be here at one time and there at another, and thus move?"
— "If it moves at all."
"Was it not shown that it is impossible for it to be anywhere in anything?"
— "Yes it was."
"Then it is even more impossible for it to come to be?"
— "I do not understand how."

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61 Whenever *kinēsis* appears in relation to *stasis* we have opted to translate it as 'motion'. Whenever it appears to point at a different state than 'motion' or 'rest', we have preserved the more generic sense of *kinēsis,* namely 'change'.
62 Cf. **Parmenides** B8.41.

" οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ."
" εἰ ἔν τῳ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πω ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, μήτ' ἔτι ἔξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἴπερ ἤδη ἐγγίγνεται; "
e " ἀνάγκη."
" εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἂν μόνον πάσχοι οὗ μέρη εἴη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἔξω εἴη ἅμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἷόν τέ που ἔσται τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναί τινὸς μήτε ἔξω."
" ἀληθῆ."
" οὗ δὲ μήτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήθ' ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν, οὐ πολὺ ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαί που, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλον
139 ἐγγιγνόμενον; "
" φαίνεται."
" οὔτ' ἄρα ποι ἰὸν καὶ ἔν τῳ γιγνόμενον χώραν ἀλλάττει, οὔτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ περιφερόμενον οὔτε ἀλλοιούμενον."
" οὐκ ἔοικεν."
" κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα κίνησιν τὸ ἓν ἀκίνητον."
" ἀκίνητον."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί γέ φαμεν ἔν τινι αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον."
" φαμὲν γάρ."
" οὐδ' ἄρα ποτὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν."
" τί δή; "
" ὅτι ἤδη ἂν ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἴη, ἐν ᾧ τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν."
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
b " ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐν ἑαὐτῷ οὔτε ἐν ἄλλῳ οἷόν τε ἦν αὐτῷ ἐνεῖναι.[63]"
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
" οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἓν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ."
" οὐκ ἔοικεν."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μηδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὂν οὔτε ἡσυχίαν ἄγει οὔθ' ἕστηκεν."
" οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε."
" τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔθ' ἕστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται."
" οὔκουν δὴ φαίνεταί γε."

63 ἐνεῖναι b: ἓν εἶναι BT.

"If something comes to be in something, isn't it necessary that it not yet be in that something—as it is still coming to be in it—but neither that it is still entirely outside of that something if it is already coming to be in it?"
— "Necessarily."
"So if anything is to undergo this [type of change], only that which has e
parts could undergo it, because some part of it would already be in it, and at the same time some other part of it would be outside. But it is impossible for that which has no parts to be somehow simultaneously either wholly inside or outside something."
— "True."
"And isn't it still more impossible for that which neither has parts nor happens to be a whole to come to be in something anywhere, since it can come to be in it neither as a part nor as a whole?"
— "Apparently."
"Therefore, it does not change its place either by going somewhere, nor coming to be in something, nor by revolving in the same place, 139
nor by altering its character."
— "Apparently not."
"Then the one is immovable in regard to any kind of change/motion."[64]
— "It is immovable."
"And yet we also say that it is impossible for it to be in anything."
— "We say so."
"Then it is [also] never in 'the same'."
— "Why is that?"
"Because then it would already be in that same in which it is."
— "Certainly."
"But it was impossible for it to be either in itself or in another."[65]
— "Indeed."
"So, the one is never in the same." b
— "Apparently not."
"But that which is never in the same is neither still nor at rest."
— "No, it cannot be either."
"The one, then, as it seems, is neither at rest nor in motion."
— "No, apparently not."

64 This being the summary of the observations of 139a1, both 'change' and 'motion' apply.
65 Two lessons here: *eneinai* and *hen einai;* we have chosen *eneinai.*

" Οὐδὲ μὴν ταὐτόν γε οὔθ' ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, οὐδ' αὖ ἕτερον οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου ἂν εἴη."
" πῇ δή; "
" ἕτερον μέν που ἑαυτοῦ ὂν ἑνὸς ἕτερον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἕν."
" ἀληθῆ."
c " καὶ μὴν ταὐτόν γε ἑτέρῳ ὂν ἐκεῖνο ἂν εἴη, αὐτὸ δ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως εἴη ὅπερ ἔστιν, ἕν, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἑνός."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
" ταὐτὸν μὲν ἄρα ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἔσται."
" οὐ γάρ."
" ἕτερον δέ γε ἑτέρου οὐκ ἔσται, ἕως ἂν ᾖ ἕν. οὐ γὰρ ἑνὶ προσήκει ἑτέρῳ τινὸς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἑτέρῳ ἑτέρου, ἄλλῳ δὲ οὐδενί."
" ὀρθῶς."
" τῷ μὲν ἄρα ἓν εἶναι οὐκ ἔσται ἕτερον· ἢ οἴει; "
" οὐ δῆτα."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ τούτῳ, οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ μὴ αὑτῷ, οὐδὲ αὐτό·
d αὐτὸ δὲ μηδαμῇ ὂν ἕτερον οὐδενὸς ἔσται ἕτερον."
" ὀρθῶς."
" οὐδὲ μὴν ταὐτόν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται."
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" οὐχ ἥπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτὴ[66] δήπου καὶ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ."
" τί δή; "
" ὅτι οὐκ, ἐπειδὰν ταὐτὸν γένηταί τῳ τι, ἓν γίγνεται."
" ἀλλὰ τί μήν; "
" τοῖς πολλοῖς ταὐτὸν γενόμενον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕν."
" ἀληθῆ."
" ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν μηδαμῇ διαφέρει, ὁπότε τι ταὐτὸν ἐγίγνετο, ἀεὶ ἂν ἓν ἐγίγνετο, καὶ ὁπότε ἕν, ταὐτόν."

66 αὐτὴ **Proclus**: αὕτη B: αὐτὴ T.

SAME/DIFFERENT

"Further, the one cannot be the same either as another or as itself, and, again, it would not be different either from itself or from another."
— "How so?"
"If it were somehow different from itself it would be different from 'one', and it would not be one."
— "True."
"Yet, if it were the same as another, it would be that other, and it c
would not be itself. Therefore, in this way it would not be just what it is—one—but would be other than one."
— "Quite so."
"Accordingly, it will not be the same as another nor different from itself."
— "No, it will not."
"Nor will it be different than another, as long as it is one. For it is not fitting for the one to be other than something else, but only for [what is] 'other' to be other than something else, and for nothing else."
— "Right."
"Consequently, the one will not be different by being one; or what do you think?"
— "Of course not."
"But, if it is not [different] for this reason, then it will not be [different] by being itself, and if not [different] by being itself, it will itself not be [different]. And if it is by no means different from anything, it will be d
different from nothing."
— "That's right."
"Nor will it be the same as itself."
— "Why not?"
"The very nature of the one is certainly not also that of the same."
— "Why?"
"Because a thing does not become *one* whenever it comes to be the same as something."
— "But why?"
"That which comes to be the same as the many must come to be many, not one."
— "True."
"But if the one and the same do not differ in any way, whenever something came to be the same, it would always come to be one, and whenever it came to be one, [it would always come to be] the same."

" πάνυ γε."

e " εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἑαυτῷ ταὐτὸν ἔσται, οὐχ ἓν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται. καὶ οὕτω ἓν ὂν οὐχ ἓν ἔσται· ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον· ἀδύνατον ἄρα καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἢ ἑτέρου ἕτερον εἶναι ἢ ἑαυτῷ ταὐτόν."

" ἀδύνατον."

" οὕτω δὴ ἕτερόν γε ἢ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἓν οὔτ' ἂν αὑτῷ οὔτ' ἂν ἑτέρῳ εἴη."

" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."

" Οὐδὲ μὴν ὅμοιόν τινι ἔσται οὐδ' ἀνόμοιον οὔθ'ἑαυτῷ οὔθ ἑτέρῳ."

" τί δή; "

" ὅτι τὸ ταὐτόν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον."

" ναί."

" τοῦ δέ γε ἑνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ ταὐτόν."

140 " ἐφάνη γάρ."

" ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ τι πέπονθε χωρὶς τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, πλείω ἂν εἶναι πεπόνθοι ἢ ἕν, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον."

" ναί."

" οὐδαμῶς ἔστιν ἄρα ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς εἶναι τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔθ' ἑαυτῷ."

" οὐ φαίνεται."

" οὐδὲ ὅμοιον ἄρα δυνατὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔθ' ἑαυτῷ."

" οὐκ ἔοικεν."

" οὐδὲ μὴν ἕτερόν γε πέπονθεν εἶναι τὸ ἕν· καὶ γὰρ οὕτω πλείω ἂν πεπόνθοι εἶναι ἢ ἕν."

" πλείω γάρ."

b " τό γε μὴν ἕτερον πεπονθὸς ἢ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἄλλου ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη ἢ ἑαυτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ, εἴπερ τὸ ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον."

" ὀρθῶς."

" τὸ δέ γε ἕν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδαμῶς ἕτερον πεπονθὸς οὐδαμῶς ἀνόμοιόν ἐστιν οὔθ' ἑαυτῷ οὔθ' ἑτέρῳ."

" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."

" οὔτε ἄρα ὅμοιον οὔτε ἀνόμοιον οὔθ' ἑτέρῳ οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν."

— "Of course."

"Accordingly, if the one will be the same as itself, it will not be one e
with itself, and thus, being one it will not be one. But this is impossible. Thus, it is impossible for the one to be other than the other, or to be the same as itself."

— "Yes, that is impossible."

"Thus, the one can neither be different than nor the same as itself or another."

— "Indeed, it cannot."

LIKE/UNLIKE

"Furthermore, it will be neither like nor unlike anything, whether in regard to itself or to another."

— "Why?"

"Because 'the like' is that which is affected somehow in the same way."

— "Yes."

"But it was shown that the same is quite separate in nature from the one."

— "Yes, this was shown."

"But if the one is affected by anything apart from being one, it would 140
be so affected as to be more than one, and that is impossible."

— "Yes."

"Therefore, by no means can the one be affected so as to be the same, either as another or as itself."

— "Apparently not."

"Consequently, it cannot be like another or itself."

— "It seems not."

"Nor can the one be affected so as to be different, for in this way it would be so affected as to be more than one."

— "Yes, more than one."

"Surely, that which is affected in a different way than itself or another would be unlike itself or another, if indeed what is affected in the b
same way is like."

— "Right."

"But the one, as it seems, since in no way can it be affected as being different, is in no way unlike itself or another."

— "It is not."

"Consequently, the one can be neither like nor unlike either another or itself."

" οὐ φαίνεται."

" Καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν οὔτε ἴσον οὔτε ἄνισον ἔσται οὔτε ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ."

" πῇ; "

" ἴσον μὲν ὂν τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ἔσται ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν ἴσον ᾖ."

" ναί."

c " μεῖζον δέ που ἢ ἔλαττον ὄν, οἷς μὲν ἂν ξύμμετρον ᾖ, τῶν μὲν ἐλαττόνων πλείω μέτρα ἕξει, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἐλάττω."

"ναί."

" οἷς δ' ἂν μὴ σύμμετρον, τῶν μὲν σμικροτέρων, τῶν δὲ μειζόνων μέτρων ἔσται."

" πῶς γὰρ οὔ; "

" οὐκοῦν ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ μετέχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ μέτρων τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἢ ἄλλων ὡντινωνοῦν τῶν αὐτῶν; "

" ἀδύνατον."

" ἴσον μὲν ἄρα οὔτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ εἴη μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν μέτρων ὄν."

"οὔκουν φαίνεταί γε."

"ἀλλὰ μὴν πλειόνων γε μέτρων ὂν ἢ ἐλαττόνων, ὅσωνπερ μέτρων,

d τοσούτων καὶ μερῶν ἂν εἴη· καὶ οὕτως αὖ οὐκέτι ἓν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ καὶ τὰ μέτρα."

" ὀρθῶς."

" εἰ δέ γε ἑνὸς μέτρου εἴη, ἴσον ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ μέτρῳ· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη, ἴσον τῳ[67] αὐτὸ εἶναι."

" ἐφάνη γάρ."

" οὔτε ἄρα ἑνὸς μέτρου μετέχον οὔτε πολλῶν οὔτε ὀλίγων, οὔτε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχον, οὔτε ἑαυτῷ ποτε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔσται ἴσον οὔτε ἄλλῳ· οὔθ' αὖ μεῖζον οὐδὲ ἔλαττον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε ἑτέρου."

" παντάπασι μὲν οὖν οὕτω."

67 τῳ] αὐτῷ B: τῷ T.

— "So it seems."

EQUAL/UNEQUAL

"Furthermore, being such, it will be neither equal nor unequal to itself or to another."
— "Why?"
"Being equal, it will be of the same measures as that to which it is equal."
— "Yes."
"And being somehow larger or smaller in regard to things with which it would be commensurate, it will have more measures than those that are smaller, and fewer than those that are larger." c
— "Yes."
"And, in regard to things with which it is not commensurate, it will be of smaller measures in the one case, and of larger measures in the other."
— "Of course."
"So, is it not impossible for what does not partake of sameness to either be of the same measures or possess any other characteristics that are the same, whatsoever?"
— "It is impossible."
"Therefore, it would not be equal either to itself or to another, if it is not of the same measures."
— "Apparently not."
"But whether it is of more measures or smaller, it would consist of just as many parts as of measures. And thus, again, it will no longer be one d but will be just as many as its measures."
— "Right."
"But, if it were of one measure, it would come to be equal to that measure; yet it was shown to be impossible that it be equal to anything."
— "Yes, this was shown."
"Therefore, since it does not partake of either one measure or many or few, nor does it partake at all of what is same, it will, as it seems, never be equal to itself or another. Nor again will it be greater or less either than itself or than another."
— "Absolutely so."

e " Τί δέ; πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τὸ ἓν δοκεῖ τῳ[68] δυνατὸν εἶναι; "
" τί δὴ γὰρ οὔ; "
" ὅτι που ἡλικίαν μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἢ αὑτῷ ἢ ἄλλῳ ἰσότητος χρόνου καὶ ὁμοιότητος μεθέξει, ὧν ἐλέγομεν οὐ μετεῖναι τῷ ἑνί, οὔθ' ὁμοιότητος οὔτε ἰσότητος."
" ἐλέγομεν γὰρ οὖν."
" καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅτι ἀνομοιοτητος τε καὶ ἀνισότητος οὐ μετέχει, καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγομεν."
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
141 " πῶς οὖν οἷόν τε ἔσται τινὸς ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ νεώτερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχειν τῳ[69] τοιοῦτον ὄν; "
" οὐδαμῶς."
" οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη νεώτερον γε οὐδὲ πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον τὸ ἓν οὔτε αὑτῷ οὔτε ἄλλῳ."
" οὐ φαίνεται."
" ἆρ' οὖν οὐδὲ ἐν χρόνῳ τὸ παράπαν δύναιτ' ἂν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἐάν τι ᾖ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἀεὶ αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" οὐκοῦν τό γε πρεσβύτερον ἀεὶ νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον; "
" τί μήν; "
b " τὸ πρεσβύτερον ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον καὶ νεώτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἅμα γίγνεται, εἴπερ μέλλει ἔχειν ὅτου πρεσβύτερον γίγνηται."
" πῶς λέγεις; "
" ὧδε· διάφορον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδὲν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι ἤδη ὄντος διαφόρου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἤδη ὄντος ἤδη εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ γεγονότος γεγονέναι, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος μέλλειν, τοῦ δὲ γιγνομένου οὔτε γεγονέναι οὔτε μέλλειν οὔτε εἶναί πω διάφορον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ εἶναι."
" ἀνάγκη γάρ."
c " ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε πρεσβύτερον διαφορότης νεωτέρου ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου."

68 τω] τῷ BT.
69 τω] τῷ BT.

TIME—OLDER, YOUNGER, SAME AGE

"What about the following: do you think that it is possible for the one e
to be older or younger than, or the same age as, anything?"
— "Why not?"
"Because presumably, if it is the same age as itself or another, it will partake of equality and likeness in regard to time, [but,] as we have said, it does not belong to the one to partake of either likeness or equality."
— "Yes, that's what we have said."
"And furthermore, that it does not partake of unlikeness and inequality, we also said this."
— "Certainly."
"Then, if it is like this, how will it be possible for it to be older or 141
younger than, or of the same age as, anything?"
— "In no way."
"So the one would be neither younger nor older than, nor the same age as, itself or another."
— "Apparently not."
"So, if it is like this, could the one even be in time at all? Or isn't it necessary that if something is in time, it is always coming to be older than itself?"
— "Necessarily."
"Then is it not always the case that the older is always older than the younger?"
— "Of course."
"Then, what comes to be older than itself at the same time comes to b
be younger than itself, if indeed it is going to have something to come to be older than?"
— "How do you mean?"
"I mean this: there is no need for anything different to come to be other than another if it is already different;[70] rather, it must *now* be different from what is *now* different, *have come to be* different from what *has come to be* different, and *be going to be* different from what *is going to be* different. But what is *coming to be* different neither *has* become [different], nor *will be* becoming [different], nor *is* [already] different, but it *is coming* to be, and nothing else."
— "Necessarily."
"But surely 'older' constitutes a difference from 'younger', and from c
nothing else."

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70 Principle of Sufficient Reason; cf. **Parmenides** B8.9–10.

" ἔστι γάρ."
" τὸ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γιγνόμενον ἀνάγκη καὶ νεώτερον ἅμα ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι."
" ἔοικεν."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ μήτε πλείω ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεσθαι χρόνον μήτ' ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἴσον χρόνον καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ μέλλειν ἔσεσθαι."
" ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα."
d " ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅσα γε ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶ καὶ μετέχει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτήν τε αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἡλικίαν ἔχειν καὶ πρεσβύτερόν τε αὑτοῦ ἅμα καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι."
" κινδυνεύει."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν τῷ γε ἑνὶ τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων οὐδὲν μετῆν."
" οὐ γὰρ μετῆν."
" οὐδὲ ἄρα χρόνου αὐτῷ μέτεστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ἔν τινι χρόνῳ."
" οὔκουν δή, ὥς γε ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ."
" Τί οὖν; τὸ ἦν καὶ τὸ γέγονε καὶ τὸ ἐγίγνετο οὐ χρόνου μέθεξιν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν τοῦ ποτὲ γεγονότος; "
e " καὶ μάλα."
" τί δέ; τὸ ἔσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσεται οὐ τοῦ ἔπειτά του[71] μέλλοντος; "
" ναί."
" τὸ δὲ δὴ ἔστι καὶ τὸ γίγνεται οὐ τοῦ νῦν παρόντος; "
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
" εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἓν μηδαμῇ μηδενὸς μετέχει χρόνου, οὔτε ποτὲ γέγονεν οὔτ' ἐγίγνετο οὔτ' ἦν ποτέ, οὔτε νῦν γέγονεν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ' ἔστιν, οὔτ' ἔπειτα γενήσεται οὔτε γενηθήσεται οὔτ' ἔσται."
" ἀληθέστατα."
" ἔστιν οὖν οὐσίας ὅπως ἄν τι μετάσχοι ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τούτων τι; "
" οὐκ ἔστιν."
" οὐδαμῶς ἄρα τὸ ἓν οὐσίας μετέχει."

71 ἔπειτά που G. **Hermann**: ἔπειτα τοῦ BT.

— "Yes, it does."
"So that which comes to be older than itself must also, at the same time, come to be younger than itself."
— "Apparently."
"But neither can it come to be for a longer time than itself, nor for a shorter; rather, it must 'come to be' and 'be' and 'have come to be' and 'be going to be', for a time equal to itself."
— "That is also necessary."
"Thus it is necessary, as it seems, for each thing that is in time and d
participates in this kind of thing, to be the same age as itself and, simultaneously, come to be older and younger than itself."
— "Very likely."
"But the one had nothing to do with such qualifications."
— "No, it had not."
"Then it has neither something to do with time, nor is it in any time."
— "It has not, as the argument shows."
"Well, doesn't the 'was' and the 'has come to be' and the 'was coming to be' seem to signify participation in time which has come to pass sometime?"
— "Of course." e
"And, then, does the 'will be' and the 'will come to be' and the 'will have come to be' signify participation in time which will come to be hereafter?"
— "Yes."
"And does the 'is' and the 'is coming to be' signify participation in time now present?"
— "Certainly."
"Therefore, if the one does not participate in time in any way, it has not ever 'come to be', nor 'was coming to be', nor 'was' ever; it has not now 'come to be', nor is it 'coming to be', nor 'is it'; nor hereafter 'will it come to be', nor 'will it have come to be', nor 'will it be'."
— "Most true."

CONCLUSION

"Is it possible that anything could partake of being in any other way than in one of these?"
— "No, it is not."
"Therefore, the one does not partake of being in any way."
— "It seems not."

" οὐκ ἔοικεν."
" οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἕν."
" οὐ φαίνεται."
" οὐδ' ἄρα οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἓν εἶναι· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη ὂν καὶ οὐσίας
142 μετέχον· ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν."
" κινδυνεύει."
" ὃ δὲ μὴ ἔστι, τούτῳ τῷ μὴ ὄντι εἴη ἄν τι αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτοῦ; "
" καὶ πῶς; "
" οὐδ' ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα."
" οὐ φαίνεται."
" οὐδ' ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται."
" οὐκ ἔοικεν."
" ἦ δυνατὸν οὖν περὶ τὸ ἓν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν; "
" οὔκουν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ."

"Therefore the one in no way *is*."
— "Apparently not."
"Therefore it is not even in such a way as to be *one,* for if it were, it would already be that which *is* and would partake of being. But, as it appears, the one neither *is* 'one' nor 'is', if we are to trust this sort of argument."
— "Quite likely." 142
"If something is not, could anything belong to it, or be of it?"
— "How could it?"
"So no name belongs to it, nor is there an account, nor any knowledge, nor perception, nor opinion of it."
— "Evidently not."
"Therefore, it is not named nor spoken of, nor is it the object of opinion or knowledge, nor does anything among the 'things that are' perceive it."
— "Apparently not."
"Now, is it possible that these things are true of the one?"
— "I do not think so."

b " Βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιοῦσιν ἀλλοῖον φανῇ; "
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν βούλομαι."
" οὐκοῦν ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, φαμέν, τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ, ποῖά ποτε τυγχάνει ὄντα, διομολογητέα ταῦτα· οὐχ οὕτω; "
" ναί."
" ὅρα δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι μέν, οὐσίας δὲ μὴ μετέχειν; "
" οὐχ οἷόν τε."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴη ἂν οὐ ταὐτὸν οὖσα τῷ ἑνί· οὐ γὰρ
c ἂν ἐκείνη ἦν ἐκείνου οὐσία, οὐδ' ἂν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἕν, ἐκείνης μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἕν τε εἶναι καὶ ἓν ἕν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν ἕν, τί[72] χρὴ ξυμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἓν ἔστιν· οὐχ οὕτω; "
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
" οὐκοῦν ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαῖνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἕν; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" ἆρα οὖν ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι οὐσίας μετέχει τὸ ἕν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδάν τις συλλήβδην εἴπῃ ὅτι ἓν ἔστιν; "
" πάνυ γε."
" πάλιν δὴ λέγωμεν, ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τί συμβήσεται. σκόπει οὖν, εἰ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταύτην τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοιοῦτον ὂν τὸ ἓν σημαίνειν, οἷον μέρη ἔχειν; "
" πῶς; "
d " ὧδε· εἰ τὸ ἔστι τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος ἑνός, ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἥ τε οὐσία καὶ τὸ ἕν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ ἐκείνου οὗ ὑπεθέμεθα, τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἓν ὂν εἶναι αὐτό, τούτου δὲ γίγνεσθαι μόρια τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" πότερον οὖν ἑκάτερον τῶν μορίων τούτων μόριον μόνον προσεροῦμεν, ἢ τοῦ ὅλου μόριον τό γε μόριον προσρητέον; "
" τοῦ ὅλου."

72 ἓν ἕν, τί] ἓν εντι B: ἓν τι T.

SECOND ARGUMENT

"So, do you want us to return to the hypothesis from the beginning, b
to see whether something of a different sort appears to us, as we go through it [again]?"
— "I want to, by all means!"
"'If one is', as we say, we should agree upon the consequences that will follow for it, of whatever sort these may happen to be. Is it not so?"
— "Yes, it is."
"Consider from the beginning: 'if one is', can it be, but not partake of being?"
— "It cannot."
"Then the being of the one would also exist, without it being the same as the one; otherwise, it could not be the being of the one, nor could the one partake in it.
Otherwise, saying that 'one is' would be like saying that 'one [is] one'. c
But this time around this is not our hypothesis, namely, what the consequences must be 'if one [is] *one*', but what the consequences are 'if one *is*'. Isn't that so?"
— "Of course."
"Is that because 'is' signifies something other than 'one'?"
— "Necessarily."
"So whenever someone says concisely that 'one is', would this amount to saying nothing other than that 'the one partakes of being'?"
— "Certainly."

PARTS/WHOLE—ONE/MANY

"Then let us again state what the consequences will be 'if one is'. Consider whether this hypothesis must not signify that the one is of such a sort as to have parts."
— "How so?"
"In this way: if 'is' is said of the 'one being', and 'one' is said of the d
'being one', and the being and the one are not the same, but are of that same of which we have made our supposition, namely, the 'one being', doesn't it follow by necessity, that (a) 'one being', by being that, constitutes a whole, of which (b) 'one' and 'being' are its parts?"
— "Yes, necessarily."
"Then shall we call each of these two parts simply 'part', or should the part be called 'part' [because it is part] of the whole?"
— "Of the whole."

" καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἐστί, ὃ ἂν ἓν ᾖ, καὶ μόριον ἔχει."
" πάνυ γε."
e " τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἆρα ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου; "
" οὐκ ἂν εἴη."
" πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τό τε ἓν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν αὖ μορίοιν τὸ μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἀεί, ὅτιπερ ἂν μόριον γένηται, τούτω τὼ μορίω[73]
143 ἀεὶ ἴσχει· τό τε γὰρ ἓν τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἕν· ὥστε ἀνάγκη δύ' ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἓν εἶναι."
" παντάπασι μὲν οὖν."
" οὐκοῦν ἄπειρον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος οὕτω τὸ ἓν ὂν εἴη; "
" ἔοικεν."
" Ἴθι δὴ καὶ τῇδε ἔτι."
" πῇ; "
" οὐσίας φαμὲν μετέχειν τὸ ἕν, διὸ ἔστιν; "
" ναί."
" καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τὸ ἓν ὂν πολλὰ ἐφάνη."
" οὕτως."
" τί δέ; αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, ὃ δή φαμεν οὐσίας μετέχειν, ἐὰν αὐτὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ' αὑτὸ λάβωμεν ἄνευ τούτου οὗ φαμεν μετέχειν, ἆρά γε ἓν μόνον φανήσεται ἢ καὶ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο; "
b " ἕν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε." " ἴδωμεν[74] δή· ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτό, εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἕν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἓν οὐσίας μετέσχεν; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" οὐκοῦν εἰ ἕτερον μὲν ἡ οὐσία, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἕν, οὔτε τῷ ἓν τὸ ἓν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων."

73 τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ B pr. T.
74 ἴδωμεν] εἰδῶμεν BT.

"Therefore, whatever is one both is a whole and has a part."
— "Of course."
"Now, what about each of these two parts of the 'one that is', 'oneness' and 'being'? Is 'oneness' ever absent from the being[-ness] part, or is e
'being'[-ness] absent from the oneness part?"
— "No, that could not be."
"So once again, each of the two parts possesses oneness and being[-ness], and the part, in turn, is composed of at least two parts, and endlessly, according to the same reasoning, whatever part comes to be always possesses these two parts, since oneness always possesses being and being always possesses oneness. Consequently, since by necessity[75] it 143
always comes to be two, it is never one."
— "Absolutely."
"So, in this way, wouldn't the 'one that is' be unlimited in multitude?"
— "Apparently."

DIFFERENCE/OTHERNESS

"Come, let us proceed in the following way as well."
— "In which way?"
"Do we say that the one partakes of being, and therefore is?"
— "Yes."
"And for this reason, 'the one that is' was shown to be many?"
— "So it was."
"And what about the one itself, which we say partakes of being? If in thought we were to grasp it all alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, will it appear to be only one, or will this same thing appear to be many?"
— "One, I believe."
"Let us see then. It is necessary that its being must be one thing and b
it itself again another thing, if indeed the one is not being, but rather, as one, it partakes of being."
— "Necessarily."
"So if the being is one thing and the one is another thing, neither by being one is the one different from being, nor by being being is the being different from the one, but by difference and otherness they are different from each other."

75 The modal operator 'by necessity' seems to apply to the whole phrase.

" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
" ὥστε οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν οὔτε τῷ ἑνὶ οὔτε τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ ἕτερον."
" πῶς γάρ; "
c " Τί οὖν; ἐὰν προελώμεθα αὐτῶν εἴτε βούλει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ἓν εἴτε τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἆρ' οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῇ προαιρέσει προαιρούμεθά τινε ὧ ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖσθαι ἀμφοτέρω; "
" πῶς; "
" ὧδε· ἔστιν οὐσίαν εἰπεῖν; "
" ἔστιν."
" καὶ αὖθις εἰπεῖν ἕν; "
" καὶ τοῦτο."
" ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἴρηται; "
" ναί."
" τί δ' ὅταν εἴπω οὐσία τε καὶ ἕν, ἆρα οὐκ ἀμφοτέρω; "
" πάνυ γε."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐὰν οὐσία τε καὶ ἕτερον ἢ ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἕν, καὶ οὕτω
d πανταχῶς ἐφ' ἑκάστου ἄμφω λέγω; "
" ναί."
" ὧ δ' ἂν ἄμφω ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύησθον, ἆρα οἷόν τε ἄμφω μὲν αὐτὼ εἶναι, δύο δὲ μή; "
" οὐχ οἷόν τε."
" ὧ[76] δ' ἂν δύο ἦτον, ἔστι τις μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχ ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἓν εἶναι; "
" οὐδεμία."
" τούτων ἄρα ἐπείπερ σύνδυο[77] ἕκαστα ξυμβαίνει εἶναι, καὶ ἓν ἂν εἴη ἕκαστον."
" φαίνεται."
" εἰ δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστι, συντεθέντος ἑνὸς ὁποιουοῦν ἡτινιοῦν συζυγίᾳ οὐ τρία γίγνεται τὰ πάντα; "
" ναί."
" τρία δὲ οὐ περιττὰ καὶ δύο ἄρτια; "
e " πῶς δ' οὔ; " " τί δέ; δυοῖν ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ δίς, καὶ τριῶν ὄντων τρίς, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ τε δύο τὸ δὶς ἓν καὶ τῷ τρία τὸ τρὶς ἕν; "
" ἀνάγκη."

76 ὧ] ᾧ B: ὦ T.
77 σύνδυο **Stephanus**: οὖν δύο B: σὺν δύο T.

— "Of course."
"So 'the different' is not the same as 'the one' or 'the being'."
— "Certainly not."
"Now, if we should choose from these, let's say, 'the being and the different', or 'the being and the one', or 'the one and the different', do we not in each case choose a pair that is correctly called 'both'?" c
— "How do you mean?"
"As follows: is it possible to speak of 'being'?"
— "It is."
"And, again, is it possible to speak of 'one'?"
— "That, too."
"So has not each of the two [just] been spoken of?"
— "Yes."
"Then what about when I say 'being and one'? Have not both been mentioned?"
— "Certainly."
"And if I say 'being and different' or 'different and one', am I not speaking of both in each case too?" d
— "Yes."

GENERATION OF NUMBERS

"Is it possible for whatever is correctly called 'both' to be both, but not 'two'?"
— "It is not possible."
"But for whatever would be two, is there any device by which each of these two would not be one?"
— "None."
"So since each of these things happens to be a pair, each one would be one."
— "Apparently."
"And if each of them is one [individually], whenever a one is added to any sort of pair, doesn't the total become three?"
— "Yes."
"And isn't three odd, and two even?"
— "Of course." e
"What about this? If there are two, must there not also be 'twice', and if three, also 'thrice', if indeed two is twice one, and three is thrice one?"
— "There must."

" δυοῖν δὲ ὄντοιν καὶ δὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη δύο δὶς εἶναι; καὶ τριῶν καὶ τρὶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὖ τρία τρὶς εἶναι; "
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" τί δέ; τριῶν ὄντων καὶ δὶς ὄντων καὶ δυοῖν ὄντοιν καὶ τρὶς ὄντοιν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τε τρία δὶς εἶναι καὶ δύο τρίς[78]; "
" πολλή γε."
144 " ἄρτιά τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκις ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττὰ περιττάκις καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκις."
" ἔστιν οὕτω."
" εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἴει τινὰ ἀριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι, ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι; "
" οὐδαμῶς γε."
" εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἕν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναι."
" ἀνάγκη."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀριθμοῦ γε ὄντος πολλ' ἂν εἴη καὶ πλῆθος ἄπειρον τῶν ὄντων· ἢ οὐκ ἄπειρος ἀριθμὸς πλήθει καὶ μετέχων οὐσίας γίγνεται; "
" καὶ πάνυ γε."
" οὐκοῦν εἰ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς οὐσίας μετέχει, καὶ τὸ μόριον ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μετέχοι ἂν αὐτῆς; "
" ναί."
b " ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἡ οὐσία νενέμηται καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀποστατεῖ τῶν ὄντων, οὔτε τοῦ σμικροτάτου οὔτε τοῦ μεγίστου; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν καὶ ἄλογον ἐρέσθαι; πῶς γὰρ ἂν δὴ οὐσία γε τῶν ὄντων του ἀποστατοῖ[79]; "
" οὐδαμῶς."
" κατακεκερμάτισται ἄρα ὡς οἷόν τε σμικρότατα καὶ μέγιστα καὶ
c πανταχῶς ὄντα, καὶ μεμέρισται πάντων μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστι μέρη ἀπέραντατῆς οὐσίας."
" ἔχει οὕτω."
" πλεῖστα ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς."
" πλεῖστα μέντοι."
" τί οὖν; ἔστι τι αὐτῶν ὃ ἔστι μὲν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας, οὐδὲν μέντοι μέρος; "
" καὶ πῶς ἄν τοῦτο[80] γένοιτο; "

78 δύο τρίς in marg. b, **Proclus** suppl.: τρία δις B: δὶς τρία T.
79 ἀποστατοῖ corr. T: ἀποστατοίη **Stobaeus**: ἀποστατεῖ B pr. T.
80 τοῦτο] τοι τοῦτο BT.

"And if there are 'two' and 'twice', must there not be 'twice two' [i.e., two times two]? And if there are 'three' and 'thrice', must there not be 'thrice three' [i.e., three times three]?"
— "Of course."
"What of this: if there are 'three' and 'twice', and if there are 'two' and 'thrice', must there not be twice three and thrice two?"
— "Yes. It must, necessarily."
"And therefore there would be 'even times even', 'odd times odd', 'odd 144
times even', and 'even times odd'."
— "It is so."
"And if that is so, do you think there is any number left that does not necessarily exist?"
— "By no means."
"Consequently, 'if one is', there must also be number."
— "Necessarily."

LIMITED/UNLIMITED—COMPRESENCE OF ONE AND BEING

"But if there is number, there would be 'the many', and an unlimited multitude of 'things that are'. Or would not a number, unlimited in multitude, also come about by partaking of being?"
— "It certainly would."
"Then if all number partakes of being, would not each part of number also partake of it?"
— "Yes."
"So is being[-ness] allocated to all the many 'things that are', and it is b
not absent from any of the 'things that are', neither from the smallest nor from the largest? Or is it unreasonable to even ask this question? For how could being be absent from 'things that are'?"
— "There is no way."
"So being is cut up into the smallest possible things and into the larg-
est possible ones and into the 'things that are' in all possible ways, c
and it is of all things the most partitioned, and the parts of being are unlimited [in number]."
— "True."
"Therefore, its parts are most multitudinous."
— "Most multitudinous, indeed."
"But what about this: is there any among them that is part of being, and yet not *a* part?"
— "How could this be?"

" ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ γε, οἶμαι, ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἀεί, ἕωσπερ ἂν ᾖ, ἕν γέ τι εἶναι, μηδὲν δὲ ἀδύνατον."
" ἀνάγκη."
" πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἑκάστῳ τῷ τῆς οὐσίας μέρει πρόσεστι τὸ ἕν, οὐκ ἀπολειπόμενον οὔτε σμικροτέρου οὔτε μείζονος μέρους οὔτε ἄλλου
d οὐδενός."
" οὕτω."
" ἆρα οὖν ἓν ὂν πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ὅλον ἐστί; τοῦτο ἄθρει."
" ἀλλ᾽ ἀθρῶ καὶ ὁρῶ ὅτι ἀδύνατον."
" μεμερισμένον ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ὅλον· ἄλλως γάρ που οὐδαμῶς ἅμα ἅπασι τοῖς τῆς οὐσίας μέρεσιν παρέσται ἢ μεμερισμένον."
" ναί."
" καὶ μὴν τό γε μεριστὸν πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοσαῦτα ὅσαπερ μέρη."
" ἀνάγκη."
" οὐκ ἄρα ἀληθῆ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν λέγοντες ὡς πλεῖστα μέρη ἡ οὐσία
e νενεμημένη εἴη. οὐδὲ γὰρ πλείω τοῦ ἑνὸς νενέμηται, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσα, ὡς ἔοικε, τῷ ἑνί. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀπολείπεται οὔτε τὸ ἓν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξισοῦσθον δύο ὄντε ἀεὶ παρὰ πάντα."
" παντάπασιν οὕτω φαίνεται."
" τὸ ἓν ἄρα αὐτὸ κεκερματισμένον ὑπὸ τῆς οὐσίας πολλά τε καὶ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθός ἐστιν."
" φαίνεται."
" οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὂν ἓν πολλά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενεμημένον πολλὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι."
" παντάπασι μὲν οὖν."
" Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ὅλου τὰ μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένον ἂν εἴη κατὰ
145 τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἕν· ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε περιέχον πέρας ἂν εἴη."
" πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; "
" τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὂν ἕν τέ ἐστί που καὶ πολλά, καὶ ὅλον καὶ μόρια, καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ἄπειρον πλήθει."
" φαίνεται."

"I suppose, rather, if indeed it *is,* it must always, so long as it is, be one thing, as it cannot be nothing."
— "It must."
"So the one is present alongside [i.e., compresent with] each and every part of being, and is absent neither from a smaller nor from a larger d
part, nor from any other."
— "So it is."
"Then, being one, is it, as a whole, in many places at the same time? Consider this carefully."
— "I am doing this, and I realize that this is impossible."
"Then, if indeed not as 'a whole', it is as 'divided into parts'. For how else will it be present alongside all the parts of being at the same time, if it is not divided?"
— "Yes."
"Then what is divided must necessarily be just as many as its parts."
— "It must."
"But then we were not speaking the truth just now when we said that being has been allocated into most multitudinous parts. For it has e
not been allocated into more than [what is] one, but, as it seems, into equally many as the one."
"For being is not absent from [whatever is] oneness, nor oneness from being, but by being two [together], they are always equal throughout all things."
— "It appears entirely so."
"Thus, the one itself, cut up by being, is many and unlimited in multitude."
— "Apparently."
"So not only is the 'one being' many, but the one itself is necessarily many, having been apportioned by being."
— "Absolutely."
"Furthermore, inasmuch as parts are parts of a whole, the one would be limited by the whole. Or are not the parts contained by the whole?" 145
— "By necessity."
"But that which contains would be a limit."
— "Of course."
"Therefore, the 'one being' is somehow both one and many, both whole and parts, both limited and unlimited in multitude."
— "Apparently."

" ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ, ἐπείπερ πεπερασμένον, καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχον; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" τί δ'; εἰ ὅλον, οὐ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἂν ἔχοι καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν; ἢ οἷόν τέ τι ὅλον εἶναι ἄνευ τριῶν τούτων; κἄν του[81] ἓν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν ἀποστατῇ, ἐθελήσει ἔτι ὅλον εἶναι; "
" οὐκ ἐθελήσει."
b " καὶ ἀρχὴν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον ἔχοι ἂν τὸ ἕν."
" ἔχοι."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε μέσον ἴσον τῶν ἐσχάτων ἀπέχει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως μέσον εἴη."
" οὐ γάρ."
" καὶ σχήματος δή τινος, ὡς ἔοικε, τοιοῦτον ὂν μετέχοι ἂν τὸ ἕν, ἤτοι εὐθέος ἢ στρογγύλου ἤ τινος μικτοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν."
" μετέχοι γὰρ ἄν."
" Ἆρ' οὖν οὕτως ἔχον οὐκ αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔσται καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ; "
" πῶς; "
" τῶν μερῶν που ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅλου."
" οὕτως."
c " πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου περιέχεται; "
" ναί."
" καὶ μὴν τά γε πάντα μέρη τὰ αὑτοῦ τὸ ἕν ἐστι, καὶ οὔτε τι πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ πάντα."
" οὐ γάρ."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὅλον τὸ ἕν ἐστιν; "
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" εἰ ἄρα πάντα τὰ μέρη ἐν ὅλῳ τυγχάνει ὄντα, ἔστι δὲ τά τε πάντα τὸ ἓν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον, περιέχεται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ πάντα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἂν περιέχοιτο τὸ ἕν, καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη."
" φαίνεται."
d " ἀλλὰ μέντοι τό γε ὅλον αὖ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μέρεσίν ἐστιν, οὔτε ἐν πᾶσιν οὔτε ἐν τινί. εἰ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν ἑνί· ἕν τινι γὰρ ἑνὶ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι που δύναιτο ἕν γε ἅπασιν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἁπάντων ἐστί, τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐν τούτῳ μὴ ἔνι,[82] πῶς ἔτι ἕν γε τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐνέσται[83]; "

81 του **Schleiermacher**: τοῦ BT.
82 ἔνι corr. Ven. 189: ἑνὶ B: ενὶ T.
83 ἐνέσται Par. 1836: ἓν ἔσται BT.

SHAPE—BEGINNING, MIDDLE, END

"So, since indeed it is limited, does it not also have extremities?"
— "Necessarily."
"What about this: if it is a whole, would it not also have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can something be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is absent from something, would it still be willing to be whole?"
— "It would not."
"So the one, it seems, would have a beginning, an end, and a middle." b
— "It would."
"But the middle is equidistant from the extremities; otherwise, it would not be 'middle'."
— "It would not."
"Being of such a sort, the one, it seems, would partake of some shape, either straight, or round, or some combination of both."
— "Yes, it would."

IN ITSELF/IN ANOTHER

"Since it is so, will it not be both in itself and in another?"
— "How so?"
"Each of the parts is somehow in the whole, and none is outside the whole."
— "Just so."
"Are all the parts contained by the whole?" c
— "Yes."
"And indeed the one is all of its parts, and neither more nor less than all."
— "Certainly."
"Is not the one also the whole?"
— "Of course."
"So if all the parts happen to be in the whole, and the one is both all the parts as well as the whole itself, and all are contained by the whole, then the one would be contained by the one; and in this way the one itself would now be in itself."
— "Apparently."
"But again the whole would not be in its parts, neither in all nor in some d
one [part]. For if it were in all, it would by necessity also be in one [of these], because if it were not in some one [part], it could no longer be somehow in all. And if that one [part] is one among all, and the whole is not in it, how will the whole still be present in all?"

" οὐδαμῶς."
" οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τισὶ τῶν μερῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅλον εἴη, τὸ πλέον ἂν ἐν τῷ ἐλάττονι εἴη, ὅ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον."
" ἀδύνατον γάρ."
" μὴ ὂν δ' ἐν πλέοσιν μηδ' ἐν ἑνὶ μηδ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς μέρεσι τὸ ὅλον
e οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ εἶναι ἢ μηδαμοῦ ἔτι εἶναι; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" οὐκοῦν μηδαμοῦ μὲν ὂν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον δὲ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐν αὑτῷ ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι; "
" πάνυ γε."
" ἦ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ὅλον, ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστίν· ἦ δὲ τὰ πάντα μέρη ὄντα τυγχάνει, αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν ἀνάγκη αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ."
" ἀνάγκη."
" Οὕτω δὴ πεφυκὸς τὸ ἓν ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἑστάναι; "
" πῇ; "
146 " ἕστηκε μέν που, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐστιν. ἐν γὰρ ἑνὶ ὂν καὶ ἐκ τούτου μὴ μεταβαῖνον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν εἴη, ἐν ἑαυτῷ."
" ἔστι γάρ."
" τὸ δέ γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ ὂν ἑστὸς δήπου ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ εἶναι."
" πάνυ γε."
" τί δέ; τὸ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἀεὶ ὂν οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀνάγκη μηδέποτ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι, μηδέποτε δὲ ὂν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἑστάναι, μὴ ἑστὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι; "
" οὕτως."
" ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ ἕν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἑστάναι."
" φαίνεται."

— "There is no way."
"Nor will it be in some of the parts: because if the whole were in some [parts], the more would be in the less, which is impossible."[84]
— "Yes, impossible."
"But if the whole is not in more than one, nor in one, nor in all the parts, must it not either be in something different or be no longer anywhere at all?" e
— "It must."
"So, if it were nowhere, it would be nothing, but since it is whole, and not in itself, it must be in another, mustn't it?"
— "By all means."
"So insofar as the one is a whole, it is in another, but insofar as it consists of all the parts, it is in itself. And thus the one must be both in itself and in another."
— "It must."

MOTION/REST

"Given that this is its nature, must not the one be both in motion and at rest?"
— "How?"
"It is somewhere at rest, if indeed it is in itself. For if it is in one thing 146
and does not move from it, it would be in the same thing, namely, in itself."
— "Yes."
"That which is always in the same thing must surely always be at rest somewhere."
— "Certainly."
"What about this? What is always in something different must conversely never be in the same; and if it is never in the same, it must also not be at rest; and if it is not at rest, is it not in motion?"
— "So it is."
"Therefore the one, since it itself is always in itself, as well as in something different, is necessarily always both in motion and at rest."
— "Apparently."

84 **Cornford** (*Plato and Parmenides,* 148–150) sees here a link to Zeno's argument against place (**Simplicius**, *Phys.* 562, 1) and Gorgias' alleged imitation of that argument (see **Aristotle**, *MXG* 979b, 22). See also 150e–151a.

b " Καὶ μὴν ταὐτόν γε δεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως ταὐτόν τε καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν πέπονθεν."
" πῶς; "
" πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει. ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον· ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ταὐτὸν ᾖ μηδ' ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος ὅλον ἂν εἴη."
" φαίνεται."
" ἆρ' οὖν τὸ ἓν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ μέρος ἐστίν; "
" οὐδαμῶς."
" οὐδ' ἄρα ὡς πρὸς μέρος αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ὅλον ἂν εἴη, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ μέρος ὄν."
" οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε."
" ἀλλ' ἆρα ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἑνὸς τὸ ἕν; "
c " οὐ δῆτα."
" οὐδ' ἄρα ἑαυτοῦ γε ἕτερον ἂν εἴη."
" οὐ μέντοι."
" εἰ οὖν μήτε ἕτερον μήθ' ὅλον μήτε μέρος αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ταὐτὸν εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" τί δέ; τὸ ἑτέρωθι ὂν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντος ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἕτερον εἶναι, εἴπερ καὶ ἑτέρωθι ἔσται; "
" ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ."
" οὕτω μὴν ἐφάνη ἔχον τὸ ἕν, αὐτό τε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν ἅμα καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ."
" ἐφάνη γάρ."
" ἕτερον ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἴη ταύτῃ ἂν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἕν."
d " ἔοικεν."
" τί οὖν; εἴ τού τι[85] ἕτερόν ἐστιν, οὐχ ἑτέρου ὄντος ἕτερον ἔσται; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" Οὐκοῦν ὅσα μὴ ἕν ἐστιν, ἅπανθ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν μὴ ἕν; "
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" ἕτερον ἄρα ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων."
" ἕτερον."

85 εἴ τού τι G: εἰ του τὶ BT.

SAME/DIFFERENT

"Furthermore, if indeed it has suffered the aforesaid [qualifications] it must be the same as itself and different from itself, and, likewise, the b
same as the others and different from the others."
— "How so?"
"Everything is somehow related to everything in this manner: either it is the same or different; or, if it is neither the same nor different, it would be related as part is to whole, or as whole is to part."
— "Apparently."
"So is the one itself part of itself?"
— "In no way."
"Then neither would it be a whole itself in relation to a part of itself; if it were, it would be a part in relation to itself."
— "No, this is impossible."
"But then is the one different from one?"
— "Certainly not." c
"Then it could not be different from itself."
— "Of course not."
"So if it is neither different nor whole nor part in relation to itself, must it then not be the same as itself?"
— "By necessity."
"What about the following? Must not what is in a different place from itself, and also in the same place, namely in itself, be different from itself, if it is to be in a different place?"
— "It seems so to me."
"So the one was shown to be such as this, since it is, at the same time, both in itself and in another?"
— "Yes, this was shown."
"In this way the one, as it seems, would be different from itself."
— "So it seems." d
"Well then, if something is different from something else, will it not be different from what is different from it?"
— "Necessarily."
"Then are not the things that are 'not-one' all different from the one, and the one different from the things 'not-one'?"
— "Of course."
"So the one would be different from the others."
— "Yes."

" ὅρα δή· αὐτό τε ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἆρ' οὐκ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις; "
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσει ταὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἢ τὸ ἕτερον ἐν ταὐτῷ ποτὲ εἶναι; "
" οὐκ ἐθελήσει."
e " εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἕτερον ἐν ταὐτῷ μηδέποτε ἔσται, οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν τὸ ἕτερον χρόνον οὐδένα. εἰ γὰρ ὁντινοῦν εἴη ἔν τῳ, ἐκεῖνον ἂν τὸν χρόνον ἐν ταὐτῷ εἴη τὸ ἕτερον. οὐχ οὕτως; "
" οὕτως."
" ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐδέποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐστιν, οὐδέποτε ἔν τινι τῶν ὄντων ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕτερον."
" ἀληθῆ."
" οὔτ' ἄρα ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἓν οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ ἐνείη[86] ἂν τὸ ἕτερον."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
" οὐκ ἄρα τῷ ἑτέρῳ γ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν τῶν μὴ ἓν οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα."
" οὐ γάρ."
147 " οὐδὲ μὴν ἑαυτοῖς γε ἕτερ' ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων, μὴ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑτέρου."
" πῶς γάρ; "
" εἰ δὲ μήτε αὑτοῖς ἕτερά ἐστι μήτε τῷ ἑτέρῳ, οὐ πάντῃ ἤδη ἂν ἐκφεύγοι τὸ μὴ ἕτερα εἶναι ἀλλήλων; "
" ἐκφεύγοι."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῦ ἑνός γε μετέχει τὰ μὴ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μὴ ἓν ἦν, ἀλλά πῃ ἂν ἓν ἦν."
" ἀληθῆ."
" οὐδ' ἂν ἀριθμὸς ε η ἄρα τὰ μὴ ἕν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω μὴ ἓν ἦν παντάπασιν, ἀριθμόν γε ἔχοντα."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
" τί δέ; τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἆρα μόριά ἐστιν; ἢ κἂν οὕτω μετεῖχε τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ μὴ ἕν; "
" μετεῖχεν."

86 ἐνείη] ἐν εἴη B: εἴη T.

"Consider this: are not 'the same' itself and 'the different' opposites of each other?"
— "Of course."
"Then will 'the same' ever be willing to be in 'the different', or 'the different' in 'the same'?"
— "It will not."
"So if 'the different' is never to be in 'the same', then 'the different' is in none of the 'things that are' at any time, for if it were in anything e
for any time whatsoever, then for *that* time 'the different' would be in the same. Isn't it so?"
— "It is so."
"But since it is never in 'the same', 'the different' would never be in any one among the 'things that are'."
— "True."
"So 'the different' would neither be in the things 'not-one', nor in the one."
— "No, it would not."
"Thus, judged against 'the different', the one would neither be different from the things 'not-one', nor would the things 'not-one' be different from the one."
— "No."
"Nor would they be different from each other by themselves, if they 147
do not partake of 'what is different'."
— "Obviously not."
"But if they are not different by themselves, nor by 'what is different', wouldn't they then completely avoid being different from each other?"
— "They would."
"But neither do the things 'not-one' partake of the one, for then they would not be 'not-one', but in some way one."
— "True."
"So neither could the things 'not-one' be a number, for if they had a number they would thus not at all be 'not-one'."
— "Certainly not."
"What about this: are the things 'not-one' parts of the one? Or would they partake of the one in this way?"
— "They would."

b " εἰ ἄρα πάντῃ τὸ μὲν ἕν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἕν, οὔτ' ἂν μόριον τῶν μὴ ἓν τὸ ἓν εἴη οὔτε ὅλον ὡς μορίων·[87] οὔτε αὖ τὰ μὴ ἓν τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια, οὔτε ὅλα ὡς μορίῳ τῷ ἑνί."
" οὐ γάρ."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔφαμεν τὰ μήτε μόρια μήτε ὅλα μήτε ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ταὐτὰ ἔσεσθαι ἀλλήλοις."
" ἔφαμεν γάρ."
" φῶμεν ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἓν πρὸς τὰ μὴ ἓν οὕτως ἔχον τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς; "
" φῶμεν."
" τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ."
c " κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου."
" Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις; "
" ἴσως."
" ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη, καὶ τἆλλά που ἕτερ' ἂν ἐκείνου εἴη."
" τί μήν; "
" οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου, καὶ οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττον; "
" τί γὰρ ἄν; "
" εἰ ἄρα μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἧττον, ὁμοίως."
" ναί."
" οὐκοῦν ᾗ ἕτερον εἶναι πέπονθεν τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου
d ὡσαύτως, ταύτῃ ταὐτὸν ἂν πεπονθότα εἶεν τό τε ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ τἆλλα τῷ ἑνί."
" πῶς λέγεις; "
" ὧδε· ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐκ ἐπί τινι καλεῖς; "
" ἔγωγε."
" τί οὖν; τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα εἴποις ἂν πλεονάκις ἢ ἅπαξ; "
" ἔγωγε."

87 μορίων corr. Ven. 189: μορίου BT.

"So if it is[88] one in every way, and they are 'not-one' in every way, the b
one would be neither a part of the things 'not-one', nor a whole with them as parts; conversely, the things 'not-one' would neither be parts of the one, nor wholes of which the one would be a part."
— "No."
"But we said that things that are neither parts nor wholes nor different from each other will be the same as each other."
— "Yes, we said that."
"So are we to say that the one, related in this way to the things 'not-one', is the same as they are?"
— "Let's say so."
"Consequently, the one, as it seems, is both different from the others and from itself, and the same as the others and as itself."
— "It appears this way from this account." c

LIKE/UNLIKE

"Then it is also both like and unlike itself and the others?"
— "Perhaps."
"At any rate, since it was shown to be different from the others, the others would somehow also be different from it."
— "Certainly."
"So is it different from the others in the same way as the others are different from it, and neither more nor less?"
— "Of course."
"So if neither more nor less, then in a similar way?"
— "Yes."
"Then insofar as it has been so affected as to be *different* from the others, and they, similarly, to be different from it, the one would be affected in the *same* way as the others, and they in the *same* way as it." d
— "What do you mean?"
"The following: don't you apply each of the names [you use] to something in particular?"
— "I do."
"Would you use the same name more than once or [just] once?"
— "I would."

88 'Exists': There is an ambiguity here as to whether the sense is predicative or existential.

" πότερον οὖν ἐὰν μὲν ἅπαξ εἴπῃς, ἐκεῖνο προσαγορεύεις οὗπέρ ἐστι τοὔνομα, ἐὰν δὲ πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο; ἢ ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα φθέγξῃ, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη σε ταὐτὸν καὶ λέγειν ἀεί; "
" τί μήν; "
" οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὄνομά ἐστιν ἐπί τινι; "
" πάνυ γε."
e " ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ φθέγγῃ, ἐάντε ἅπαξ ἐάντε πολλάκις, οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῳ οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι ὀνομάζεις ἢ ἐκεῖνο οὗπερ ἦν ὄνομα."
" ἀνάγκη."
" ὅταν δὴ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἕτερον μὲν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, δὶς τὸ ἕτερον εἰπόντες οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνῃ τῇ φύσει αὐτὸ ἀεὶ λέγομεν, ἥσπερ ἦν τοὔνομα."
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
148 " ἦ[89] ἄρα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ[90] ἕτερον πεπονθέναι οὐκ ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἂν πεπονθὸς εἴη τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις· τὸ δέ που ταὐτὸν πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον· οὐχί; "
" ναί."
" ἦ δὴ τὸ ἓν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων πέπονθεν εἶναι, κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασιν ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη· ἅπαν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἕτερόν ἐστιν."
" ἔοικεν."
" Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνομοίῳ[91] ἐναντίον."
" ναί."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ταὐτῷ.[92]"
" καὶ τοῦτο."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γ᾽ ἐφάνη, ὡς ἄρα τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις ταὐτόν."
b " ἐφάνη γάρ."
" τοὐναντίον δέ γε πάθος ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων."
" πάνυ γε."
" ἦ γε μὴν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον ἐφάνη."
" ναί."

89 ἦ] ἢ B: ἦ T: εἰ vulg.
90 κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ **Thomson**: κατὰ ταυτὸ BT.
91 τῷ ἀνομοίῳ] τῷ ὁμοίῳ B: τῶν ἀνομοίων T.
92 ταὐτῷ in marg. T: αὐτῷ BT.

"Then if you use it once, would you be speaking of the thing of which it is the name, but if you use it many times, would you not be speaking of it? Or rather, isn't it necessary, regardless of whether you use the same name once or many times, to always speak of the same thing?"
— "To be sure."
"Then isn't 'the different' a name for something in particular?"
— "Certainly."
"So when you pronounce it, whether once or many times, you do not e
apply it to some other thing, nor name something other than that thing of which it is the name."
— "Necessarily."
"When we say 'the others are different from the one' and 'the one is different from the others', though we say 'different' twice, we do not apply it instead to some other nature, but always to that nature whose name it is."
— "Of course."
"So, insofar as the one is different from the others, and the others 148
from the one, with regard to being so affected as to be different, the one would be affected in such a way as to be *not other* than the others but the same as them. And that which is affected in the same way is presumably alike, is it not?"
— "Yes."
"So insofar as the one is so affected as to be different from the others, in that respect it would be entirely like them all, because it is entirely different from them all."
— "So it seems."
"Yet, on the other hand, 'the like' is opposite to 'the unlike'."
— "Yes."
"So also 'the different' to 'the same'."
— "That also."
"But this too was shown: that the one is the same as the others."
— "Yes, it was." b
"But being the same as the others is the opposite qualification to being different from the others."
— "Certainly."
"Insofar as the one is different, it was shown to be like."
— "Yes."

" ἦ ἄρα ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον ἔσται κατὰ τοὐναντίον πάθος τῷ ὁμοιοῦντι πάθει. ὡμοίου δέ που τὸ ἕτερον; "
" ναί."
" ἀνομοιώσει ἄρα τὸ ταὐτόν, ἢ οὐκ ἐναντίον ἔσται τῷ ἑτέρῳ."
c " ἔοικεν."
" ὅμοιον ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἔσται τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἦ μὲν ἕτερον, ὅμοιον, ἦ δὲ ταὐτόν, ἀνόμοιον."
" ἔχει γὰρ οὖν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον."
" καὶ γὰρ τόνδε ἔχει."
" τίνα; "
" ἦ ταὐτὸν πέπονθε, μὴ ἀλλοῖον πεπονθέναι, μὴ ἀλλοῖον δὲ πεπονθὸς μὴ ἀνόμοιον, μὴ ἀνόμοιον δὲ ὅμοιον εἶναι· ἦ δ' ἄλλο πέπονθεν, ἀλλοῖον, ἀλλοῖον δὲ ὂν ἀνόμοιον εἶναι."
" ἀληθῆ λέγεις."
" ταὐτόν τε ἄρα ὂν τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν ἐστι, κατ'
d ἀμφότερα καὶ καθ' ἑκάτερον, ὅμοιόν τε ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις."
" πάνυ γε."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὡσαύτως, ἐπείπερ ἕτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατ' ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" Τί δὲ δή; περὶ τοῦ ἅπτεσθαι τὸ ἓν αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἅπτεσθαι πέρι πῶς ἔχει, σκόπει."
" σκοπῶ."
" αὐτὸ γάρ που ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὅλῳ τὸ ἓν ἐφάνη ὄν."
" ὀρθῶς."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἕν; "
" ναί."

"So insofar as it is the same, it will be unlike, according to the opposite qualification to the qualification that makes it like. So somehow 'the different' made it like?"
— "Yes."
"So 'the same' will make it unlike; otherwise, it will not be opposite to 'the different'."
— "So it seems." c
"Consequently, the one will be like and unlike the others—insofar as it is different, [it is] like, and insofar as it is the same, unlike."
— "Yes, it does indeed seem to admit of this sort of account."
"And also of this one."
— "Which one?"
"Insofar as it has been so affected as to be 'the same', it has been affected so as to be 'not of another kind'; and if it has been affected as being 'not of another kind', it is 'not unlike'; and if 'not unlike', it is 'like'. But insofar as it has been so affected as to be 'other', it has been affected so as to be 'of another kind'; and if it is of 'another kind', it is 'unlike'."
— "You speak the truth."
"Thus, since the one is the same as the others, and [also] different, in both ways and in either way, it would be both like and unlike the others."
— "Of course." d
"And it will be so, in exactly the same way, in regard to itself: since it was shown to be both different from itself and the same as itself, in both ways and in either [way], won't it be shown to be both like and unlike itself?"
— "Necessarily."

IN CONTACT/NOT IN CONTACT

"And what about this? Consider the question whether the one is in contact and not in contact with itself and with the others."
— "Very well."
"For the one was shown to be somehow in itself as a whole."
— "That's right."
"Isn't the one also in the others?"
— "Yes."

e " ἦ μὲν ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, τῶν ἄλλων ἅπτοιτο ἄν· ἦ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἀπείργοιτο ἅπτεσθαι, αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ ἅπτοιτο ἂν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄν."
" φαίνεται."
" οὕτω μὲν δὴ ἅπτοιτο ἂν τὸ ἓν αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων."
" ἅπτοιτο."
" τί δὲ τῇδε; ἆρ' οὐ πᾶν τὸ μέλλον ἅψεσθαί τινος ἐφεξῆς δεῖ κεῖσθαι ἐκείνῳ οὗ μέλλει ἅπτεσθαι, ταύτην τὴν ἕδραν κατέχον ἣ ἂν μετ' ἐκείνην ᾖ[93] ἧ[94] ἂν κέηται, ἅπτεται; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα εἰ μέλλει αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἅψεσθαι, ἐφεξῆς δεῖ εὐθὺς μεθ' ἑαυτὸ κεῖσθαι, τὴν ἐχομένην χώραν κατέχον ἐκείνης ἐν[95] ᾗ αὐτό ἐστιν."
" δεῖ γὰρ οὖν."
149 " οὐκοῦν δύο μὲν ὂν τὸ ἓν ποιήσειεν ἂν ταῦτα καὶ ἐν δυοῖν χώραιν ἅμα γένοιτο· ἕως δ' ἂν ᾖ ἕν, οὐκ ἐθελήσει; "
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
" ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τῷ ἑνὶ μήτε δύο εἶναι μήτε ἅπτεσθαι αὐτῷ αὑτοῦ."
" ἡ αὐτή."
" ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἅψεται."
" τί δή; "
" ὅτι, φαμέν, τὸ μέλλον ἅψεσθαι χωρὶς ὂν ἐφεξῆς δεῖ ἐκείνῳ εἶναι οὗ μέλλει ἅψεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν μέσῳ μηδὲν εἶναι."
" ἀληθῆ."
" δύο ἄρα δεῖ τὸ ὀλίγιστον εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει ἅψις εἶναι."
b " δεῖ."
" ἐὰν δὲ τοῖν δυοῖν ὅροιν τρίτον προσγένηται ἑξῆς, αὐτὰ μὲν τρία ἔσται, αἱ δὲ ἅψεις δύο."
" ναί."

93 ᾖ ἕδρα BT: ἕδρα om. **Bekker**: ἕδραν **Heindorf**.
94 ᾗ B: ᾖ T.
95 ἐν T: om. B.

"Then insofar as it is in the others, it would be in contact with the others, but insofar as it is in itself, it would be prevented from being e
in contact with the others, and, being in itself, would be in contact with itself."
— "Apparently."
"Thus the one would be in contact with itself and with the others."
— "It would."
"What about this: must not everything that is to contact something lie adjacent to that which it is to contact, occupying the place that lies next to what it contacts?"
— "Necessarily."
"And so the one, if it is to contact itself, must lie directly adjacent to itself, occupying the place contiguous to that in which it itself is."
— "Yes, it must."
"Now, if the one were two it would do that and it would come to be in 149
two places simultaneously, but as long as it is one, it will not?"
— "It will not."
"So by the same necessity the one can neither be two nor be in contact with itself."
— "Yes, by the same."
"But neither will it be in contact with the others."
— "Why?"
"Because, as we said, what is to contact [something] must, while being separate, be next to what it is to contact, and there must be no third thing between them."
— "True."
"So there must be at least two things if there is to be contact."
— "There must."
"But if to the two terms a third is added in succession, they will be b
three, yet their [points of] contact will be two."
— "Yes."

" καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀεὶ ἑνὸς προσγιγνομένου μία καὶ ἄψις προσγίγνεται, καὶ συμβαίνει τὰς ἄψεις τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀριθμῶν μιᾷ ἐλάττους εἶναι. ᾧ γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα δύο ἐπλεονέκτησε τῶν ἄψεων εἰς τὸ πλείω εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὰς ἄψεις, τῷ ἴσῳ τούτῳ καὶ ὁ ἔπειτα ἀριθμὸς
c πᾶς πασῶν τῶν ἄψεων πλεονεκτεῖ. ἤδη γὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν ἅμα ἕν τε τῷ ἀριθμῷ προσγίγνεται καὶ μία ἄψις ταῖς ἄψεσιν."
" ὀρθῶς."
" ὅσα ἄρα ἐστὶν τὰ ὄντα τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἀεὶ μιᾷ αἱ ἄψεις ἐλάττους εἰσὶν αὐτῶν."
" ἀληθῆ."
" εἰ δέ γε ἓν μόνον ἐστί, δυὰς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ἄψις οὐκ ἂν εἴη."
" πῶς γάρ; "
" οὔκουν, φαμέν, τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε μετέχει αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ ἄλλα ἐστίν."
" οὐ γάρ."
" οὐκ ἄρα ἔνεστιν[96] ἀριθμὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἑνὸς μὴ ἐνόντος[97] ἐν αὐτοῖς."
d " πῶς γάρ; "
" οὔτ' ἄρα ἕν ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε δύο οὔτε ἄλλου ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντα ὄνομα οὐδέν."
" οὔ."
" τὸ ἓν ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν ἕν, καὶ δυὰς οὐκ ἂν εἴη."
" οὐ φαίνεται."
" ἄψις ἄρα οὐκ ἔστι δυοῖν μὴ ὄντοιν."
" οὐκ ἔστιν."
" οὔτ' ἄρα τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων ἅπτεται οὔτε τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπείπερ ἄψις οὐκ ἔστιν."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
" οὕτω δὴ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἅπτεταί τε καὶ οὐχ ἅπτεται."
" ἔοικεν."
" Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνισον αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις; "
"πῶς; "

96 ἔνεστιν b: ἕν ἐστιν BT.
97 ἐνόντος b: ἓν ὄντος B: ὄντος T.

"Thus always when one is added, one [point of] contact is added as well, and it follows that the [points of] contact are always fewer by one than the multitude of the units. For every succeeding number of terms exceeds the number of contacts by just as much as the first two terms exceeded the number of contacts. So thereafter, at the same time c
both a one is added to the number and one [point of] contact is added to the contacts."
— "That's right."
"So however many the things are in number, the contacts are always fewer than they are by one."
— "True."
"But if there is only one, and not two, there would be no contact."
— "How could there be?"
"So let us say that the things other than one neither are one nor do they partake of it, if indeed they are other."
— "No, indeed."
"So number is not contained in the others, since one is not in them."[98]
— "Of course not."
"So the others are neither one nor two, nor do they have the name of d
any other number."
— "No."
"So the one alone is one, and it would not be a pair."
— "Apparently not."
"So there is no [point of] contact, since there is no duality."
— "There is not."
"Therefore, the one is not in contact with the others, nor the others with the one, since in fact there is no contact."
— "No, certainly not."
"So according to all of this, the one is both in contact and not in contact, both with the others and with itself."
— "So it seems."

EQUAL/UNEQUAL—LARGENESS/SMALLNESS

"Is it then both equal and unequal to itself and to the others?"
— "How so?"

98 Again, the lesson *enestin* instead of *hen estin* was chosen.

e " εἰ μεῖζον εἴη τὸ ἓν ἢ τἆλλα ἢ ἔλαττον, ἢ αὖ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μείζω ἢ ἐλάττω, ἆρα οὐκ ἂν τῷ μὲν ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς οὔτε τι μείζω οὔτε τι ἐλάττω ἂν εἴη ἀλλήλων αὐταῖς γε ταύταις ταῖς οὐσίαις· ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν πρὸς τῷ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἑκάτερα ἰσότητα ἔχοιεν, ἴσα ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ δὲ τὰ μὲν μέγεθος, τὸ[99] δὲ σμικρότητα, ἢ καὶ μέγεθος μὲν τὸ ἕν, σμικρότητα δὲ τἆλλα, ὁποτέρῳ μὲν τῷ εἴδει μέγεθος προσείη, μεῖζον ἂν εἴη, ᾧ δὲ σμικρότης, ἔλαττον; "

" ἀνάγκη."

" οὐκοῦν ἐστόν γέ[100] τινε τούτω εἴδη, τό τε μέγεθος καὶ ἡ σμικρότης; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που μὴ ὄντε γε ἐναντίω τε ἀλλήλοιν εἴτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐγγιγνοίσθην."

150 " πῶς γὰρ ἄν; "

" εἰ ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ σμικρότης ἐγγίγνεται, ἤτοι ἐν ὅλῳ ἂν ἢ ἐν μέρει αὐτοῦ ἐνείη."

" ἀνάγκη."

" τί δ᾽ εἰ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγίγνοιτο; οὐχὶ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ δι᾽ ὅλου αὐτοῦ τεταμένη εἴη ἢ περιέχουσα αὐτό; "

" δῆλον δή."

" ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου μὲν οὖσα ἡ σμικρότης τῷ ἑνὶ ἴση ἂν αὐτῷ εἴη, περιέχουσα δὲ μείζων; "

" πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; "

" δυνατὸν οὖν σμικρότητα ἴσην τῳ εἶναι ἢ μείζω τινός, καὶ πράττειν

b γε τὰ μεγέθους τε καὶ ἰσότητος, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῆς; "

" ἀδύνατον."

" ἐν μὲν ὅλῳ ἄρα τῷ ἑνὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη σμικρότης, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ, ἐν μέρει."

" ναί."

" οὐδέ[101] γε ἐν παντὶ αὖ τῷ μέρει· εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὰ ποιήσει ἅπερ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον· ἴση ἔσται ἢ μείζων τοῦ μέρους ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐνῇ."

" Ἀνάγκη."

" οὐδενί ποτε ἄρα ἐνέσται τῶν ὄντων σμικρότης, μήτ᾽ ἐν μέρει μήτ᾽ ἐν ὅλῳ ἐγγιγνομένη· οὐδέ τι ἔσται σμικρὸν πλὴν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος."

" οὐκ ἔοικεν."

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99 τὸ Par. 1810: τὰ BT.

100 γέ al.: τέ BT.

101 οὐδέ G. **Hermann**: οὔτε B: οὔτι T.

"If the one were larger or smaller than the others, or the others in turn e
larger or smaller than the one, then surely the one by being one, and
the others by being other than the one, would be neither larger nor
smaller than each other, by virtue of their own being? But if both of
them, in addition to their being of this sort, [also] possessed equality,
they would be equal to each other. And, if the others had largeness and
the one had smallness, or, if the others had smallness and the one had
largeness, whichever Form had largeness added to it would be larger,
and whichever had smallness added to it would be smaller?"
— "Necessarily."
"So then there are these two Forms, largeness and smallness? For if
somehow they were not two, they would not be opposite to each other,
and would not come to be in the 'things that are'."
— "No. How could they?" 150
"So, if smallness comes to be in the one, it would be either in the whole
of it or in part of it."
— "Necessarily."
"What if it were to come to be in the whole? Would it not be in the
one either by being extended equally throughout the whole of it, or
by containing it?"
— "Clearly."
"And if smallness were present equally throughout the one, wouldn't
it be equal to it, but if it contained the one, be larger?"
— "Of course."
"So can smallness be equal to something or larger than something,
and perform the tasks that belong to largeness and equality, but not b
[the tasks] that belong to itself?"
— "Impossible."
"So smallness could not be in the one as a whole, but if indeed it is in
the one, it would be in a part of it."
— "Yes."
"But, again, not in all that part. Otherwise, it will do the same [tasks]
as it did in regard to the whole: in each case it will be equal to or larger
than the part it is."
— "Necessarily."
"Therefore, smallness will never be in any of the things that are, nei-
ther coming to be in a part nor in a whole. Nor will anything be small
except smallness itself."
— "Apparently not."

c " οὐδ' ἄρα μέγεθος ἐνέσται ἐν αὐτῷ· μεῖζον γὰρ ἄν τι εἴη ἄλλο καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ μεγέθους, ἐκεῖνο ἐν ᾧ τὸ μέγεθος ἐνείη, καὶ ταῦτα σμικροῦ αὐτῷ οὐκ ὄντος, οὗ ἀνάγκη ὑπερέχειν, ἐάνπερ ᾖ μέγα· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ σμικρότης οὐδαμοῦ ἔνι."

" ἀληθῆ."

" ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτὸ μέγεθος οὐκ ἄλλου μεῖζον ἢ αὐτῆς σμικρότητος, οὐδὲ σμικρότης ἄλλου ἔλαττον ἢ αὐτοῦ μεγέθους."

" οὐ γάρ."

" οὔτε ἄρα τὰ ἄλλα μείζω τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ ἐλάττω, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε
d σμικρότητα ἔχοντα, οὔτε αὐτὼ τούτω πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἔχετον τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τοῦ ὑπερέχειν καὶ ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλω, οὔτε αὖ τὸ ἓν τούτοιν οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μεῖζον ἂν οὐδ' ἔλαττον εἴη, μήτε μέγεθος μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον."

" οὔκουν φαίνεταί γε."

" ἆρ' οὖν, εἰ μήτε μεῖζον μήτε ἔλαττον τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ἐκείνων μήτε ὑπερέχειν μήτε ὑπερέχεσθαι; "

" ἀνάγκη."

" οὐκοῦν τό γε μήτε ὑπερέχον μήτε ὑπερεχόμενον πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐξ ἴσου εἶναι, ἐξ ἴσου δὲ ὂν ἴσον εἶναι."

e " πῶς γὰρ οὔ; "

" καὶ μὴν καὶ αὐτό γε τὸ ἓν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ οὕτως ἂν ἔχοι· μήτε μέγεθος ἐν ἑαυτῷ μήτε σμικρότητα ἔχον οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοιτο οὔτ' ἂν ὑπερέχοι ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἴσου ὂν ἴσον ἂν εἴη ἑαυτῷ."

" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."

" τὸ ἓν ἄρα ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον ἂν εἴη."

" φαίνεται."

" καὶ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτὸ ἂν εἴη ἔξωθεν, καὶ
151 περιέχον μὲν μεῖζον ἂν ἑαυτοῦ εἴη, περιεχόμενον δὲ ἔλαττον, καὶ οὕτω μεῖζον ἂν καὶ ἔλαττον εἴη αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἕν."

" εἴη γὰρ ἄν."

" οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἀνάγκη, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἑνός τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων; "

" πῶς γὰρ οὔ; "

"So largeness will not be in it either. For if it were, there would be some other thing [besides largeness itself], namely, that in which largeness is—and this without smallness being present in it too [i.e., in the one], which largeness must exceed if indeed it is to be large. But this is impossible, since smallness is not present in anything." c
— "True."
"But largeness itself is not larger than anything other than smallness itself, nor is smallness smaller than anything other than largeness itself."
— "No, they are not."
"So the others are neither larger nor smaller than the one, since they have neither largeness nor smallness. Nor do these two themselves [i.e., largeness and smallness] have the capacity of either exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but [only] in relation to each other. Nor, again, could the one be larger or smaller than the others, since it has neither largeness nor smallness." d
— "No, evidently not."
"So if the one is neither larger nor smaller than the others, it must neither exceed them nor be exceeded by them?"
— "Necessarily."
"Now, what neither exceeds nor is exceeded must by necessity be even, and since it is even throughout, it is equal."
— "Certainly." e
"And the one would also be so in relation to itself: having neither largeness nor smallness in itself, it would neither exceed itself, nor be exceeded by itself, but being equal throughout, it would be equal to itself."
— "Absolutely."
"Therefore the one would be equal to itself and to the others."
— "Apparently."
"However, the one, being in itself, would also be around itself on the outside; and containing itself, it would be larger than itself; yet being 151
contained, it would be smaller; and thus it would be both larger and smaller that itself."
— "Yes, it would be."
"And isn't this also necessary: that there be nothing outside the one and the others?"
— "No doubt."

" ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναί που δεῖ τό γε ὂν ἀεί."
" ναί."
" οὐκοῦν τό γε ἕν τῳ ὂν ἐν μείζονι ἔσται ἔλαττον ὄν; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἴη."
" οὐ γάρ."
" ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἔστι χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, δεῖ δὲ αὐτὰ ἕν τῳ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι, τά τε ἄλλα ἐν τῷ
b ἑνὶ καὶ τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδαμοῦ εἶναι; "
" φαίνεται."
" ὅτι μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔνεστι, μείζω ἂν εἴη τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, περιέχοντα αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ἓν ἔλαττον τῶν ἄλλων, περιεχόμενον· ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον μεῖζον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλάττω."
" ἔοικεν."
" τὸ ἓν ἄρα ἴσον τε καὶ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττόν ἐστιν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων."
" φαίνεται."
" καὶ μὴν εἴπερ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ
c πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν."
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μέτρων ὂν καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἔλαττον ἂν καὶ πλέον εἴη αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἴσον αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατὰ ταὐτά."
" πῶς; "
" ὅνπερ μεῖζόν ἐστι, πλειόνων που καὶ μέτρων ἂν εἴη αὐτῶν· ὅσων δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν· καὶ ὧν ἔλαττον, ὡσαύτως· καὶ οἷς ἴσον, κατὰ ταὐτά."
" οὕτως."
d " οὐκοῦν ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον ὂν καὶ ἴσον ἴσων ἂν εἴη μέτρων καὶ πλειόνων καὶ ἐλαττόνων αὑτῷ, ἐπειδὴ δὲ μέτρων, καὶ μερῶν; "

"But surely what is must always be somewhere."[102]
— "Yes."
"Then won't that which is in something be in something larger [than itself], since it is smaller? Otherwise, one thing could not be in another thing."
— "No, it could not."
"Since there is nothing else apart from the others and the one, and since they must be in something, must they not forthwith be in each other—the others in the one and the one in the others—or else be nowhere at all?"
— "Apparently." b
"So because the one is in the others, the others would be larger than the one, since they contain it, and the one would be smaller than the others, since it is contained. But because the others are in the one, by the same account the one would be larger than the others, whereas the others [would be] smaller than the one."
— "So it seems."
"Therefore the one is equal to, and larger and smaller than, both itself and the others."
— "Evidently."
"And if in fact it is larger and smaller and equal, it would be of equal, and more, and fewer measures than itself and the others, and since of c measures, also of parts."
— "Of course."
"So since it is of equal and more and fewer measures, it would also be fewer and more in number than itself and the others, and, in the same respect, equal to itself and to the others."
— "How so?"
"It would somehow have more measures than the things it is larger than—having as many measures as parts—and in like manner, less than those it is smaller than, and in the same respect, equal to those it is equal with."
— "Just so."
"Then, since it is larger and smaller than and equal to itself, would it not be of equal and more and fewer measures than itself? And since d of measures, also of parts?"

102 This claim and the one in the next line are assumed by **Cornford** to be restatements of Gorgias' arguments in **Aristotle**, *MXG* 979b22 (*Plato and Parmenides,* 148–149).

" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" ἴσων μὲν ἄρα μερῶν ὂν αὐτῷ ἴσον ἂν τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῷ εἴη, πλειόνων δὲ πλέον, ἐλαττόνων δὲ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ."
" φαίνεται."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα ὡσαύτως ἕξει τὸ ἕν; ὅτι μὲν μεῖζον αὐτῶν φαίνεται, ἀνάγκη πλέον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν· ὅτι δὲ σμικρότερον, ἔλαττον· ὅτι δὲ ἴσον μεγέθει, ἴσον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις; "
" ἀνάγκη."
e " οὕτω δὴ αὖ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἓν καὶ ἴσον καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων."
" ἔσται."
" Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἕν, καὶ ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὐτό τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων, χρόνου μετέχον; "
" πῶς; "
" εἶναι μέν που αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει, εἴπερ ἓν ἔστιν."
" ναί."
152 " τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ μέθεξις οὐσίας μετὰ χρόνου τοῦ παρόντος, ὥσπερ τὸ ἦν μετὰ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ αὖ τὸ ἔσται μετὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐσίας ἐστὶ κοινωνία; "
" ἔστι γάρ."
" μετέχει μὲν ἄρα χρόνου, εἴπερ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι."
" πάνυ γε."
" οὐκοῦν πορευομένου τοῦ χρόνου; "
" ναί."
" ἀεὶ ἄρα πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται ἑαυτοῦ, εἴπερ προέρχεται κατὰ χρόνον."
" ἀνάγκη."
" ἆρ' οὖν μεμνήμεθα ὅτι νεωτέρου γιγνομένου τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται; "
" μεμνήμεθα."

— "Of course."
"So being of parts equal to itself, it would be equal to itself in multitude, and if it consists of more parts, it would be more than itself in number, and if of fewer, it would be less?"
— "Apparently."
"Now, will not the one also relate similarly to the others? Because if it appears larger than they, must it not also be more than they are in number; and because it appears smaller, fewer; and because it appears equal in largeness, then also equal to the others in quantity?"
— "Necessarily."
"And so once again, as it seems, the one will be equal, and more, and e
fewer, in number than itself and the others."
— "It will."

CODA

TIME—OLDER, YOUNGER, SAME AGE

"So does the one also partake of time? Is it, and does it come to be, both younger and older than itself and than the others, and neither younger nor older than either itself or the others, if it partakes of time?"
— "How do you mean?"
"If indeed the one is, then 'to be' belongs to it in some way."
— "Yes."
"But is 'the to be' anything else but the partaking of being together with 'time present', just as 'the was' is communion with being together 152
with 'time past', and, again, 'the will be' is communion with being together with 'time to come'?"
— "Yes, it is."
"So it partakes of time, if in fact it also partakes of being."
— "Certainly."
"Of time moving forward?"
— "Yes."
"So it always comes to be older than itself, if indeed it moves forward in accordance with time."
— "Necessarily."
"Now, we recall that the older comes to be older than that which comes to be younger?"
— "We do."

b " οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ γίγνεται τὸ ἕν, νεωτέρου ἂν γιγνομένου ἑαυτοῦ πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτο; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" γίγνεται μὲν δὴ νεώτερόν τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον αὑτοῦ οὕτως."
" ναί."
" ἔστι δὲ πρεσβύτερον ἆρ' οὐχ ὅταν κατὰ τὸν νῦν χρόνον ᾖ γιγνόμενον τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται; οὐ γάρ που πορευόμενόν γε ἐκ τοῦ ποτὲ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα ὑπερβήσεται τὸ νῦν."
" οὐ γάρ."
c " ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐπίσχει τότε τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον, ἐπειδὰν τῷ νῦν ἐντύχῃ καὶ οὐ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἔστι τότ' ἤδη πρεσβύτερον; προϊὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ληφθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ προϊὸν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐφάπτεσθαι, τοῦ τε νῦν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα, τοῦ μὲν νῦν ἀφιέμενον, τοῦ δ' ἔπειτα ἐπιλαμβανόμενον, μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων γιγνόμενον, τοῦ τε ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν."
" ἀληθῆ."
" εἰ δέ γε ἀνάγκη μὴ παρελθεῖν τὸ νῦν πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἐπειδὰν
d κατὰ τοῦτο ᾖ, ἐπίσχει ἀεὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ γιγνόμενον."
" φαίνεται."
" καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν, ἐπέσχεν τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι τότε πρεσβύτερον."
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
" οὐκοῦν οὗπερ ἐγίγνετο πρεσβύτερον, τούτου καὶ ἔστιν· ἐγίγνετο δὲ αὑτοῦ; "
" ναί."
" ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρεσβύτερον νεωτέρου πρεσβύτερον; "
" ἔστιν."
" καὶ νεώτερον ἄρα τότε αὑτοῦ ἐστι τὸ ἕν, ὅταν πρεσβύτερον
e γιγνόμενον ἐντύχῃ τῷ νῦν."
" ἀνάγκη."
" τό γε μὴν νῦν ἀεὶ πάρεστι τῷ ἑνὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι· ἔστι γὰρ ἀεὶ νῦν ὅτανπερ ᾖ."
" πῶς γὰρ οὔ; "
" ἀεὶ ἄρα ἐστί τε καὶ γίγνεται πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νεώτερον τὸ ἕν."
" ἔοικεν."
" πλείω δὲ χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἢ τὸν ἴσον; "

"Then, since the one comes to be older than itself, wouldn't it come to b
be older than the self that comes to be younger?"
— "Necessarily."
"Thus it comes to be both younger and older than itself."
— "Yes."
"But it is older, is it not, whenever in coming to be it is in the present
time, between 'the was' and 'the will be'? For as it advances from 'the
before' to 'the afterwards', it will certainly not skip over 'the now'."
— "No, it will not."
"Then does not it cease to come to be older when it comes upon 'the c
now', and then no longer comes to be older, but already is older? For
if it were moving ahead, it could never be seized by 'the now'. For
what moves ahead is in such a state as to contact both 'the now' and
'the afterwards', letting go of 'the now' and grasping 'the afterwards',
while coming to be between the two, 'the afterwards' and 'the now'."
— "True."
"But, if everything that comes to be cannot circumvent 'the now',
whenever something reaches this point, it always ceases coming to be d
whatever it may come to be, and then it is this."
— "Apparently."
"And so, too, with the one: whenever while coming to be older it comes
upon 'the now', it ceases coming to be older, and then it is older."
— "Of course."
"And therefore it is older than what it was coming to be older than—
and wasn't it coming to be older than itself?"
— "Yes."
"And the older is older than a younger?"
— "It is."
"So the one is then also younger than itself, whenever in its coming to
be older it comes upon 'the now'."
— "Necessarily."
"But 'the now' always accompanies the one throughout its existence, e
for the one always is now, whenever it is."
— "Of course."
"Therefore the one always is and comes to be both older and younger
than itself."
— "So it seems."
"Is it or does it come to be, for a longer time than itself, or for an equal
time?"

" τὸν ἴσον."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν τόν γε ἴσον χρόνον ἢ γιγνόμενον ἢ ὂν τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχει."
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" τὸ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἔχον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερόν ἐστιν."
" οὐ γάρ."
" τὸ ἓν ἄρα τὸν ἴσον χρόνον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ὂν οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν οὐδὲ[103] γίγνεται."
" οὔ μοι δοκεῖ."
153 " τί δέ; τῶν ἄλλων; "
" οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν."
" τόδε γε μὴν ἔχεις λέγειν, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ ἕτερά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἕτερον, πλείω ἐστὶν ἑνός· ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ ὂν ἓν ἂν ἦν· ἕτερα δὲ ὄντα πλείω ἑνός ἐστι καὶ πλῆθος ἂν ἔχοι."
" ἔχοι γὰρ ἄν."
" πλῆθος δὲ ὂν ἀριθμοῦ πλείονος ἂν μετέχοι ἢ τοῦ ἑνός."
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" τί οὖν; ἀριθμοῦ φήσομεν τὰ πλείω γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ γεγονέναι πρότερον, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω; "
" τὰ ἐλάττω."
b " τὸ ὀλίγιστον ἄρα πρῶτον· τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ ἕν. ἦ γάρ; "
" ναί."
" πάντων ἄρα τὸ ἓν πρῶτον γέγονε τῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐχόντων. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ ἄλλα καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐστίν."
" ἔχει γάρ."
" πρῶτον δέ γε, οἶμαι, γεγονὸς πρότερον γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὕστερον· τὰ δ' ὕστερον γεγονότα νεώτερα τοῦ πρότερον γεγονότος· καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη τἆλλα νεώτερα τοῦ ἑνός, τὸ δὲ ἓν πρεσβύτερον τῶν ἄλλων."
" εἴη γὰρ ἄν."
" Τί δὲ τόδε; ἆρ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν παρὰ φύσιν τὴν αὑτοῦ γεγονός, ἢ ἀδύνατον; "
" ἀδύνατον."
c " ἀλλὰ μὴν μέρη γε ἔχον ἐφάνη τὸ ἕν, εἰ δὲ μέρη, καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσον."
" ναί."

103 οὐδὲ **Heindorf**: οὔτε B.

— "An equal time."
"But what comes to be, or is, for an equal [amount of] time is of the same age."
— "Of course."
"And that which is of the same age is neither older nor younger."
— "No."
"So since the one comes to be and is for a time equal to itself, it neither is nor comes to be younger or older than itself."
— "I don't think so."
"Well, then, what about the others?"
— "I cannot say."
"But surely you can say this: those other than the one, if indeed they 153
are different things and not *a* different thing, are more than one. For if they were a different thing, they would be one, but being different things they are more than one and have multitude."
— "Yes, they would."
"And, being a multitude, they would partake of a greater number than of the one."
— "Of course."
"And when it comes to number, what shall we say comes to be and has come to be earlier: 'the more' or 'the less'?"
— "'The less'."
"So the least [i.e., the fewest] comes first, and this is the one, isn't it?"
— "Yes."
"So among all the things that have number, the one has come to be b
first. And all the others, too, have number, if indeed they are others and not an other."
— "Yes, they have."
"But what has come to be first, has I think, come to be earlier, and the others later; and those that have come to be later are younger than what has come to be earlier. And so the others would be younger than the one, and the one older than the others."
— "Yes, they would."
"And what about this? Would the one have come to be contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?"
— "Impossible." c
"But the one was shown to have parts, and if parts, then also a beginning, and an end, and a middle."
— "Yes."

" οὐκοῦν πάντων πρῶτον ἀρχὴ γίγνεται, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα μέχρι τοῦ τέλους; "
" τί μήν; "
" καὶ μὴν μόριά γε φήσομεν ταῦτ' εἶναι πάντα τἆλλα τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνός, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ γεγονέναι ἕν τε καὶ ὅλον."
" φήσομεν γάρ."
d " τελευτὴ δέ γε, οἶμαι, ὕστατον γίγνεται· τούτῳ δ' ἅμα τὸ ἓν πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι· ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν μὴ παρὰ φύσιν γίγνεσθαι, ἅμα τελευτῇ ἂν γεγονὸς ὕστατον ἂν τῶν ἄλλων πεφυκὸς εἴη γίγνεσθαι."
" φαίνεται."
" νεώτερον ἄρα τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἕν ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα."
" οὕτως αὖ μοι φαίνεται."
" τί δὲ δή; ἀρχὴν ἢ ἄλλο μέρος ὁτιοῦν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν, ἐάνπερ μέρος ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ μέρη, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἓν εἶναι, μέρος γε ὄν; "
e " ἀνάγκη."
" οὐκοῦν τὸ ἓν ἅμα τε τῷ πρώτῳ γιγνομένῳ γίγνοιτ' ἂν καὶ ἅμα τῷ δευτέρῳ, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀπολείπεται τῶν ἄλλων γιγνομένων, ὅτιπερ ἂν προσγίγνηται ὁτῳοῦν, ἕως ἂν πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον διελθὸν ὅλον ἓν γένηται, οὔτε μέσου οὔτε πρώτου οὔτε ἐσχάτου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἀπολειφθὲν ἐν τῇ γενέσει."
" ἀληθῆ."
" πᾶσιν ἄρα τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν ἴσχει τὸ ἕν. ὥστ' εἰ μὴ
154 παρὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον τῶν ἄλλων γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη, ἀλλ' ἅμα. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός· κατὰ δὲ τὸν πρόσθεν πρεσβυτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον, καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνου ὡσαύτως."
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
" ἔστι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχον τε καὶ γεγονός. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τἆλλα
b τοῦ ἑνός, καὶ μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον γίγνεσθαι; ἆρα ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ἔχει, ἢ ἑτέρως; "
" οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν."

"Then doesn't the beginning come first for all things—both for the one itself and for each of the others—and after the beginning, everything else as well until the end?"
— "Certainly."
"Furthermore, we shall say that all these others are parts of the whole and of the one, and that this itself—as one and whole—has come to be concurrently with the end."
— "Yes, we shall."
"I take it that the end comes to be last, and oneness by nature comes d
to be concurrently with it. So if indeed the one itself must not come to be contrary to its own nature, in coming to be concurrently with the end, it naturally comes to be last of all the others."
— "Apparently."
"Therefore, the one is younger than the others, and the others are older than the one."
— "Again, so it appears to me."
"But then: must not a beginning, or any other part of the one whatsoever, or of anything else—if indeed it is *a* part, and not parts—be necessarily one, given that it is a part?"
— "Necessarily."
"So the one would come to be concurrently with the first that comes to be and concurrently with the second, and it is absent from none of the e
others that come to be—regardless of what is added to what—until, by reaching the last [point in the sequence], it comes to be one whole [thing], lacking in its coming-to-be neither of the middle, nor the last, nor the first, nor of any other."
— "True."
"Therefore, the one is of the same age as all the others. And so, if the one itself is not by nature contrary to its own nature, it would have come to be neither before nor after the others, but at the same time. 154
By this account, the one would be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others [older or younger] than the one. But according to our previous [account], it was older and younger [than the others], and likewise the others [were older and younger] than it."
— "Of course."

" ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ τοσόνδε γε, ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, γίγνεσθαί γε αὐτὸ πρεσβύτερον ἔτι ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς γενόμενον διήνεγκε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δύναιτο, οὐδ᾽ αὖ τὸ νεώτερον ὂν ἔτι νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι· ἀνίσοις γὰρ ἴσα προστιθέμενα, χρόνῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ἴσῳ ποιεῖ διαφέρειν ἀεὶ ὅσῳπερ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον διενέγκῃ."
" πῶς γὰρ οὔ; "
c " οὐκ ἄρα τό γε ὂν τοῦ[104] ὄντος γίγνοιτ᾽ ἄν ποτε πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲ νεώτερον, εἴπερ ἴσῳ διαφέρει ἀεὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν· ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι καὶ γέγονε πρεσβύτερον, τὸ δὲ νεώτερον, γίγνεται δ᾽ οὔ."
" ἀληθῆ."
" καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα ὂν τῶν ἄλλων ὄντων οὔτε πρεσβύτερόν ποτε οὔτε νεώτερον γίγνεται."
" οὐ γὰρ οἷόν."
" ὅρα δὲ εἰ τῇδε πρεσβύτερα καὶ νεώτερα γίγνεται."
" πῇ δή; "
" ᾗ τό τε ἓν τῶν ἄλλων ἐφάνη πρεσβύτερον καὶ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός."
" τί οὖν; "
d " ὅταν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον ᾖ, πλείω που χρόνον γέγονεν ἢ τὰ ἄλλα."
" ναί."
" πάλιν δὴ σκόπει· ἐὰν πλέονι καὶ ἐλάττονι χρόνῳ προστιθῶμεν τὸν ἴσον χρόνον, ἆρα τῷ ἴσῳ μορίῳ διοίσει τὸ πλέον τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἢ σμικροτέρῳ; "
" σμικροτέρῳ."
" οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται, ὅτιπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἦν πρὸς τἆλλα ἡλικίᾳ διαφέρον τὸ ἕν, τοῦτο καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔπειτα, ἀλλὰ ἴσον λαμβάνον χρόνον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔλαττον ἀεὶ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ διοίσει αὐτῶν ἢ πρότερον· ἢ οὔ; "
e " ναί."
" οὐκοῦν τό γε ἔλαττον διαφέρον ἡλικίᾳ πρός τι ἢ πρότερον νεώτερον γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἃ ἦν πρεσβύτερον πρότερον; "

104 τοῦ ἑνὸς BT: ἑνὸς secl. **Schleiermacher**.

"This is how it is and has come to be. But then again, what about its coming to be *both* older and younger, and neither younger nor older, than the others, and the others than the one? Is the case with coming-to-be just as it is with being, or is it different?"
— "I cannot say."
"But I can say at least this much: if one thing is older than another b
thing, it could not come to be even older by an amount greater than its original difference in age; nor, again, could the younger come to be still younger. For adding equals to unequals, whether to time or to anything else whatsoever, always makes them different by an amount equal to that by which they originally differed."
— "Of course."
"So 'that which is' could never come to be older or younger than any c
other 'that which is', if indeed they always differ in age by an equal amount. Yet [one] is and has come to be older, and the other younger, though they are not [in the process of] coming to be so. So the one as well, since it is, never comes to be either older or younger than the others that are."
— "No, it does not."
"But consider then whether it comes to be older and younger in this way."
— "In what way?"
"In the way that the one was shown to be older than the others and the others than the one."
— "What of that?"
"Whenever the one is older than the others, it has somehow come to be for a longer time than the others."
— "Yes." d
"Then consider again: if we add an equal time to more and to less time, will the more differ from the less by an equal or a smaller portion?"
— "A smaller one."
"So whatever the proportional difference in age there is originally between the one and the others, this will not continue thereafter, but by obtaining the equal [amount of] time as the others, the difference in age between them will constantly come to be less than before. Is this not so?"
— "Yes."
"So wouldn't that which differs from something in age less than it e
previously did come to be younger than it previously was, in relation to those it was previously older than?"
— "Younger."

" νεώτερον."
" εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνο νεώτερον, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα αὖ τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τὸ ἓν πρεσβύτερα ἢ πρότερον; "
" πάνυ γε."
" τὸ μὲν νεώτερον ἄρα γεγονὸς πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γεγονός τε καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὄν, ἔστι δὲ οὐδέποτε πρεσβύτερον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρεσβύτερον· ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ νεώτερον
155 ἐπιδίδωσιν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον. τὸ δ' αὖ πρεσβύτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου νεώτερον γίγνεται ὡσαύτως. ἰόντε γὰρ αὐτοῖν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοιν γίγνεσθον, τὸ μὲν νεώτερον πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου, τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον νεώτερον τοῦ νεωτέρου· γενέσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἂν οἷω τε εἴτην. εἰ γὰρ γένοιντο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γίγνοιντο, ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄν. νῦν δὲ γίγνονται μὲν πρεσβύτερα ἀλλήλων καὶ νεώτερα· τὸ μὲν ἓν
b τῶν ἄλλων νεώτερον γίγνεται, ὅτι πρεσβύτερον ἐφάνη ὂν καὶ πρότερον γεγονός, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πρεσβύτερα, ὅτι ὕστερα γέγονε. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἴσχει, ἐπειδήπερ αὐτοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐφάνη καὶ πρότερα γεγονότα."
" φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτως."
" οὐκοῦν ᾗ μὲν οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου πρεσβύτερον γίγνεται οὐδὲ νεώτερον, κατὰ τὸ ἴσῳ ἀριθμῷ ἀλλήλων ἀεὶ διαφέρειν, οὔτε τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον γίγνοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ νεώτερον, οὔτε τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός· ᾗ
c δὲ ἄλλῳ ἀεὶ μορίῳ διαφέρειν ἀνάγκη τὰ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων γενόμενα καὶ τὰ ὕστερα τῶν προτέρων, ταύτῃ δὴ ἀνάγκη πρεσβύτερά τε καὶ νεώτερα ἀλλήλων γίγνεσθαι τά τε ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων; "
"πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
" κατὰ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν αὐτό τε αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον οὔτ' ἔστιν οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε αὑτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων."
" παντελῶς μὲν οὖν."
d " ἐπειδὴ δὲ χρόνου μετέχει τὸ ἓν καὶ τοῦ πρεσβυτερόν τε καὶ νεώτερον γίγνεσθαι, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦ ποτὲ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα καὶ τοῦ νῦν, εἴπερ χρόνου μετέχει; "

"But if it comes to be younger, do not those others, in turn, [come to be] older than before, in relation to the one?"
— "Certainly."
"So the younger that came to be [later] comes to be older in relation to what came to be earlier and is older, and it never is older, but it is constantly coming to be older than that [i.e., the older]. For it [i.e., the older] advances toward the younger and the younger toward the 155
older. And again, in like manner the older comes to be younger than the younger. Thus, by going in opposite directions, they come to be the opposite of each other, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. But they cannot [arrive] in their coming to be. For if they arrived, they would no longer come to be, but would [already] be in that way. But as it is, they are coming to be older and younger than each other. The one comes to be younger than the others, because it was shown to be older and to have come to be earlier, b
whereas the others come to be older than the one, because they have come to be later. And, by the same account, the others, too, are related in this way to the one, since indeed, they were shown to be older than the one and to have come to be earlier."
— "Yes, it appears this way."
"Then, insofar as nothing comes to be older or younger than any other thing—by reason of their always differing from one another by an equal amount—neither would the one come to be older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one. But, insofar as what comes to c
be earlier must differ from what comes to be later by an amount that is always different—and also the later from the earlier—then, in the same way is it not necessary that they come to be older and younger than each other, the others than the one and the one than the others?"
— "Of course."
"Then according to all this, the one itself is and comes to be older and younger than itself and the others, and it neither is nor comes to be either older or younger than itself or the others."
— "Absolutely."
"And since the one partakes of time and of coming to be older and d
younger, must it not then also partake of 'the before', and 'the after', and of 'the now', if indeed it partakes of time?"

" ἀνάγκη."
" ἦν ἄρα τὸ ἓν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ ἐγίγνετο καὶ γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται."
" τί μήν; "
" καὶ εἴη ἄν τι ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐκείνου, καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται."
" πάνυ γε."
" καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ εἴη ἂν αὐτοῦ καὶ δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις, εἴπερ καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα πράττομεν."
" ὀρθῶς λέγεις."
" καὶ ὄνομα δὴ καὶ λόγος ἔστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὀνομάζεται καὶ λέγεται·
e καὶ ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἓν ἔστιν."
" παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει οὕτως."
" Ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν. τὸ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν οἷον διεληλύθαμεν, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτό, ἕν τε ὂν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἓν μήτε πολλὰ καὶ μετέχον χρόνου, ὅτι μὲν ἔστιν ἕν, οὐσίας μετέχειν ποτέ, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ μετέχειν αὖ ποτε οὐσίας; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" ἆρ' οὖν, ὅτε μετέχει, οἷόν τε ἔσται τότε μὴ μετέχειν, ἢ ὅτε μὴ μετέχει, μετέχειν; "
" οὐχ οἷόν τε."
" ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄρα χρόνῳ μετέχει καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὐ μετέχει· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
156 μόνως τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοι τε καὶ οὐ μετέχοι."
" ὀρθῶς."
" οὐκοῦν ἔστι καὶ οὗτος χρόνος, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ὅτε ἀπαλλάττεται αὐτοῦ; ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε ἔσται τοτὲ μὲν ἔχειν τὸ αὐτό, τοτὲ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, ἐὰν μή ποτε καὶ λαμβάνῃ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀφίῃ; "
" οὐδαμῶς."
" τὸ δὴ οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν ἆρά γε οὐ γίγνεσθαι καλεῖς; "
" ἔγωγε."
" τὸ δὲ ἀπαλλάττεσθαι οὐσίας ἆρα οὐκ ἀπόλλυσθαι; "

— "Necessarily."
"Therefore, the one 'was' and 'is' and 'will be', and 'was coming to be' and 'comes to be' and 'will come to be'."
— "Certainly."
"And something could belong to it and be of it, [along with] 'was' and 'is' and 'will be'."
— "Of course."
"And there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it, since indeed we are currently performing all those actions in regard to it."
— "What you say is right."
"And a name and an account belong to it, and it is named and spoken of. And as many such things [i.e., attributes] happen to pertain to the e
others, they also pertain to the one."
— "That's completely so."

CONCLUSION: RESULTS OF ARGUMENTS I AND II

"Let us speak of it again for a third time: if the one is as we have described it—both one and many and neither one nor many, and partaking of time—must it not, since it is one, sometimes partake of being, and in turn, sometimes not partake of being because it *is* not [one]?"
— "By necessity."
"When it partakes [of being], will it at that time be able not to partake, or to partake, when it doesn't partake?"
— "It will not be able to."
"So it partakes at one time and does not partake at another, for only in this way could it both partake and not partake of the same thing." 156
— "Right."

COMING-TO-BE/CEASING-TO-BE

"Then isn't there also a [given] time when it takes part in being, and when it relinquishes it? Or, how will it be able at one time to have the same [thing] and at another time not have it, unless it sometimes both obtains it and releases it?"
— "There is no way."
"So do you not call taking part in being 'coming-to-be'?"
— "Yes, I do."
"And then relinquishing being 'ceasing-to-be'?"

" καὶ πάνυ γε."
" τὸ ἓν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, λαμβάνον τε καὶ ἀφιὲν οὐσίαν γίγνεταί τε καὶ
b ἀπόλλυται."
" ἀνάγκη."
" ἓν δὲ καὶ πολλὰ ὂν καὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον ἆρ' οὐχ, ὅταν μὲν γίγνηται ἕν, τὸ πολλὰ εἶναι ἀπόλλυται, ὅταν δὲ πολλά, τὸ ἓν εἶναι ἀπόλλυται; "
" πάνυ γε."
" ἓν δὲ γιγνόμενον καὶ πολλὰ ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαί τε καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι; "
" πολλή γε."
" καὶ μὴν ἀνόμοιόν γε καὶ ὅμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ὁμοιοῦσθαί τε καὶ ἀνομοιοῦσθαι; "
" ναί."
c " καὶ ὅταν μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον καὶ ἴσον, αὐξάνεσθαί τε καὶ φθίνειν καὶ ἰσοῦσθαι; "
" οὕτως."
" ὅταν δὲ κινούμενόν τε ἵστηται καὶ ὅταν ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μεταβάλλῃ, δεῖ δή που αὐτό γε μηδ' ἐν ἑνὶ χρόνῳ εἶναι."
" πῶς δή; "
" ἑστός τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἑστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν."
" πῶς γάρ; "
" χρόνος δέ γε οὐδεὶς ἔστιν, ἐν ᾧ τι οἷόν τε ἅμα μήτε κινεῖσθαι μήτε ἑστάναι."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
" ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν."
" οὐκ εἰκός."
" πότ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὔτε γὰρ ἑστὸς ὂν[105] οὔτε κινούμενον
d μεταβάλλει, οὔτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
" ἆρ' οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἄτοπον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τότ' ἂν εἴη, ὅτε μεταβάλλει; "
" τὸ ποῖον δή; "

105 ὂν B: ἂν T.

— "Certainly."
"Indeed, the one, as it seems, when it obtains and releases being, comes to be and ceases to be." b
— "By necessity."
"And since it is one and many and comes to be and ceases to be, does it not then, when it comes to be one, cease to be as many, and when it comes to be many, cease to be as one?"
— "Certainly."
"And since it comes to be one and many, must it not be separated and combined?"
— "Very much so."
"And whenever it comes to be like and unlike, must it not be made like and unlike?"
— "Yes."
"And whenever it comes to be larger and smaller and equal, must it not be increased and decreased and made equal?"
— "Just so."

THE INSTANT

"And whenever, being in motion, it comes to rest, and whenever, being at rest, it changes to moving, it itself must somehow be in no time at all." c
— "How is that?"
"It will not be able to be initially at rest and afterwards in motion, or initially in motion and afterwards at rest, without changing."
— "Of course not."
"But there is no time in which something can, simultaneously, be neither in motion nor at rest."
— "Certainly not."
"But surely, neither does it change without changing."
— "Hardly."
"So when does it change? For this happens neither when it is at rest, nor when it is in motion, nor when it is in time." d
— "No, it does not."
"Is there, then, this oddity in which it would be just when it changes?"
— "What kind of oddity?"

" τὸ ἐξαίφνης. τὸ γὰρ ἐξαίφνης τοιόνδε τι ἔοικε σημαίνειν, ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλον εἰς ἑκάτερον. οὐ γὰρ ἔκ γε τοῦ ἑστάναι ἑστῶτος ἔτι μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως κινουμένης ἔτι μεταβάλλει· ἀλλὰ
e ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἑστάναι καὶ τὸ ἑστὸς ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι."

" κινδυνεύει."

" καὶ τὸ ἓν δή, εἴπερ ἕστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλοι ἂν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα· μόνως γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἀμφότερα ποιοῖ· μεταβάλλον δ' ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἂν εἴη, οὐδὲ κινοῖτ' ἂν τότε, οὐδ' ἂν σταίη."

" οὐ γάρ."

" ἆρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας μεταβολὰς ἔχει, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι
157 εἰς τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μεταβάλλῃ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, μεταξύ τινων τότε γίγνεται κινήσεών τε καὶ στάσεων, καὶ οὔτε ἔστι τότε οὔτε οὐκ ἔστι, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται; "

" ἔοικε γοῦν."

" κατὰ δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἰὸν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἐφ' ἓν οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, οὔτε διακρίνεται οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἐπὶ ἀνόμοιον καὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίου ἐπὶ ὅμοιον ἰὸν οὔτε ὅμοιον
b οὔτε ἀνόμοιον, οὔτε ὁμοιούμενον οὔτε ἀνομοιούμενον· καὶ ἐκ σμικροῦ ἐπὶ μέγα καὶ ἐπὶ ἴσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἰὸν οὔτε σμικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε ἴσον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθῖνον οὔτε ἰσούμενον εἴη ἄν."

" οὐκ ἔοικε."

" ταῦτα δὴ τὰ παθήματα πάντ' ἂν πάσχοι τὸ ἕν, εἰ ἔστιν."

" πῶς δ' οὔ; "

"The instant. The instant seems to signify the kind of thing from which there is changing in each of two directions. For something does not change from rest while it is still resting, or from motion while it is still moving. But the instant, that odd-natured thing, sits[106] between motion e
and rest—being in no time at all—and what moves into it and out of it changes to resting and what rests changes to moving."
— "Quite likely."
"And the one, if it indeed is both at rest and in motion, would change in each of two directions, for only in this way could it do both. But in changing, it changes in an instant, and when it changes, it would be in no time at all, and [at that point] it would be neither in motion nor at rest."
— "No, it would not."

PASSING THROUGH NEITHER/NOR

"Is this also the case in regard to the other types of changes? Whenever the one changes from being to ceasing-to-be, or from not-being to 157
coming-to-be, does it then not come to be between certain motions and states of rest, and then it neither is nor is not, and neither comes to be nor ceases to be?"
— "It seems so."
"And by the same account, when it goes from one to many and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, and is neither separated nor combined. And when it goes from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, nor is it being made like nor unlike. And when it goes from small to large and to equal, and vice versa, b
it is neither small nor large nor equal; nor would it be increasing or decreasing, nor being made equal."
— "Apparently not."
"The one, if it is, would undergo all of the above."
— "Of course."

106 ἐγκάθηται: 'sit in', 'lie in ambush', 'lie in a place', 'lie couched in' (ἐγκάθημαι in **Liddell-Scott-Jones**, *A Greek-English Lexicon*). Cf. **Gill**, *Plato:* Parmenides, 164.

" Τί δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις προσήκοι ἂν πάσχειν, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα οὐ σκεπτέον; "
" σκεπτέον."
" λέγωμεν δή, ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι; "
" λέγωμεν."
" οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ ἕν ἐστι τἆλλα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἦν."
" ὀρθῶς."
c " οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεταί γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τἆλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῃ."
" πῇ δή; "
" ὅτι που τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς μόρια ἔχοντα ἄλλα ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ μόρια μὴ ἔχοι, παντελῶς ἂν ἓν εἴη."
" ὀρθῶς."
" μόρια δέ γε, φαμέν, τούτου ἐστὶν ὃ ἂν ὅλον ᾖ."
" φαμὲν γάρ."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε ὅλον ἓν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀνάγκη εἶναι, οὗ ἔσται μόρια τὰ μόρια. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν μορίων οὐ πολλῶν μόριον χρὴ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὅλου."
" πῶς τοῦτο; "
d " εἴ τι πολλῶν μόριον εἴη, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸ εἴη, ἑαυτοῦ τε δή που μόριον ἔσται, ὅ ἐστιν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, εἴπερ καὶ πάντων. ἑνὸς γὰρ μὴ ὂν μόριον, πλὴν τούτου τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται, καὶ οὕτως ἑνὸς ἑκάστου οὐκ ἔσται μόριον, μὴ ὂν δὲ μόριον ἑκάστου οὐδενὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἔσται. μηδενὸς δὲ ὂν πάντων τούτων τι εἶναι, ὧν οὐδενὸς οὐδέν ἐστι, καὶ μόριον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν ἀδύνατον.[107]"
" φαίνεταί γε δή."
" οὐκ ἄρα τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς τινὸς
e ἰδέας καὶ ἑνός τινος, ὃ καλοῦμεν ὅλον, ἐξ ἁπάντων ἓν τέλειον γεγονός, τούτου μόριον ἂν τὸ μόριον εἴη."

107 ἀδύνατον εἶναι BT: εἶναι secl. **Heindorf**.

THIRD ARGUMENT

"'If the one is', should we not consider next what would be appropriate for the others to undergo as well?"
— "We should."
"Shall we then state what those 'other than the one' must have undergone, 'if the one is'?"
— "We shall."

PART/WHOLE

"So, then, if indeed they are 'other than the one', the others are not the c
one either, for if they were, they would not be 'other than the one'."
— "That's right."
"And yet the others are not utterly deprived of oneness, but partake of it in some way."
— "In what way?"
"It is presumably because things 'other than the one' have parts that they are other, for if they did not have parts, they would be entirely one."
— "That's right."
"And parts, we say, are [parts] of that which is a whole."
— "Yes, we do."
"But surely the whole, of which the parts will be parts, must be a one composed of many, for each of the parts must be a part, not of many, but of a whole."
— "Why is that?"
"If something were to be part of a many [i.e., a plurality], among which it itself would be counted, then surely it will somehow be part of itself, d
which is impossible, and also [part] of each one of the others—if indeed it were to be part of all. For if it is not part of the one, it [instead] will be part of the others—with the one excepted—and thus it will not be part of each one, and if not part of each, then of none of the many. But that which is of none at all, cannot be a part—or anything else—of all those things it is none of [individually]."
— "It certainly appears so."
"So the part would not be part either of many or of all, but of a single concept[108] and unity, which we call 'whole', a perfect oneness that has e
come to be from all. This is what the part would be part of."

108 Cf. **Fowler**, *Plato in Twelve Volumes,* Vol. 9.

" παντάπασι μὲν οὖν."
" εἰ ἄρα τἆλλα μόρια ἔχει, κἂν τοῦ ὅλου τε καὶ ἑνὸς μετέχοι."
" πάνυ γε."
" ἓν ἄρα ὅλον τέλειον μόρια ἔχον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός."
" ἀνάγκη."
" καὶ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μορίου γε ἑκάστου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο
158 ἀνάγκη μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνός. εἰ γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριόν ἐστι, τό γε ἕκαστον εἶναι ἓν δήπου σημαίνει, ἀφωρισμένον μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ ὄν, εἴπερ ἕκαστον ἔσται."
" ὀρθῶς."
" μετέχοι δέ γε ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο ὂν ἢ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετεῖχεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἂν αὐτὸ ἕν· νῦν δὲ ἑνὶ μὲν εἶναι πλὴν αὐτῷ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀδύνατόν που."
" ἀδύνατον."
" μετέχειν δέ γε τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀνάγκη τῷ τε ὅλῳ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν ὅλον ἔσται, οὗ μόρια τὰ μόρια· τὸ δ' αὖ ἕκαστον ἓν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, ὃ ἂν ᾖ μόριον ὅλου."
" οὕτως."
b " οὐκοῦν ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ ἑνὸς μεθέξει τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ; "
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" τὰ δ' ἕτερα τοῦ ἑνὸς πολλά που ἂν εἴη. εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἓν μήτε ἑνὸς πλείω εἴη τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."

— "Absolutely."
"So if the others have parts, they would also partake of wholeness and oneness."
— "Certainly."
"So things other than the one must be one complete whole, which has parts."
— "Necessarily."
"Furthermore, the same account applies also to each part, since it too must partake of the one, for if each of these is a part—and 'each' signifies somehow to be one—it is singled out from the others and also is by itself—if indeed it is to be 'each'." 158
— "That's right."
"But it would obviously partake of the one, since it is other than the one, for if it were not [other], it would not partake of it but would itself be the one. But as it is, it is quite impossible for anything except the one itself to be the one."
— "Impossible."
"But both the whole and the part must partake of the one, for the one is to be a whole of which the parts are parts, and in turn each part of a whole will be one part of the whole."
— "Just so."
"Then things partaking of the one will be other than the one while partaking of it?" b
— "Of course."
"But things other than the one would presumably be many, for if the things other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing."
— "Agreed."

" Ἐπεὶ δέ γε πλείω ἑνός ἐστι τά τε τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὅλου μετέχοντα, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἤδη πλήθει ἄπειρα εἶναι αὐτά γε ἐκεῖνα τὰ μεταλαμβάνοντα τοῦ ἑνός; "
" πῶς; "
" ὧδε ἴδωμεν.[109] ἄλλο τι οὐχ ἓν ὄντα οὐδὲ μετέχοντα τοῦ ἑνὸς τότε, ὅτε μεταλαμβάνει αὐτοῦ, μεταλαμβάνει; "
c " δῆλα δή."
" οὐκοῦν πλήθη ὄντα, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἔνι; "
" πλήθη μέντοι."
" τί οὖν; εἰ ἐθέλοιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ τῶν τοιούτων ἀφελεῖν ὡς οἷοί τέ ἐσμεν ὅτι ὀλίγιστον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἀφαιρεθὲν ἐκεῖνο, εἴπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ μετέχοι, πλῆθος εἶναι καὶ οὐχ ἕν; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀεὶ σκοποῦντες αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτὴν τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν τοῦ εἴδους ὅσον ἂν αὐτῆς ἀεὶ ὁρῶμεν ἄπειρον ἔσται πλήθει; "
" παντάπασι μὲν οὖν."
d " καὶ μὴν ἐπειδάν γε ἓν ἕκαστον μόριον μόριον γένηται, πέρας ἤδη ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὰ μόρια."
" κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν."
" τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ τοῦ ἑνὸς ξυμβαίνει ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κοινωνησάντων, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τι γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὃ δὴ πέρας παρέσχε πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἡ δ' ἑαυτῶν φύσις καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπειρίαν."
" φαίνεται."
" οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὅλα καὶ κατὰ μόρια ἄπειρά τέ ἐστι καὶ πέρατος μετέχει."
" πάνυ γε."

109 ἴδωμεν] εἰδῶμεν BT.

LIMITED/UNLIMITED

"And now, since both the things that partake of the one as part and the one as whole are more than one, must not those that take part in oneness be already unlimited in multitude?"
— "How so?"
"Let us look at the question in this way: isn't it the case that, at the time when they come to take part in the one, they neither are one, nor partake of the one?"
— "Clearly." c
"So they are multitudes in which oneness is not present?"[110]
— "Multitudes, indeed."
"Now, if we wanted to subtract in thought from these multitudes the minimum amount possible, must not what is subtracted be too a multitude and not one, if indeed it does not partake of the one?"
— "Necessarily."
"So whenever we examine in this way that nature alone by itself, different from the Form, will not whatever we see of it in each case be unlimited in multitude?"
— "Yes, absolutely."
"Furthermore, whenever each part comes to be one part, the parts then d have a limit in relation to each other and in relation to the whole, and the whole [has a limit] in relation to the parts."
— "Undoubtedly."
"Then it follows for things 'other than the one', that from their taking part in the one and in each other, something different comes to be in them, as it seems, that provides a limit for them in relation to each other. But by themselves, their own nature provides lack of limit."
— "Apparently."
"In this way, indeed, the things 'other than the one', taken both as wholes and as individual parts, both are unlimited and also partake of a limit."
— "Certainly."

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110 Irrational numbers? That is, numbers, quantities or magnitudes not expressible by means of finite hence unitary fractions; roots, for example, whose value cannot be determined in the finite terms of the unit. (Only square roots of square numbers are rational.) The most significant work on irrational numbers occurred in Plato's lifetime, see the discoveries of Theodorus of Cyrene, as mentioned in the *Theaetetus* (147d–148b). In particular cf. ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος in regard to roots, (*Theaetetus*, 147d6, "unlimited in multitude") with the above rendering πλήθει ἄπειρα (*Parmenides,* 158b).

e " Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς; "
" πῇ δή; "
" ᾗ μέν που ἄπειρά ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν πάντα, ταὐτὸν πεπονθότα ἂν εἴη ταύτῃ."
" πάνυ γε."
" καὶ μὴν ᾗ γε ἅπαντα πέρατος μετέχει, καὶ ταύτῃ πάντ' ἂν εἴη ταὐτὸν πεπονθότα."
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" ᾗ δέ γε πεπερασμένα τε εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρα πέπονθεν, ἐναντία πάθη ἀλλήλοις ὄντα ταῦτα τὰ πάθη πέπονθεν."
159 " ναί."
" τὰ δ' ἐναντία γε ὡς οἷόν τε ἀνομοιότατα."
" τί μήν; "
" κατὰ μὲν ἄρα ἑκάτερον τὸ πάθος ὅμοια ἂν εἴη αὐτά τε αὑτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ δ' ἀμφότερα ἀμφοτέρως ἐναντιώτατά τε καὶ ἀνομοιότατα."
" κινδυνεύει."
" οὕτω δὴ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτά τε αὑτοῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη."
" οὕτως."
" καὶ ταὐτὰ δὴ καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ κινούμενα καὶ ἑστῶτα, καὶ
b πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὑρήσομεν πεπονθότα τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπείπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἐφάνη πεπονθότα."
" ὀρθῶς λέγεις."

LIKENESS/UNLIKENESS

"So are they not also both like and unlike each other and themselves?" e
— "In what way?"
"Insofar as they are all unlimited somehow according to their own nature, they would all be affected in the same way."
— "Certainly."
"And, insofar as they all partake of limit, in this way, too, they would all be so affected as to be 'the same'."
— "How could it be otherwise?"
"However, insofar as they are both limited and unlimited, they would suffer qualifications that are opposites of each other." 159
— "Yes."
"But opposites are as unlike as possible."
— "To be sure."
"So in respect to either of these two qualifications they would be like themselves and each other, but in respect of both qualifications they would be both utterly opposite and unlike themselves and each other."
— "Probably so."
"Thus, the others themselves would be both likes and unlikes both of themselves and of each other."
— "So they would be."

ALL QUALIFICATIONS

"And, since in fact they were shown to have these [particular] qualifications, we shall have no further difficulty in finding that the things 'other than the one' are both the same as and different from each other, both in motion and at rest, and have undergone all the opposite b qualifications."
— "You are right."

" Οὐκοῦν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη ἐῴμεν[111] ὡς φανερά, ἐπισκοποῖμεν δὲ πάλιν, ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, ἆρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ οὕτω μόνον; "
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
" λέγωμεν δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἓν εἰ ἔστι, τί χρὴ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς πεπονθέναι."
" λέγωμεν γάρ."
" ἆρ' οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἓν τῶν ἄλλων, χωρὶς δὲ τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶναι; "
" τί δή; "
c " ὅτι που οὐκ ἔστι παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερον, ὃ ἄλλο μέν ἐστι τοῦ ἑνός, ἄλλο δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. πάντα γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅταν ῥηθῇ τό τε ἓν καὶ τἆλλα."
" πάντα γάρ."
" οὐκ ἄρα ἔτ' ἔστιν ἕτερον τούτων, ἐν ᾧ τό τε ἓν ἂν εἴη τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ τἆλλα."
" οὐ γάρ."
" οὐδέποτε ἄρα ἐν ταὐτῷ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ τἆλλα."
" οὐκ ἔοικεν."
" χωρὶς ἄρα; "
" ναί."
" οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμὲν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕν."
" πῶς γάρ; "
" οὔτ' ἄρα ὅλον εἴη ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔτε μόρια αὐτοῦ, εἰ χωρίς τέ ἐστι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ μόρια μὴ ἔχει.[112]"
d " πῶς γάρ; "
" οὐδενὶ ἄρα τρόπῳ μετέχοι ἂν τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, μήτε κατὰ μόριόν τι αὐτοῦ μήτε κατὰ ὅλον μετέχοντα."
" οὐκ ἔοικεν."

111 ἐῴμεν] ἐῶμεν BT.
112 ἔχει] ἔχῃ BT.

FOURTH ARGUMENT

"Well, then, if we now leave these [findings] as evident, might we also examine in turn whether, 'if one is',[113] the things 'other than one' are only in this way and not in any other way?"
— "By all means."
"Let's state from the beginning what qualifications things 'other than the one' must have, 'if one is'."
— "Yes, let us."
"So is not the one separate from the others, and the others separate from the one?"
— "Why?"
"Because presumably there is besides them nothing else that is other than the one and other than the others, for all things have been mentioned whenever both the one and the others are mentioned." c
— "Yes, all things."
"So there is no further thing different from them, in which both the one and the others might be in the same."
— "No, there is not."
"So the one and the others are never in the same."
— "It seems not."
"So they are separate?"
— "Yes."
"And further, we say that what is truly one does not have parts."
— "How could it?"
"So neither could the one be in the others as a whole, nor could parts of it be in them, if it is separate from the others and does not have parts."
— "Of course not."
"So the others could in no way partake of the one, neither of any part of it, nor of it as a whole." d
— "Apparently not."

113 There seems to be an inconsistency in the wording of this hypothesis (ἓν εἰ ἔστιν) when compared to the hypothesis of Argument I, "if it is one" (εἰ ἕν ἐστιν). The wording here appears to allude to the hypothesis of Argument II, "if one is." However, as Argument IV shows, the object "others than one" is not associable with the "one plus being" composite of Argument II; in particular, 159d7 demonstrates that it is impossible for the "others than one" to be many, thus they are not a "weaving together" but merely spoken of as a simple attribute.

" οὐδαμῇ ἄρα ἓν τἆλλά ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἓν οὐδέν."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
" οὐδ' ἄρα πολλά ἐστι τἆλλα. ἓν γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μόριον τοῦ ὅλου, εἰ πολλὰ ἦν· νῦν δὲ οὔτε ἓν οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε μόριά ἐστι τἆλλα τοῦ ἑνός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῦ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει."
" ὀρθῶς."
" οὐδ' ἄρα δύο οὐδὲ τρία οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τὰ ἄλλα οὔτε ἔνεστιν[114] ἐν
e αὐτοῖς, εἴπερ τοῦ ἑνὸς πανταχῇ στέρεται."
" οὕτως."
" Οὐδὲ ὅμοια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόμοια οὔτε αὐτά ἐστι τῷ ἑνὶ τὰ ἄλλα, οὔτε ἔνεστιν[115] ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης καὶ ἀνομοιότης. εἰ γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια αὐτὰ εἴη ἢ ἔχοι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, δύο που εἴδη ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔχοι ἂν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνός."
" φαίνεται."
" ἦν δέ γε ἀδύνατον δυοῖν τινοῖν μετέχειν ἃ μηδ' ἑνὸς μετέχοι."
" ἀδύνατον."
160 " οὔτ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὔτ' ἀνόμοιά ἐστιν οὔτ' ἀμφότερα τἆλλα. ὅμοια μὲν γὰρ ἂν ὄντα ἢ ἀνόμοια ἑνὸς ἂν τοῦ ἑτέρου εἴδους μετέχοι, ἀμφότερα δὲ ὄντα δυοῖν τοῖν ἐναντίοιν· ταῦτα δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη."
" ἀληθῆ."
" Οὐδ' ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδὲ κινούμενα οὐδὲ ἑστῶτα, οὐδὲ γιγνόμενα οὐδὲ ἀπολλύμενα, οὐδὲ μείζω οὐδὲ ἐλάττω οὐδὲ ἴσα· οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν πέπονθε τῶν τοιούτων. εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον πεπονθέναι ὑπομένει τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ δυοῖν καὶ τριῶν καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ
b ἀρτίου μεθέξει, ὧν αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνός γε πάντῃ πάντως στερομένοις."
" ἀληθέστατα."

114 ἔνεστιν] ἓν ἐστιν BT.
115 ἔνεστιν] ἓν ἐστιν BT.

OTHERS LACK ONENESS

"In no way, then, are the others one, nor do they have any oneness in themselves."
— "No."
"So neither are the others many, for if they were, each of them would be one part of a whole. But as it is, things other than one are neither one nor many, neither whole nor parts, since they in no way partake of it."
— "Right."
"Thus, the others themselves are neither two nor three, nor is two or three present in them, if indeed they are entirely deprived of the one." e
— "Just so."
"So the others themselves neither are like and unlike the one, nor is likeness and unlikeness in them. For if they themselves were like and unlike, or had likeness and unlikeness in themselves, things other than the one would presumably have in themselves two Forms opposite to each other."[116]
— "Apparently."
"But it was impossible for what could not partake of any one thing to partake of any two."
— "Impossible."
"So the others are neither like, nor unlike, nor both. For if they were like or unlike, they would partake of one of the two Forms, and if they 160
were both, they would partake of two opposites. But that was shown to be impossible."
— "True."
"So they are neither the same nor different, neither in motion nor at rest, neither coming to be nor ceasing to be, neither greater, nor less, nor equal. Nor do they have any other qualifications of this sort. For if the others are subject to any qualification of this sort, they will also partake of one and two and three and odd and even, but it was shown that it is impossible for them to partake of these things, since they are in every way utterly deprived of the one." b
— "Very true."

116 Again, there are two lessons here, and we follow the same as above.

" οὕτω δὴ ἓν εἰ ἔστιν, πάντα τέ ἐστι τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν[117] ἐστι καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως."
" παντελῶς μὲν οὖν."

117 οὐδὲ ἕν T: οὐδέν B.

FINAL CONCLUSION: 'IF ONE IS'

"Therefore, 'if one is', the one both is all things and is not even one thing, both in relation to itself and, likewise, in relation to the others." — "Entirely so."

" Εἶεν· εἰ δὲ δὴ μὴ ἔστι τὸ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἆρ' οὐ σκεπτέον μετὰ τοῦτο[118]; "
" σκεπτέον γάρ."
" τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; ἆρά τι διαφέρει τῇσδε, εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; "
" διαφέρει μέντοι."
c " διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; "
" πᾶν τοὐναντίον."
" τί δ' εἴ τις λέγοι, εἰ μέγεθος μὴ ἔστιν ἢ σμικρότης μὴ ἔστιν ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, ἆρα ἐφ' ἑκάστου ἂν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἑτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ μὴ ὄν; "
" πάνυ γε."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τῶν ἄλλων τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει; "
" ἴσμεν."
d " πρῶτον μὲν ἄρα γνωστόν τι λέγει, ἔπειτα ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἕν, εἴτε τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ προσθεὶς εἴτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ[119] ἧττον γιγνώσκεται, τί τὸ λεγόμενον μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων. ἢ οὔ; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" ὧδε ἄρα λεκτέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τί χρὴ εἶναι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, ἢ μηδὲ ὅ τι λέγεται γιγνώσκεσθαι, ὅταν τις εἴπῃ ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν."
" ἀληθῆ."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἕτερα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγεσθαι; "
" πάνυ γε."
e " καὶ ἑτεροιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. οὐ γὰρ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἑτεροιότητα λέγει, ὅταν τὸ ἓν ἕτερον τῶν ἄλλων λέγῃ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκείνου."
" φαίνεται."

118 τοῦτο T: ταῦτα B.
119 γὰρ apogr.: om. Tb (οὐδὲν γὰρ . . . μὴ εἶναι om. B: add. b in marg.).

FIFTH ARGUMENT

DIFFERENCE

"So far, so good. But should we not examine next what must follow 'if the one is not'?"
— "Yes, we should."
"What then, would this hypothesis mean: 'if one is not'? Does it differ at all from this hypothesis: 'if not-one is not'?"
— "Of course it differs."
"Does it merely differ, or is saying 'if not-one is not' the complete c
opposite of saying 'if one is not'?"
— "The complete opposite."
"What if someone were to say 'if largeness is not' or 'if smallness is not' or anything else of that sort, would it not be clear that in each case he is speaking of something different that is not?"
— "Of course."
"And so in the present case, too, whenever he says 'if one is not', isn't it clear that that which he says 'is not' is different from other things, and don't we recognize what he means?"
— "Yes, we do."
"So in the first place, he speaks of something knowable, and in the second, of something different from the others when he says 'one', d
whether he adds being or not being to it. For whatever is said 'not to be' is nonetheless known, and also that it is different from the others. Is it not?"
— "Necessarily."
"So at this point, we must state from the beginning 'if one is not' what must be [the case]. First, as it seems, this must pertain to it, [namely] that there is knowledge of it; otherwise, it would not be known what is meant whenever someone says 'if one is not'."
— "True."
"And so the others must be different from it, or else it cannot be spoken of as different from the others."
— "Of course."
"So 'difference in kind' belongs to it in addition to knowledge [of it]. For when someone says that 'the one is different from the others', he e
refers to *its* difference in kind, not to that of the others."
— "So it appears."

" καὶ μὴν τοῦ γε ἐκείνου καὶ τοῦ τινὸς καὶ τούτου καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τούτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων μετέχει τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἓν ἐλέγετο οὐδ' ἂν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα, οὐδ' ἐκείνῳ ἄν τι ἦν οὐδ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἄν τι ἐλέγετο, εἰ μήτε τοῦ τινὸς αὐτῷ μετῆν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων τούτων."
" ὀ ρθῶς."
161 " εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἑνὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστι, μετέχειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τό γε ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μέντοι μήτε τὸ ἓν μήτ' ἐκεῖνο μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου του ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑπόκειται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μετεῖναι."
" καὶ πάνυ γε."
" Καὶ ἀνομοιότης ἄρα ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς ἕτερα ὄντα ἑτεροῖα καὶ εἴη ἄν."
" ναί."
" τὰ δ' ἑτεροῖα οὐκ ἀλλοῖα; "
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" τὰ δ' ἀλλοῖα οὐκ ἀνόμοια; "
b " ἀνόμοια μὲν οὖν."
" οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνόμοιά ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνομοίῳ τά γε ἀνόμοια ἀνόμοια ἂν εἴη."
" δῆλον."
" εἴη δὴ ἂν καὶ τῷ ἑνὶ ἀνομοιότης, πρὸς ἣν τὰ ἄλλα ἀνόμοια αὐτῷ ἐστίν."
" ἔοικεν."
" εἰ δὲ δὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνομοιότης ἔστιν αὐτῷ, ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑαυτοῦ ὁμοιότητα αὐτῷ εἶναι; "
" πῶς; "
" εἰ ἑνὸς ἀνομοιότης ἔστι τῷ ἑνί, οὐκ ἄν που περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου ὁ λόγος εἴη οἵου τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἴη περὶ ἑνός, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ ἑνός."
c " πάνυ γε."
" οὐ δεῖ δέ γε."
" οὐ δῆτα."

"Furthermore, the 'one that is not' partakes of 'that', 'of something', 'of this', 'to this', 'of these', and of all others of this sort. For if it did not partake either of 'something' or of the other things [i.e., notions], the one could not be spoken of, nor could the things other than one, nor could anything belong to it nor be of it, nor could it be said to be anything."
— "That's right." 161
"The one cannot be, if in fact it is not. Still, nothing prevents it from partaking of many [notions]. However, it must in fact even do so [i.e., partake], if it is indeed that [particular] one and not some other [thing] that is not. But if it will be neither the one nor that [other thing] which is not, and our account is about something else, then nothing should be uttered at all. But if it is 'that one' and not something else that is supposed not to be, it must partake of that and of many other [notions]."
— "Yes, certainly."

LIKE/UNLIKE

"So unlikeness, too, belongs to it in relation to the others. For things 'other than the one', since they are different, would also be different in kind."
— "Yes."
"And are not things that are 'different in kind' not also *other* in kind?"
— "Certainly."
"Are not things 'other in kind' unlike?"
— "Indeed, unlike." b
"Then, if in fact they are unlike the one, obviously what is unlike would be unlike an unlike."
— "Obviously."
"So the one would also have unlikeness, in relation to which the others are unlike it."
— "It seems this way."
"But if it has unlikeness in regard to the others, must it not then have likeness in regard to itself?"
— "How so?"
"If the one has unlikeness in regard to the one, the account would presumably not be about such a thing as the one, nor would the hypothesis be about one, but about something other than one."
— "Certainly." c
"But that cannot be."
— "No, it cannot."

" δεῖ ἄρα ὁμοιότητα τῷ ἑνὶ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι."
" δεῖ."
" καὶ μὴν οὐδ' αὖ ἴσον γ' ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. εἰ γὰρ εἴη ἴσον, εἴη τε ἂν ἤδη καὶ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἰσότητα· ταῦτα δ' ἀμφότερα ἀδύνατα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν ἕν."
" ἀδύνατα."
" ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσον, ἆρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τἆλλα ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἴσα εἶναι; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" τὰ δὲ μὴ ἴσα οὐκ ἄνισα; "
" ναί."
" τὰ δὲ ἄνισα οὐ τῷ ἀνίσῳ ἄνισα; "
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
d " καὶ ἀνισότητος δὴ μετέχει τὸ ἕν, πρὸς ἣν τἆλλα αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἄνισα; "
" μετέχει."
" ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀνισότητός γ' ἐστὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης."
" ἔστι γάρ."
" ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ μέγεθός τε καὶ σμικρότης τῷ τοιούτῳ ἑνί; "
" κινδυνεύει."
" μέγεθος μὴν καὶ σμικρότης ἀεὶ ἀφέστατον ἀλλήλοιν."
" πάνυ γε."
" μεταξὺ ἄρα τι αὐτοῖν ἀεί ἐστιν."
" ἔστιν."
" ἔχεις οὖν τι ἄλλο εἰπεῖν μεταξὺ αὐτοῖν ἢ ἰσότητα; "
" οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο."
" ὅτῳ ἄρα ἔστι μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότης, ἔστι καὶ ἰσότης αὐτῷ μεταξὺ τούτοιν οὖσα."
" φαίνεται."
e " τῷ δὴ[120] ἑνὶ μὴ ὄντι, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἰσότητος ἂν μετείη καὶ μεγέθους καὶ σμικρότητος."
" ἔοικεν."

120 δὴ Par. 1810, **Heindorf** from Ficinus: δὲ BT.

"Therefore, likeness must belong to the one in regard to itself."
— "It must."

EQUAL/UNEQUAL

"Furthermore, it is not equal to the others either, for if it were equal, it would then be like them in respect to equality, and henceforth be. But both of these are impossible if, in fact, 'one is not'."
— "Impossible."
"Then, since it is not equal to the others, are not the others, too, necessarily not equal to it?"
— "Necessarily."
"Are not things that are not equal unequal?"
— "Yes."
"And are not things unequal unequal to what is unequal?"
— "Of course."
"So the one partakes also of inequality, in relation to which the others d
are unequal to it?"
— "Yes, it does."
"But largeness and smallness belong to inequality."
— "They do."
"So do largeness and smallness also pertain to this kind of one?"
— "Quite likely."
"Yet largeness and smallness always keep furthest apart from each other."
— "Certainly."
"So there is always something between them."
— "There is."
"Then can you suggest anything between them other than equality?"
— "No, only that."
"Therefore anything which has largeness and smallness also has equality, and this is between these two."
— "Apparently."
"As it seems, the one, even 'if it is not', would [still] partake of equality, e
largeness, and smallness."
— "So it seems."

" Καὶ μὴν καὶ οὐσίας γε δεῖ αὐτὸ μετέχειν πῃ."
" πῶς δή; "
" ἔχειν αὐτὸ δεῖ οὕτως ὡς λέγομεν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοι,[121] οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν ἡμεῖς λέγοντες τὸ ἓν μὴ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι ὄντα αὐτὰ λέγομεν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως; "
" οὕτω μὲν οὖν."
162 " ἐπειδὴ δέ φαμεν ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν φάναι καὶ ὄντα λέγειν."
" ἀνάγκη."
" ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἓν οὐκ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔσται μὴ ὄν, ἀλλά τι τοῦ εἶναι ἀνήσει πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἔσται ὄν."
" παντάπασι μὲν οὖν."
" δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει μὴ εἶναι, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ τὸ ὂν τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔχειν μὴ εἶναι, ἵνα τελέως αὖ ᾖ.[122] οὕτως γὰρ ἂν τό τε ὂν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν οὐκ ἂν εἴη,
b μετέχοντα τὸ μὲν ὂν οὐσίας τοῦ εἶναι ὄν, μὴ οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ μὴ[123] εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ μέλλει τελέως εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν μὴ οὐσίας μὲν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ὄν,[124] οὐσίας δὲ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ ὄν, εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν αὖ τελέως μὴ ἔσται."
" ἀληθέστατα."
" οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ τῷ τε ὄντι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τῷ μὴ ὄντι τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστι, καὶ τῷ ἑνί, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ εἶναι ἀνάγκη μετεῖναι εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι."
" ἀνάγκη."
" καὶ οὐσία δὴ φαίνεται τῷ ἑνί, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν."
" φαίνεται."
" καὶ μὴ οὐσία ἄρα, εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν."
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "

121 ἔχοι Coisl.: ἔχῃ BT.
122 αὖ εἶναι ᾖ BT: αὖ ᾖ (or αὖ ὂν ᾖ) **Shorey**.
123 μὴ add. **Shorey**.
124 ὄν **Shorey**: μὴ ὄν BT.

BEING/NOT-BEING

"Furthermore, it must also in some way partake of being."
— "How is that?"
"It must be as we are describing it, for if it is not in this way, we would not be speaking the truth when we say that 'the one is not'. But if we do speak the truth, it is clear that we are saying 'things that are'. Is this not so?"
— "It is indeed so." 162
"And since we claim to speak the truth, we must claim also to speak of 'things that are'."
— "Necessarily."
"It appears, therefore, that the 'one that is not' is. For if it will not be not-being, that is to say, if in some way it will let go of being [not-being] towards not being [not-being], then straightaway it will be that which is."
— "Absolutely."
"So if it [i.e., the one] is 'not to be', not-being must have a bond to *being* not-being, just as, in turn, the being has a bond to *not being* not-being, in order to completely be. This, above all, would be how 'what is' is, and how 'what is not' is not. On the one hand, 'what is', if it is completely to be, partakes of being in order to be a thing that is, and [partakes] of not-being in order not to be a thing that is not, and, on b
the other hand, 'what is not', if what is not is completely not to be, partakes of not-being in order to *not* be a thing that is, and of being in order to be a thing that *is* not."[125]
— "Very true."
"Accordingly, since in fact 'what is' partakes of not-being, and 'what is not' partakes of being, so, too, the one, since 'it is not', must partake of being in order not to be."
— "Necessarily."
"So it appears that the one, 'if it is not', also has being."
— "Apparently."
"And so also not-being, if indeed 'it is not'."
— "Of course."

125 A good example: the same thing must participate in opposing, that is, *compresent* Forms. Participation means participation in contraries, which must be available thus present to the mind.

" οἷόν τε οὖν τὸ ἔχον πως μὴ ἔχειν οὕτω, μὴ μεταβάλλον ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἕξεως; "
" οὐχ οἷόν τε."
c " πᾶν ἄρα τὸ τοιοῦτον μεταβολὴν σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχῃ."
" πῶς δ' οὔ; "
" μεταβολὴ δὲ κίνησις· ἢ τί φήσομεν; "
" κίνησις."
" οὐκοῦν τὸ ἓν ὄν τε καὶ οὐκ ὂν ἐφάνη; "
" ναί."
" οὕτως ἄρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον φαίνεται."
" ἔοικεν."
" καὶ κινούμενον ἄρα τὸ οὐκ ὂν ἓν πέφανται, ἐπείπερ καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐκ τοῦ εἶναι ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἔχον."
" κινδυνεύει."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μηδαμοῦ γέ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἴπερ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν μεθίσταιτό ποθέν ποι."
" πῶς γάρ; "
" οὐκ ἄρα τῷ γε μεταβαίνειν κινοῖτ' ἄν."
" οὐ γάρ."
d " οὐδὲ μὴν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν στρέφοιτο· ταὐτοῦ γὰρ οὐδαμοῦ ἅπτεται. ὂν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ταὐτόν· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν ἔν τῳ τῶν ὄντων ἀδύνατον εἶναι."
" ἀδύνατον γάρ."
" οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἕν γε μὴ ὂν στρέφεσθαι ἂν δύναιτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστιν."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
" οὐδὲ μὴν ἀλλοιοῦταί που τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τὸ ὂν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἔτι περὶ τοῦ ἑνός, εἴπερ ἠλλοιοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τινός."
" ὀρθῶς."
e " εἰ δὲ μήτ' ἀλλοιοῦται μήτε ἐν ταὐτῷ στρέφεται μήτε μεταβαίνει, ἆρ' ἄν πῃ ἔτι κινοῖτο; "
" πῶς γάρ; "
" τό γε μὴν ἀκίνητον ἀνάγκη ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ δὲ ἡσυχάζον ἑστάναι."
" ἀνάγκη."

MOTION/REST

"Can something that is in some state not be in that state, without changing from that state?"
— "It cannot."
"So every thing of that sort, whatever both is in some state and not in c
that state, signifies change."
— "Of course."
"But change is motion—or what shall we call it?"
— "Motion."
"Now wasn't the one shown both to be and not to be?"
— "Yes."
"Therefore, it appears to be both: in such a state and not in such a state."
— "So it appears."
"So the 'one that is not' has been shown also to move, if indeed it has been shown to undergo change, too, from being [in such a state] to not being [in such a state]."
— "Very likely."
"However, if it is nowhere among the 'things that are'—as it is not, if, indeed, it is not—it would not move from one place to another."
— "Obviously not."
"So it would not move by changing places."
— "No, it would not."
"Nor would it revolve in the same place, because it nowhere touches d
the same. For 'what is the same' is a thing that is, and 'what is not' cannot be in any of the 'things that are'."
— "No, it cannot."
"Therefore, the one, 'if it is not', would not be able to revolve in that in which it is not."
— "No, it would not."
"And, indeed, the one, whether it is or is not, presumably is not altered from itself. For then the account would no longer be about the one, but about something other than it, if in fact the one were altered from itself."
— "That's right."
"But if it is not altered and does not revolve in the same place and does e
not change places, could it still move somehow?"
— "How could it?"
"But surely, what is unmoved necessarily holds still, and what holds still is at rest."
— "Necessarily."

" τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὂν ἕστηκέ τε καὶ κινεῖται."
" ἔοικεν."
163 " καὶ μὴν εἴπερ γε κινεῖται, μεγάλη ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. ὅπῃ γὰρ ἄν τι κινηθῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκέθ' ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὡς εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἑτέρως."
" οὕτως."
" κινούμενον δὴ[126] τὸ ἓν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται."
" ναί."
" καὶ μὴν μηδαμῇ γε κινούμενον οὐδαμῇ ἂν ἀλλοιοῖτο."
" οὐ γάρ."
" ἦ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖται τὸ οὐκ ὂν ἕν, ἀλλοιοῦται· ἦ δὲ μὴ κινεῖται, οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται."
" οὐ γάρ."
" τὸ ἓν ἄρα μὴ ὂν ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται."
" φαίνεται."
" τὸ δ' ἀλλοιούμενον ἆρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον,
b ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἕξεως· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον μήτε γίγνεσθαι μήτε ἀπόλλυσθαι; "
" ἀνάγκη."
" καὶ τὸ ἓν ἄρα μὴ ὂν ἀλλοιούμενον μὲν γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπόλλυται· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν μὴ ὂν γίγνεταί τε καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καὶ οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτ' ἀπόλλυται."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."

126 δὴ **Heindorf** from Ficinus: δὲ BT.

"So, as it seems, the one, 'if it is not', is both at rest and in motion."
— "So it seems."

ALTERED/NOT ALTERED

"And surely, if in fact it moves, it certainly must be altered, for if anything moves in any fashion, to this extent it is no longer in the same 163
state as it was, but in a different state."
— "Just so."
"Then, since it moves, the one is also altered."
— "Yes."
"And yet, since it in no way moves, it is in no way altered."
— "No, it is not."
"So insofar as the 'one that is not' moves, it is altered, but insofar as it does not move, it is not altered."
— "No, it is not."
"Therefore the one, 'if it is not', is both altered and not altered."
— "It appears so."
"Must not that which is altered come to be different from what it was before, and also cease to be in its previous state, and must not that b
which is not altered neither come to be nor cease to be?"
— "Necessarily."
"Therefore, the one, too, 'if it is not', both comes to be and ceases to be, if it is altered, and neither comes to be nor ceases to be, if it is not altered. And thus, the one, 'if it is not', both comes to be and ceases to be, and neither comes to be nor ceases to be."
— "Quite so."

" Αὖθις δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἴωμεν πάλιν ὀψόμενοι εἰ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν φανεῖται ἅπερ καὶ νῦν, ἢ ἕτερα."
c " ἀλλὰ χρή." " οὐκοῦν ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, φαμέν, τί χρὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ ξυμβαίνειν; "
" ναί."
" τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ὅταν λέγωμεν, ἆρα μή τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἢ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν τούτῳ ᾧ ἂν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναι; "
" οὐδὲν ἄλλο."
" πότερον οὖν, ὅταν φῶμεν μὴ εἶναί τι, πῶς οὐκ εἶναί φαμεν αὐτό, πῶς δὲ εἶναι; ἢ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ἔστι λεγόμενον ἁπλῶς σημαίνει ὅτι οὐδαμῶς οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν οὐδέ πῃ μετέχει οὐσίας τό γε μὴ ὄν; "
" ἁπλούστατα μὲν οὖν."
d " οὔτε ἄρα εἶναι δύναιτο ἂν τὸ μὴ ὂν οὔτε ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς οὐσίας μετέχειν."
" οὐ γάρ."
" τὸ δὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι μή τι ἄλλο ἦν[127] ἢ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας μεταλαμβάνειν, τὸ δ' ἀπολλύναι οὐσίαν; "
" οὐδὲν ἄλλο."
" ᾧ δέ γε μηδὲν τούτου μέτεστιν, οὔτ' ἂν λαμβάνοι οὔτ' ἀπολλύοι αὐτό."
" πῶς γάρ; "
" τῷ ἑνὶ ἄρα, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ ἔστιν, οὔτε ἑκτέον οὔτε ἀπαλλακτέον οὔτε μεταληπτέον οὐσίας οὐδαμῶς."
" εἰκός."
" οὔτε ἄρα ἀπόλλυται τὸ μὴ ὂν ἓν οὔτε γίγνεται, ἐπείπερ οὐδαμῇ μετέχει οὐσίας."
" οὐ φαίνεται."
e " οὐδ' ἄρ' ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῇ· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτό τε καὶ ἀπολλύοιτο τοῦτο πάσχον."
" ἀληθῆ."
" εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι; "

127 ἦν **Heindorf**: ᾖ BT.

SIXTH ARGUMENT

"Let us once more go back to the beginning to see whether things appear the same to us as they do now, or different."
— "Indeed, we should."
"So let us ask, 'if one is not', what consequences must follow for it?" c
— "Yes."

ABSENCE OF BEING

"Whenever we say 'is not', does this signify anything other than the absence of being for what we say is not?"
— "Nothing else."
"When we say that 'something is not', are we saying that in a way 'it is not', yet in a way 'it is'? Or does the expression 'is not' signify simply without qualification that 'what is not' in no sense or manner is, and that it does not partake of being in any way whatsoever?"
— "Without any qualification whatsoever."
"So 'what is not' could neither be, nor partake of being in any other d way at all."
— "No, it could not."
"Were not 'coming-to-be' and 'ceasing-to-be' nothing other than taking part in being, in one case, and relinquishing being, in the other?"
— "Nothing other than this."
"But what does not partake of this [i.e., being] at all could neither obtain nor relinquish it."
— "How could it?"
"So the one, since it in no way is, must neither have, nor relinquish, nor take part in being in any way."
— "That is plausible."
"So the 'one that is not' neither ceases to be nor comes to be, since in fact it does not partake of being in any way."
— "Apparently not."

NO CHANGE, MOVEMENT, REST, OR OTHER QUALIFICATIONS

"So neither is it altered in any way. For if it were to undergo this, it e would then both come to be and cease to be."
— "True."
"And if it is not altered, necessarily it must not move either?"

" ἀνάγκη."
" οὐδὲ μὴν ἑστάναι φήσομεν τὸ μηδαμοῦ ὄν. τὸ γὰρ ἑστὸς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τινι δεῖ ἀεὶ εἶναι."
" τῷ αὐτῷ·[128] πῶς γὰρ οὔ; "
" οὕτω δὴ αὖ τὸ μὴ ὂν μήτε ποτὲ ἑστάναι μήτε κινεῖσθαι λέγωμεν."
" μὴ γὰρ οὖν."
" ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔστι γε αὐτῷ τι τῶν ὄντων. ἤδη γὰρ ἂν του μετέχον
164 ὄντος οὐσίας μετέχοι."
" δῆλον."
" οὔτε ἄρα μέγεθος οὔτε σμικρότης οὔτε ἰσότης αὐτῷ ἔστιν."
" οὐ γάρ."
" οὐδὲ μὴν ὁμοιότης γε οὐδὲ ἑτεροιότης οὔτε πρὸς αὐτὸ οὔτε πρὸς τἆλλα εἴη ἂν αὐτῷ."
" οὐ φαίνεται."
" τί δέ; τἆλλα ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ, εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι; "
" οὐκ ἔστιν."
" οὔτε ἄρα ὅμοια οὔτε ἀνόμοια οὔτε ταὐτὰ οὔθ' ἕτερά ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὰ ἄλλα."
" οὐ γάρ."
b " τί δέ; τὸ ἐκείνου ἢ τὸ ἐκείνῳ ἢ τὸ τὶ ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ τὸ τούτου ἢ ἄλλου ἢ ἄλλῳ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ἔπειτα ἢ νῦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ αἴσθησις ἢ λόγος ἢ ὄνομα ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν ὄντων περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔσται; "
" οὐκ ἔσται."
" οὕτω δὴ ἓν οὐκ ὂν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ."
" οὔκουν δὴ ἔοικέν γε οὐδαμῇ ἔχειν."

128 τῷ αὐτῷ BT (B gives it to the other speaker): τὸ αὐτό al.

— "Necessarily."
"Nor will we say then that 'what is nowhere' is at rest, for what is at rest must always be in the same thing."
— "In the same thing, of course."
"Thus, let us say again that 'what is not' is not ever at rest nor in motion."
— "Quite so."
"But in fact, nothing among the 'things that are' belongs to it, for by partaking of 'this, that is' [i.e., anything that is], it would at once 164
partake of being."
— "Obviously."
"So neither largeness nor smallness nor equality belongs to it."
— "No, they do not."
"Furthermore, neither likeness nor difference in kind would belong to it, neither in relation to itself nor in relation to the others."
— "Apparently not."

NO RELATIONS

"And what about this? Can the others be related to it, if, by necessity, nothing belongs to it?"
— "They cannot."
"So the others are neither like it nor unlike it, neither the same as nor different from it."
— "Indeed not."
"And what of this: will 'of that', 'to that', 'something', 'this', 'of this', 'of b
another', 'to another', or time past, or afterwards, or now, or knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or an account, or a name, or anything else among the 'things that are' pertain to 'what is not'?"
— "It will not."
"Thus the one, 'if it is not', is not in any state at all."
— "No, it appears to be in none whatsoever."

" Ἔτι δὴ λέγωμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα τί χρὴ πεπονθέναι."
" λέγωμεν γάρ."
" ἄλλα μέν που δεῖ αὐτὰ εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο."
" οὕτω."
" εἰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, τά γε ἄλλα ἕτερά ἐστιν. ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ
c αὐτῷ καλεῖς τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἕτερον; "
" ἔγωγε."
" ἕτερον δέ γέ πού φαμεν τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ἑτέρου, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο δὴ ἄλλο εἶναι ἄλλου; "
" ναί."
" καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄρα, εἰ μέλλει ἄλλα εἶναι, ἔστι τι οὗ ἄλλα ἔσται."
" ἀνάγκη."
" τί δὴ οὖν ἂν εἴη; τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἄλλα, μὴ ὄντος γε."
" οὐ γάρ."
" ἀλλήλων ἄρα ἐστί· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔτι λείπεται, ἢ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἄλλοις."
" ὀρθῶς."
" κατὰ πλήθη ἄρα ἕκαστα ἀλλήλων ἄλλα ἐστί. κατὰ ἓν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν οἷά
d τε εἴη, μὴ ὄντος ἑνός· ἀλλ᾽ ἕκαστος, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ ὄγκος αὐτῶν ἄπειρός ἐστι πλήθει, κἂν τὸ σμικρότατον δοκοῦν εἶναι λάβῃ τις, ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἐν ὕπνῳ φαίνεται ἐξαίφνης ἀντὶ ἑνὸς δόξαντος εἶναι πολλὰ καὶ ἀντὶ σμικροτάτου παμμέγεθες πρὸς τὰ κερματιζόμενα ἐξ αὐτοῦ."
" ὀρθότατα."
" τοιούτων δὴ ὄγκων ἄλλα ἀλλήλων ἂν εἴη τἆλλα, εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος ἄλλα ἐστίν."
" κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν."

SEVENTH ARGUMENT

"Let us state then how the *others* are affected 'if one is not'."
— "Yes, we should."

OTHER THAN EACH OTHER

"They must somehow be *other,* for if they were not even other, one would not be speaking of 'the others'."
— "Just so."
"But if the account is about the others, the others are different. Or do you not apply [the designations] 'other' and 'different' to the same thing?" c
— "Yes, I do."
"And don't we say that the different is somehow different from a different, and that the other is other than another?"
— "Yes."
"So if the others are to be other, there is something of which they will be other."
— "Necessarily."
"So what would that be? For they will not be other than the one, if indeed it is not."
— "No, they will not."
"So they are other than each other, since that is the only possibility left, lest they be other than nothing."
— "That's right."
"So they each are other than each other as multitudes, for they could d not be so as ones, 'if one is not'. But, as it seems, each mass of them is unlimited in multitude, and even if someone were to take what seemed to be smallest, instantly, like a dream [appears] in sleep, instead of appearing to be one it appears many, and instead of smallest it appears enormous, in relation to [any] minute bits extracted from it."
— "That is right."
"It is [only] as masses of this sort that the others would be other than each other—if they are other, and the one is not."
— "Quite so."

" οὐκοῦν πολλοὶ ὄγκοι ἔσονται, εἷς ἕκαστος φαινόμενος, ὢν δὲ οὔ, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται; "

" οὕτω."

e " καὶ ἀριθμὸς δὲ εἶναι αὐτῶν δόξει, εἴπερ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον, πολλῶν ὄντων."

" πάνυ γε."

" καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἄρτια, τὰ δὲ περιττὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὄντα οὐκ ἀληθῶς φαίνεται, εἴπερ ἓν μὴ ἔσται."

" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."

" καὶ μὴν καὶ σμικρότατόν γε, φαμέν, δόξει ἐν[129] αὐτοῖς ἐνεῖναι·[130]

165 φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ὡς σμικρῶν ὄντων."

" πῶς δ' οὔ; "

" καὶ ἴσος μὴν τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ σμικροῖς ἕκαστος ὄγκος δοξασθήσεται εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μετέβαινεν ἐκ μείζονος εἰς ἔλαττον φαινόμενος, πρὶν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ δόξειεν[131] ἐλθεῖν· τοῦτο δ' εἴη ἂν φάντασμα ἰσότητος."

" εἰκός."

" οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον ὄγκον πέρας ἔχων, αὐτός γε[132] πρὸς αὑτὸν οὔτε ἀρχὴν οὔτε πέρας οὔτε μέσον ἔχων; "

" πῇ δή; "

b " ὅτι ἀεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὥς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη ἀεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετά τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἔν τε τῷ μέσῳ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δέ, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἑνὸς αὐτῶν ἑκάστου λαμβάνεσθαι, ἅτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνός."

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129 δόξει ἐν **Heindorf**: δόξειεν BT.
130 ἐνεῖναι] ἓν εἶναι B: εἶναι T.
131 δόξειεν T: δόξειν B.
132 γε G. **Hermann**: τε BT.

DOXA

"So won't there be many masses then, each *appearing,* but not being, one, if indeed one is not to be?"
— "Just so."
"And they will seem to have [some] number, if in fact each is also one, e
though they are many."
— "Certainly."
"And some among them appear even and some odd, without truly being so, if in fact one is not to be."[133]
— "Of course."
"Furthermore, we say, a smallest, too, will seem to be among them, but this appears as a many, and [also] large in relation to each of that 165
many, because they are smaller [still]."
— "Of course."
"And each mass will be conceived to be equal to these many small things. For it could not, in appearance, shift from larger to less, before seeming to enter an in-between state, and this would be [only] a *semblance* of equality."[134]
— "That's quite likely."
"So will it not appear to have a limit in relation to another mass, while in relation to itself have neither beginning, nor limit [i.e., end], nor middle?"
— "How so?"
"Because whenever someone grasps something in thought as if it were any of these [i.e., beginning, middle, or end], before the beginning b
another beginning always appears, and after the end a different end remaining appears, and in the middle others more in the middle than the middle [appear] but smaller, because it is not possible to grasp each of these as one, since 'the one is not'."

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133 Again, Plato seems to have irrational numbers in mind.

134 Appearance vs. consistency: One must seek consistency—the mind provides consistency even where there is none. Cf. 164d: the things will appear to have number if they appear to have oneness, without actually having it. If they are many, they appear to have number; thus, they appear to be odd and even, etc. (i.e., all the mathematical rules should be applicable). Plato shows that even at the level of Doxa, rationality can be applied because of the mind's penchant for recognizing or providing patterns, to seek what is consistent. Even if things appear in a certain way—without actually being so—what *appears* can nonetheless be counted. Thus, the rules for counting will apply.

" ἀληθέστατα."
" θρύπτεσθαι δὴ,[135] οἶμαι, κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἄν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ὄγκος γάρ που ἄνευ ἑνὸς αἰεὶ[136] λαμβάνοιτ' ἄν."
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
c " οὐκοῦν τό γε τοιοῦτον πόρρωθεν μὲν ὁρῶντι καὶ ἀμβλὺ ἓν φαίνεσθαι[137] ἀνάγκη, ἐγγύθεν δὲ καὶ ὀξὺ νοοῦντι πλήθει ἄπειρον ἓν ἕκαστον φανῆναι, εἴπερ στέρεται τοῦ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος; "
" ἀναγκαιότατον μὲν οὖν."
" οὕτω δὴ ἄπειρά τε καὶ πέρας ἔχοντα καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἕκαστα τἆλλα δεῖ φαίνεσθαι, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, τἆλλα[138] δὲ τοῦ ἑνός."
" δεῖ γάρ."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅμοιά τε καὶ ἀνόμοια δόξει εἶναι; "
" πῇ δή; "
" οἷον ἐσκιαγραφημένα ἀποστάντι μὲν ἓν πάντα φαινόμενα ταὐτὸν
d φαίνεσθαι πεπονθέναι καὶ ὅμοια εἶναι."
" πάνυ γε."
" προσελθόντι δέ γε πολλὰ καὶ ἕτερα καὶ τῷ τοῦ ἑτέρου φαντάσματι ἑτεροῖα καὶ ἀνόμοια ἑαυτοῖς."
" οὕτω."
" καὶ ὁμοίους δὴ καὶ ἀνομοίους τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτούς τε ἑαυτοῖς ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀλλήλοις."
" πάνυ μὲν οὖν."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἁπτομένους καὶ χωρὶς ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κινουμένους πάσας κινήσεις καὶ ἑστῶτας πάντῃ, καὶ γιγνομένους καὶ ἀπολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα, καὶ πάντα που τὰ
e τοιαῦτα, ἃ διελθεῖν εὐπετὲς ἤδη ἡμῖν, εἰ ἑνὸς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν."
" ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν."

135 δή B: δὲ T.
136 αἰεὶ T: om. B.
137 ἓν φαίνεσθαι b: ἐμφαίνεσθαι BT.
138 τἆλλα corr. Ven. 189: ἄλλα B: ἀλλὰ T.

— "Very true."
"So every being that someone grasps in thought must, I think, be fractioned into minute bits, because without oneness, it would always somehow be grasped as a mass."
— "Certainly."
"So, if seen from afar and indistinctly, such a thing must necessarily c
appear one, but if observed from up close and grasped distinctly with one's mind, would each one necessarily seem to be unlimited in multitude, if indeed it is deprived of oneness, since 'one is not'?"
— "Most necessarily, indeed."
"Thus, the others must each appear both unlimited and as having limit, and both one and many, 'if one is not' but the 'other than the one, are'."
— "Yes, they must."
"Won't they also seem to be both like and unlike?"
— "In what way?"
"As when, to a distant viewer, all [the subjects] in a painting appearing one, seem to have the same qualifications, and [thus] to be alike." d
— "Certainly."
"But in coming closer they appear many and different, and, because of this *semblance* of difference, they [appear] different in kind and unlike themselves."
— "Just so."
"So these masses must also appear both like and unlike both themselves and each other."
— "Of course."
"Consequently, they [the masses] must appear both the same as and different from each other, both in contact with and separate from themselves, both moving in all kinds of motions and in every way at rest, both coming to be and ceasing to be and neither, and as all these kinds of things somehow—which would be easy for us to go through e
at this point—'if one is not' and 'many are'."
— "Very true indeed."

" Ἔτι δὴ ἅπαξ ἐλθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴπωμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα δὲ τοῦ ἑνός, τί χρὴ εἶναι."
" εἴπωμεν γὰρ οὖν."
" οὐκοῦν ἓν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται τἆλλα."
" πῶς γάρ; "
" οὐδὲ μὴν πολλά γε· ἐν γὰρ πολλοῖς οὖσιν ἐνείη[139] ἂν καὶ ἕν. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἕν, ἅπαντα οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἂν πολλὰ εἴη."
" ἀληθῆ."
166 " μὴ ἐνόντος δὲ ἑνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὔτε πολλὰ οὔτε ἕν ἐστι τἆλλα."
" οὐ γάρ."
" οὐδέ γε φαίνεται ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά."
" τί δή; "
" ὅτι τἆλλα τῶν μὴ ὄντων οὐδενὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὐδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδέ τι τῶν μὴ ὄντων παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῷ ἐστιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν."
" ἀληθῆ."
" οὐδ' ἄρα δόξα τοῦ μὴ ὄντος παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐστὶν οὐδέ τι φάντασμα, οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπὶ[140] τῶν ἄλλων."
" οὐ γὰρ οὖν."
b " ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δοξάζεταί τι τῶν ἄλλων ἓν εἶναι οὐδὲ πολλά· ἄνευ γὰρ ἑνὸς πολλὰ δοξάσαι ἀδύνατον."
" ἀδύνατον γάρ."
" ἓν ἄρα εἰ μὴ ἔστι, τἆλλα οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε δοξάζεται ἓν οὐδὲ πολλά."
" οὐκ ἔοικεν."
" οὐδ' ἄρα ὅμοια οὐδὲ ἀνόμοια."
" οὐ γάρ."
" οὐδὲ μὴν τὰ αὐτά γε οὐδ' ἕτερα, οὐδὲ ἁπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρίς, οὐδὲ ἄλλα ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διήλθομεν ὡς φαινόμενα αὐτά, τούτων οὔτε τι ἔστιν οὔτε φαίνεται τἆλλα, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν."

139 ἐνείη] ἓν εἴη B: εἴη T.
140 ἐπὶ **Schleiermacher**: ὑπὸ BT.

EIGHTH ARGUMENT

"Let us return once again to the beginning and state what must be the case, 'if one is not' but the 'others than the one are'."
— "Yes, let us do so."
"Well, the others will not be one."
— "Of course not."
"Nor will they be many, for if they were many, oneness would also be present in them. But if none of them is [a] one, they are all nothing, and thus they could not be many either."
— "True."
"If oneness is not present in the others, the others are neither many 166
nor one."
— "No, they are not."
"Nor do they appear one or many."
— "Why?"
"Because the others are not in communion in any way whatsoever with any of the 'things that are not'; and none of the 'things that are not' pertain to any of the others, since 'things that are not' have no share [of anything]."
— "True."
"So neither opinion nor appearance regarding 'what is not' pertains to the others; nor is 'what is not' conceived in any way whatsoever by the others."
— "Certainly not."

NO QUALIFICATIONS

"So 'if one is not', none of the others is conceived to be one or many either, since, without oneness, it is impossible to conceive of many." b
— "Yes, impossible."
"Therefore, 'if one is not', the others neither are nor are conceived to be one or many."
— "It seems not."
"So [they are] neither like nor unlike either of these."
— "No."
"Indeed, they are neither the same nor different, neither in contact nor separate, nor anything else that they appeared to be in our previous argument. The others neither are, nor appear to be, any of those things, 'if one is not'."

c " ἀληθῆ."
" οὐκοῦν καὶ συλλήβδην εἰ εἴποιμεν, ἓν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδέν ἐστιν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποιμεν; "
" παντάπασι μὲν οὖν."
" εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἓν εἴτ᾽ ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα πάντως ἐστί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ φαίνεταί τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται."
" ἀληθέστατα."

— "True." c
"In short, if we were to say, 'if one is not, nothing is', would we not be speaking correctly?"
— "Absolutely."

FINAL CONCLUSION

"Then let that be said—and also the following, namely that, as it seems, if 'one is' or if '[one] is not', [then] it and the others both are and are not, and both appear and do not appear to be all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other."
— "Very true."